

Handycipher: a Low-tech, Randomized, Symmetric-key Cryptosystem

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Abstract. Handycipher is a low-tech, randomized, symmetric-key, stream cipher, simple enough to permit pen-and-paper encrypting and decrypting of messages, while providing a significantly high level of security. It combines a simple 31-character substitution cipher with a 3,045-token nondeterministic homophonic substitution cipher, and employs the insertion of randomly chosen decoy characters at random locations in the ciphertext. A deniable encryption scheme based on the cipher is described, as well as a way of extending the cipher by using randomly generated session keys.

1 Introduction

For several thousand years cryptography was concerned largely with developing various kinds of substitution and transposition ciphers which, through sharing a manageably sized secret key, permitted easy encryption and decryption of messages using nothing more than pen and paper. This has all changed, of course, within our lifetime and now with public key cryptosystems, employing massively powerful computers, so-called hand ciphers are for the most part interesting only to historians and hobbyists.

Yet one can conceive of circumstances in which a highly secure pen-and-paper cipher would be invaluable; for example, someone needing to send or receive a secret message might not have access to a secure computer, or might need to refrain from using one to avoid arousing suspicion that messages are being exchanged secretly. Indeed, Bruce Schneier, a cryptographer and fellow at Harvard's Berkman Center, designed the Solitaire cipher[9] used in the novel *Cryptonomicon* for such a scenario.

Moreover, apart from any consideration of potential real-world applications, it is an interesting challenge to explore how much security against a large-scale computer-based cryptanalytic attack can be achieved using nothing more than a few hours of effort with pen and paper. The problem of designing such a cipher has received little attention in the recent cryptographic literature, and Schneier's Solitaire is widely regarded as the best serious attempt to deal effectively with this problem yet to have been devised. In this paper we describe a cipher which compares favorably in that it is a good deal easier to implement by hand, is less subject to error propagation, and needs no additional equipment besides pen and paper (unlike Solitaire which requires an ordered deck of cards).

In a seminal 1949 paper which heralded the emergence of modern cryptography, Shannon [10] observed:

... we can frame a test of ciphers which might be called the acid test. It applies only to ciphers with a small key (less than, say, 50 decimal digits), applied to natural languages, and not using the ideal method of gaining secrecy. The acid test is this: How difficult is it to determine the key or a part of the key knowing a small sample of message and corresponding cryptogram? ... Note that the requirement of difficult solution under these conditions is not, by itself, contradictory to the requirements that enciphering and deciphering be simple processes.

In this spirit, then, the cipher described in this paper is proposed as a candidate for a modern formulation of Shannon's acid test. Using a relatively small key (16 decimal digits more than Shannon's suggestion but still 36 bits less than the Advanced Encryption Standard 256-bit key size), Handycipher incorporates a nondeterministic encryption procedure along the lines described by Rivest and Sherman[8], and employs multiple encryption as suggested by Merkle and Hellman[5]. Combining a simple 31-character substitution cipher with a 3,045-token nondeterministic homophonic substitution cipher results in a novel system which, while easy to implement by hand, confers enough complexity to the relationship between ciphertext and plaintext and that between ciphertext and key to achieve a significant level of computational security against both statistical analysis and known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext attack models.

The basic approach of the cipher is to take each plaintext character, convert it to a key-defined pattern of length five and, using this pattern as a template with one to five holes, select certain ciphertext characters from a 5 x 5 key-defined grid.

2 The Core-cipher

Handycipher is based on a core-cipher which operates on plaintext strings over the 31-character alphabet A comprising the 26 uppercase letters $\{A-Z\}$ together with the five symbols $\{, . - ? \hat{\ } \}$, and generates ciphertext strings over the 50-character alphabet A' comprising the 50 uppercase and lowercase letters $\{A-Y\}$ and $\{a-y\}$. Some permutation of these 50 characters plus the space symbol $\hat{\ }$ is chosen as a secret shared 51-character key K , as for example:

$$K = \text{QjufGCtwbUSNLqHAgVDOoansIhyBKJWFdxvPk}\hat{\text{peXMTlirYRmcE}}$$

The 50 non-space characters of K (i.e., all but $\hat{\ }$) are displayed as a 5 x 10 table T_K by writing successive groups of ten characters into the five rows of the table, as, continuing with the example:

$$T_K =$$

Q	j	u	f	G	C	t	w	b	U
S	N	L	q	H	A	g	V	D	O
o	a	n	s	I	h	y	B	K	J
W	F	d	x	v	P	k	p	e	X
M	T	l	i	r	Y	R	m	c	E

