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Paper 2014/636

Improved Timing Attacks on ECDSA

Vikram Singh

Abstract

We improve the timing attack on ECDSA in [1] by Brumley and Tuveri. We use the Gaussian heuristic to analyse the length of error vectors in the lattice Close Vector Problem in order to determine the problems which are theoretically solvable. Then we cost each solution using a strengthened lattice reduction algorithm and Schnorr-Euchner enumeration to determine which problems are practically solvable. The original work by Brumley and Tuveri resulted in OpenSSL's ECDSA being updated to remove the timing information they exploited, so that application is not vulnerable to our improvements. However we publish this work as a general advance in side-channel recovery techniques which may be applicable in related scenarios.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
CryptographyLatticeECDSAOpenSSLTLSSide-channelTiming AttackDigital Signature SchemeHKZ-reductionLattice Enumeration
Contact author(s)
vs77814 @ gmx com
History
2014-08-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/636
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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