A 31-plaintext-character sub-key \bar{K} is derived from K by omitting the 20 lowercase letters {f-y} and substituting {Z , . ? -} for the letters {a b c d e}, respectively

$$\bar{K} = \text{QGC,USNLHAVDOZIBKJWF?P^-XMTYR.E}$$

and is displayed as a substitution table, $\xi_{\bar{K}}$

$$\xi_{\bar{K}}: \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z , . - ? ^} \\ 10 16 3 12 31 20 2 9 15 18 17 8 26 7 13 22 1 29 6 27 5 11 19 25 28 14 4 30 24 21 23 \end{array} \right.$$

Then, simply by referring to T_K and $\xi_{\bar{K}}$, plaintext characters are encrypted into k-tuples of ciphertext characters by means of the following scheme:

Regarding the first five columns of T_K as a 5×5 matrix comprising five rows, five columns, and ten diagonals¹, each plaintext character m is encrypted by first expressing $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)$ as a five digit binary number $b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5$ and by using the position of the 1's in this number as a pattern, associating the plaintext character m with a subset of the ciphertext characters comprising a randomly chosen row, column, or diagonal. Then a randomly chosen permutation of that subset is taken as the corresponding k-tuple of ciphertext characters.

For example, the plaintext character ? occupying position 21 = 10101 is encrypted into one of the six permutations of one of the twenty 3-tuples

QuG SLH onI Wdv Mlr QoM jaT unl fsi GIr
Qnr jsM uIT fol Gai QsT jIl uoi far GnM

whereas the plaintext character A occupying position 10 = 01010 is encrypted into one of the two permutations of one of the twenty 2-tuples

jf Nq as Fx Ti SW NF Ld qx Hv
Nx Lv qW HF Sd Hd Sx Nv LW qF

This roughly sketched scheme is now defined more precisely as follows. A plaintext message M is encrypted into a ciphertext cryptogram C using a 51-character key K by means of the encryption algorithm E defined as:

¹ The diagonals are extended by “wrapping” around the edges

Core-cipher Encryption Algorithm: $C \leftarrow E(K, M)$

First, omitting the remaining 50 characters of K are displayed as a 5×10 **key-table** T_K by writing successive groups of ten characters into the five rows of the table.

The first five columns of T_K comprise a 5×5 **key-matrix** M_K and the rows, columns, and diagonals of M_K are designated $R_1 - R_5, C_1 - C_5$, and $D_1 - D_{10}$, respectively. We refer to them collectively as **lines**, and call two or more characters **colinear** if they lie in the same line. The 25 characters comprising columns $C_6 - C_{10}$ are said to be **null characters**.

Also, a 31-character plaintext sub-key \bar{K} is derived from K by omitting the 20 lowercase letters $\{\mathbf{f-y}\}$ and substituting $\{\mathbf{Z, ., ?, -}\}$ for the letters $\{\mathbf{a, b, c, d, e}\}$ respectively, and a simple (numerical coding) substitution $\xi_{\bar{K}}$ is applied, transforming each character m of M into the number $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)$ representing its position in \bar{K} (i.e., if $\bar{K} = p_1p_2 \dots p_{31}$ then $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m) = i$ where $m = p_i$).

Then the following four steps are applied in turn to each character m of M .

- (1) A random choice is made (with equal probability of each of the 20 possible rows, columns or diagonals) between:
 - (1.1) **Column-encryption:** One of the five columns in M_K , say C_j , is randomly chosen (with equal probability),
or
 - (1.2) **Row-encryption:** One of the five rows in M_K , say R_j , is randomly chosen (with equal probability) subject to the following three restrictions, where \hat{m} denotes the character immediately following m in M :
 - (1.2.1) $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m) \neq 1, 2, 4, 8, \text{ or } 16$, and
 - (1.2.2) $\xi_{\bar{K}}(\hat{m}) \neq 2^{5-j}$, if the position of the character \hat{m} in M is an odd number, and
 - (1.2.3) $\xi_{\bar{K}}(\hat{m}) \neq 2^{j-1}$, if the position of the character \hat{m} in M is an even number.
or
 - (1.3) **Diagonal-encryption:** One of the ten diagonals in M_K , say D_j , is randomly chosen (with equal probability) subject to the restriction that $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m) \neq 1, 2, 4, 8, \text{ or } 16$.
- (2) $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)$ is expressed as a five digit binary number, $b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5$, and if the position of the character m in M is an odd number, then
 - (2.1) If 1.1 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the i -th element of C_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising C_j , or
 - (2.2) If 1.2 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the i -th element of R_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising R_j , or
 - (2.3) If 1.3 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the i -th element of D_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising D_j .

But if the position of the character m in M is an even number, then

- (2.4) If 1.1 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the $(6 - i)$ -th element of C_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising C_j , or
- (2.5) If 1.2 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the $(6 - i)$ -th element of R_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising R_j , or
- (2.6) If 1.3 was chosen in step 1, then for each i such that $b_i = 1$, the $(6 - i)$ -th element of D_j is chosen, yielding a subset of the five characters comprising D_j .

(Thus for each successive plaintext character the process alternates between reading rows left-to-right or right-to-left and between reading columns and diagonals top-down or bottom-up.)

- (3) The elements of the subset specified in step 2 are concatenated in a randomly chosen order. If this string, composed of 1 to 5 ciphertext characters, satisfies both of the following two restrictions, where \bar{m} denotes the character immediately preceding m in M , then it is taken as $\sigma(m)$. Otherwise, step 1 is restarted.²
 - (3.1) The first character of $\sigma(m)$ must not lie in the line used to encrypt \bar{m} , and
 - (3.2) The first character of $\sigma(m)$ must be colinear with the last character of $\sigma(\bar{m})$, unless $\xi_{\bar{K}}(\bar{m}) = 1, 2, 4, 8, \text{ or } 16$ in which case the first character of $\sigma(m)$ must be non-colinear with the single character of $\sigma(\bar{m})$.
- (4) So-called **noise characters** are randomly inserted into each $\sigma(m)$ produced in step 3 in the following manner: following each character of $\sigma(m)$ except the first, any one of the eight characters non-colinear with that character³ may optionally be inserted (i.e., one such character may or may not be inserted).

Finally, the strings produced in step 4 for each character of M are concatenated forming C .

As a result of the restrictions contained in steps 1 and 3, the resulting ciphertext cryptogram C , consisting of the string $\sigma(m_1)\sigma(m_2)\sigma(m_3)\dots$ can be unambiguously decrypted into the plaintext message $M = m_1m_2m_3\dots$ by means of the decryption algorithm D defined as follows:

² It's fairly straightforward to show that some combination of choices made in steps 1 and 3 satisfying all restrictions must exist unless $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m) \cdot \xi_{\bar{K}}(\bar{m}) = 16$ for two consecutive plaintext characters, which would require the two consecutive ciphertext characters to lie in the same row. Accordingly, for each key there will be five bigrams which cannot be encrypted by the algorithm; such bigrams can be handled by hyphenating them. (See Appendix 1.)

³ See implementation note 10.3

Core-cipher Decryption Algorithm: $M \Leftarrow D(K, C)$

C is divided into contiguous groups of characters, proceeding from left to right, discarding noise characters, at each stage grouping as large an initial segment of the remaining ciphertext as possible composed of mutually colinear characters of M_K , then inverting the association between binary numbers and subsets of column, row, or diagonal elements invoked in step 2 of the encryption algorithm, and finally decoding that number by inverting the substitution $\xi_{\bar{K}}$.

Thus each plaintext character m is encrypted by randomly choosing a line of the key-matrix M_K and representing that character's numerical code $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)$ by an n -tuple $\sigma(m)$ of characters lying in the chosen line, but the randomly chosen line is required to be a column in case $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m) = 1, 2, 4, 8, \text{ or } 16$. So that in decryption it will be possible to tell where one encrypted character ends and the next begins, $\sigma(m)$ is not allowed to begin with any character lying in the line chosen for $\sigma(\bar{m})$. Noise characters are recognizable because although they lie outside of the line determined by the first two characters of the $\sigma(m)$ being decrypted, being non-colinear with the previous character, they cannot be the beginning of the next encrypted character.

3 Example Encryption With the Core-cipher

Using the key-table T_K from Section 2:

$$T_K =$$

Q	j	u	f	G	C	t	w	b	U
S	N	L	q	H	A	g	V	D	O
o	a	n	s	I	h	y	B	K	J
W	F	d	x	v	P	k	p	e	X
M	T	l	i	r	Y	R	m	c	E

and its associated substitution table, ξ_K :

$$\xi_{\bar{K}}: \begin{cases} \text{A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z , . - ? ^} \\ 10 16 3 12 31 20 2 9 15 18 17 8 26 7 13 22 1 29 6 27 5 11 19 25 28 14 4 30 24 21 23 \end{cases}$$

the plaintext CATS AND DOGS could be encrypted as follows:⁴

⁴ In the third column $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)$ is expressed in binary; in the fourth column the row, column, or diagonal chosen in Step 1 is indicated.

\underline{m}	$\underline{\xi_{\bar{K}}(m)}$		$\underline{C/R/D}$	$\underline{\sigma(m)}$	$\underline{\sigma(m)+noise}$
C	3	00011	R5	ri	rin
A	10	01010	R2	qN	qN
T	27	11011	R4	xFvW	xFvqW
S	6	00110	C3	Ln	Ln
^	23	10111	D10	GnMF	GnMF
A	10	01010	D1	Nx	Nx
N	7	00111	D6	sdT	sdT
D	12	01100	C2	Fa	Fa
^	23	10111	D4	oFfl	oFLfNl
D	12	01100	C4	xs	xs
O	13	01101	D1	nNr	nNr
G	2	00010	C3	L	L
S	6	00110	C2	Fa	Fa

yielding the ciphertext:

rinqNxFvaWLnGnMFNxsdTFaoFLfNlxsNnRlFa

This ciphertext would be decrypted by scanning it from left to right, deleting noise characters, and dividing it, according to the table T_K , into its constituent k-tuples and then finding each group's associated binary number, converting to decimal, and decoding by inverting the substitution ξ_K

$$\xi_{\bar{K}}^{-1}: \begin{cases} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 18 & 19 & 20 & 21 & 22 & 23 & 24 & 25 & 26 & 27 & 28 & 29 & 30 & 31 \\ \text{Q} & \text{G} & \text{C} & , & \text{U} & \text{S} & \text{N} & \text{L} & \text{H} & \text{A} & \text{V} & \text{D} & \text{O} & \text{Z} & \text{I} & \text{B} & \text{K} & \text{J} & \text{W} & \text{F} & ? & \text{P} & \text{^} & - & \text{X} & \text{M} & \text{T} & \text{Y} & \text{R} & . & \text{E} \end{cases}$$

Thus, **rin** is recognized as the bigram **ri** because **n** is non-colinear with **i** (and so is a noise character) while the following **q** is colinear with **i** but lies outside the line determined by **ri**, and **ri** is associated with $00011 = 3$ which is decoded as **C**. Then **qN** is recognized as the bigram **qN** because the following **x** is colinear with **N** but lies outside the line determined by **qN**, and **qN** is associated with $01010 = 10$ which is decoded as **A**. Then **xFvqW** is recognized as the 4-tuple **xFvW** because **q** is non-colinear with **v** (and so is a noise character) while the following **L** is colinear with **W** but lies outside the line determined by **xFvW**, and **xFvW** is associated with $11011 = 27$ which is decoded as **T**, and so forth.

For a slightly larger example consider the 229-character plaintext:

IT HAUNTS ME, THE PASSAGE OF TIME. I THINK TIME IS A MERCILESS THING. I THINK LIFE
IS A PROCESS OF BURNING ONESELF OUT AND TIME IS THE FIRE THAT BURNS YOU. BUT I
THINK THE SPIRIT OF MAN IS A GOOD ADVERSARY. -- TENNESSEE WILLIAMS⁵

which can be encrypted by the Core-cipher as, for example, this 873-character ciphertext:

⁵ where ^ characters have been replaced by spaces for legibility.

isWxq LfdWr lMriH udfTi aGnld HSNqx soHlf LWflr MiTSs FdIvW MSWQf xWoTQ SnMTs rQLHL
 STqFN nFNlf jSriT MlouM iFNnN rTaGQ fuFiq xGfrN fxnsa HIFSW lMoGQ LGjqv fiGad ILjvs
 ndflQ uWust nqMLu dMLnx sNiMQ LGuSQ fLMuv jqlFo HqxiM FGnfq lNjaT MLvsI qFGLM nvasi
 adGrT invNu MoTiT jWaFv iLGqd FnLQu Gsfja FnaHi sfxGW fLIrl SdHjQ saFTq dunLH follL
 Qdnan oIxrN Qjxuf nMqSI jflqr fLaSs aoGnQ ondLG ulIxj lauIL Wqsdu Lolnj qNiqs fliMo
 uxivL lNMT H TdfsQ NLvsT qluiS anMos FnIlv dGniM Fdxvo WQISa WrNsv jMnGF iWoMN lusLQ
 ndFnf NvnoG iLuLT IoWMu QjsWv HLdHQ aTxuf SGsQH Fxsio WFofl GxrNQ TdHas iSdru laLGN
 dMaiQ SnGnl dLaSQ Gurfl LuHdG jMLsv joxdW svITN xnrGu fQWSM ojQnG TqMSM WjQjx vNTir
 oMnMF GinrT aFsjM vfsro Hvdfx WfGuM NLFHo uFQWS oIjlg SQafl xHSJa fruLH qLNif qsQNx
 rGdFN alTho fulHT QsMvL jFfaG SiFdu jQiGa dsiqS xGILQ iaGdL WlraI soaid IaqGn dufoQ
 ujiGd QFHvN xilSt sSQHo WSMdq lSqHn LvNqr nxqas ifoqF inaGj oQiuN qxdLd lTiQr lMLNS
 HsqNv xsfiQ lTvML svMdr xQInj oSQMq fdrWu GfQLT riQMj aNFFT uNons Iqisx fWaTl xvdfF
 WnflH oFMru ilSGi vsMHL WNsDQ HqNFM qWI

parsed as:

I T ^ H A U N T S ^ M E , ^ T H
 isWxq LfdWr lMriH udf Ti aG nld HSNq xs oHlf LWf lrMiTS s FdIvW MSWQ fx

E ^ P A S S A G E ^ O F ^ T I
 WoTQSnM TsrQLH LSTq FN nF NL fj S riTml ouMiFN nNr Ta GQfuF iqxGf rNfxn

M E . ^ I ^ T H I N K ^
 saHIF SWlMoGQL Gjquf iGadI Ljvs ndflQu Wustnq ML udMLn xsNi MQL GuSQf

T I M E ^ I S ^ A ^ M E R
 LMuvjq lFoH qxi MFGnfql NjaT MLvs Iq FGLMnv as iadG rTin vNuMoTi TjWaF

C I L E S S ^ T H I N G . ^ I
 viL GqdFn L QuGsfj aF naH isfxG WfLIr lS dHjQs aFT q dunL Hfol lLQdn

^ T H I N K ^ L I F E ^ I S ^
 anoI xrNQ jxu FnMq SIj flq rfLa S saoGn Qo ndLGul Ixjla uILWq sd uLolnj

A ^ P R O C E S S ^ O F ^ B U R N
 qN iqsF liM ouxiv Lln MT HTdfsQ NL vs TqIu iSa nM osFnI l vd GniMF dxv

I N G ^ O N E S E L F ^ O U
 oWQIS aWr N svjM nGFi WoMN lusLQnd Fnf NvnoGiLu L TI oWMuQ jsWv HL

T ^ A N D ^ T I M E ^ I S
 dHQaTx ufSGsQ HF xsi oW FoflG xrNQ TdHas iSdr ulaLGndM aiQSnG nldL aS

^ T H E ^ F I R E ^ T H A T
 QGurf lLuHd Gj MLsvjo xdWsv IT Nxnr GufQ WSMojQ nGTqM SMWjQ jx vN TiroM

^ B U R N S ^ Y O U . ^ B U T
 nMFG i nr TaFsj Mvfsr oH vdfxW fGuM NLFH ouF QWSo IjlgS Q af lxHSj

^ I ^ T H I N K ^ T H E ^ S P
 afruL HqLN ifqs QNxr Gd FNalT Hof ul HTQs MvLj Ff aGsiFd ujQiG ad siq


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I      R      I      T      ^      O      F      ^      M      A      N      ^      I      S
SxGI1Q iaGd LWlra Isoa idIaqG ndu fo QujiG dQFH vN xiIs TsSQH oWSMd qI

^      A      ^      G      O      O      D      ^      A      D      V      E      R      S      A      R
SqHnL vN QrnX q aSi foqFi na GjoQiu Nq xd Ldl TiQr1M LNSH sq Nv xsfiQ

Y      .      ^      ^      -      -      ^      T      E      N      N      E      S      S
lTvM LsvMd rxQInj oSQM qfd rW uGfQL TriQM jaNfFT uNo nsI qisxf Wa Tl

E      E      ^      W      I      L      L      I      A      M      S
xvdfFWn flHoF Mruil SGi vsMHL W N sdQH qN FMq WI

```

4 Handycipher

While the Core-cipher itself has proven to be remarkably robust when encrypting relatively short plaintexts (less than a few hundred characters), with increasing message length it becomes more vulnerable to statistically based hill-climbing attacks along the lines described by Dhavare, et al.[4] even though the random insertion of noise characters is designed to interfere with such attacks. Therefore Handycipher is further strengthened by randomly salting the ciphertext with additional decoys chosen from the 25 null characters of columns C_6 – C_{10} of the key-matrix.

After a message has been encrypted by the Core-cipher using the key K into a ciphertext C' (composed of non-nulls), a slightly longer string N of nulls is generated by randomly choosing from K 's 25 nulls, and then N is randomly interleaved with C' by means of the following procedure.

Salting Algorithm: $R \leftarrow \text{salt}(S, T)$

Given two strings $S = s_1s_2\dots s_{|S|}$ and $T = t_1t_2\dots t_{|T|}$, S is said to be salted with T by randomly interleaving the two strings, resulting in a string $R = r_1r_2\dots r_{|R|}$ constructed by the following process, which is designed to incorporate all of S while randomly interleaving successive characters of T (repeating from the beginning of T in case the end of T is reached before S is exhausted).

```

i ← 0    j ← 0    k ← 0
WHILE j ≤ |S|
  flip a fair coin
  IF heads
    increment i
    increment j
    IF j ≤ |S|
      ri ← sj
    ENDIF
  ELSE
    increment i
    increment k
    ri ← tk
    IF k = |T|
      k ← 0      (Issue a warning that T should be made longer.)
    ENDIF
  ENDIF
ENDWHILE

```

So that the interleaved null characters will statistically resemble the non-nulls, they are chosen in a manner designed to make close repetition of identical nulls unlikely. To accomplish all of this, Handycipher is defined as the following extension of the Core-cipher:

Handycipher Encryption Algorithm: $C \leftarrow E^\dagger(K, M)$

1. $C' \leftarrow E(K, M)$
2. Generate a somewhat longer string N of nulls⁶ by sequentially choosing nulls at random from the set of 25, but potentially rejecting each choice with probability $(6 - k)/5$ if that choice would duplicate the k th previous choice, for $1 \leq k \leq 5$.⁷
3. $C \leftarrow \text{salt}(C', N)$

and the corresponding decryption is simply accomplished as:

⁶ The exact number of nulls called for by the salting algorithm will depend on K , M , and C' but typically will not exceed the length of C' by more than 16%. In case N is too short, the algorithm will recycle it from the beginning (which introduces a vulnerability) and issue a warning but, of course, when encrypting by hand the required nulls can be selected as needed rather than in advance as the null-string N .

⁷ This leads to 100% rejection at $k = 1$ (i.e., consecutive identical nulls are not allowed) and lessens the probability of identical nulls occurring close to each other in N .

Handycipher Decryption Algorithm: $M \Leftarrow D^\dagger(K, C)$

This algorithm is identical to the Core-cipher decryption algorithm except that the phrase *proceeding from left to right* is amended to read *proceeding from left to right and omitting null characters*.

5 Complementary Keys

Regarding the last five columns of the 5×10 key-table T_K as a 5×5 **null-matrix** N_K we can write $T_K = M_K N_K$ where M_K is composed of the non-nulls and N_K is composed of the nulls. If for two keys $K1$ and $K2$, M_{K2} is some permutation of N_{K1} and N_{K2} is some permutation of M_{K1} (i.e., each key's nulls are the other's non-nulls) we can call these two keys **complementary**. So for any given key there are $5! \cdot (25!)^2 \approx 1.23 \cdot 10^{52}$ complementary keys.

If $C1 \Leftarrow E(K1, M1)$ and $C2 \Leftarrow E(K2, M2)$ are Core-cipher encryptions of two messages $M1$ and $M2$ using complementary keys $K1$ and $K2$, respectively, then $C1$ and $C2$ will each consist entirely of nulls if decrypted by D^\dagger using the wrong key. This leads to several interesting consequences. If the characters of $C1$ and $C2$ are randomly interleaved then the resulting string C will be decrypted by D^\dagger to $M1$ using the key $K1$ but decrypted to $M2$ using the key $K2$; i.e., $M1 \Leftarrow D^\dagger(K1, C)$ and $M2 \Leftarrow D^\dagger(K2, C)$.

As an amusing example, taking the previous example key as $K1$:

$K1 = \text{QjufGCtwbUSNLqHAgVDOoansIhyBKJWFdxvPk^peXMTlirYRmcE}$

with key-table:

$$T_{K1} =$$

Q	j	u	f	G	C	t	w	b	U
S	N	L	q	H	A	g	V	D	O
o	a	n	s	I	h	y	B	K	J
W	F	d	x	v	P	k	p	e	X
M	T	l	i	r	Y	R	m	c	E

and taking a randomly constructed complementary key as $K2$:

$K2 = \text{eUmDpQnTrsbRCJwIdioxEkXOfjHLvPgVtBaS^G1FKcAYyMuWqN}$

with key-table:

$$T_{K2} =$$

e	U	m	D	p	Q	n	T	r	s
b	R	C	J	w	I	d	i	o	x
h	E	k	X	O	f	j	H	L	v
P	g	V	t	B	a	S	G	l	f
K	c	A	Y	y	M	u	W	q	N

the following ciphertext, created by such a random interleaving of two Core-cipher encryptions:

```
isAhR BWxqT ehmPb qkoYI NEpKY AVwuQ hxDAr jWSKh rdabM AOBUI XsChV dgEu0 klnjK cgLVt
kKdHq DgBoS XkKrL jpUED hIgUS xKAlG nhdPM HbqYv LmSWi qsnhR uCHJL mFqBi xwsDF dgOMl
TNATj UYabV LtvUO ohSxf ekVAi QCEsT idxoV kWetv jAVQS Fjdka omPMX ilwne hOkER MKPhR
FSJXJ GjYTD BxtAm NFMSC ekHdp fVEye VSlwR Nyejx Gkstf JiqLX OUASX WsLgM FhNDi ctGbA
TdSUK cTYoy ACDUH Egshf imAxw gvHkg hBmEJ utXHo DEndj klStQ BMPfV yoNmE raWLx XfkCh
XOdUc FipEO JMXkh KCUXG MFndu RCYUC BJKnH YWGBC UgSVc KqGEW BMhmf FmJtY NXwVS HPLGV
lkyfR oGHrx tNSBV xNgks QHmaA TdCaF Rgfqi EhYsm ULvHs cECQF uJcJT QyHAJ sMSUa KBCPh
KbLoe fcWqd IVxnc wRjEX lYixi NcuAK yLlFe DNwMt aQjbx vAdUC KUBJh waDCS iGjRw byhPp
fxcmE OLiJS GTaPN emvcO mkOEn PHyff DEbeA uluiL vnhXo lCMEP iBdlN QNiSG Patdh gQTsG
HIVAs cgDah nNySu LbHvc XeVdx saiwx afbNe tRlBV nPcWX uCVsY LncFy MKjLA JgXsK bSOTA
dCPlj hxbIK eugPG VjLjr XeMnk hANVC akQTs dEPWt PVLsL FKHqm OkFft aReTN WnwGU VCDNT
gFANh lkRjs GFtiM nevac OAcMj FouGk qMndV IcjNE xNUsp mxCjU BKAcY uYfKd GexbQ SQpoq
adgkq ABGiC DgAVn vogSJ YXKwd vgjaD JXVRv ngKsl PoSmo hFYVk fHoTS mJCRm sJwHv iCLuo
lFRgq VctHY ECXhk KLGsJ kglGQ VcfPV IjqAO utbLK CaXtD iCTXB txbPl kEVrv PBhsg dulnL
DNajU cqTWE MShOX EQPsg UEgoJ tlyMr TioND uiEqC dSyMr PHDUr RdhTm BQpoY hPKXC GnfBq
MQYpw iVXve hRouN xknmU DgrXl BHhaF AwcoO mfqek CWVfH AlFmR tTHyo MdkQe SVLYW frvuR
jLEic edxgr SyCDO gKEHN VLSpI GgstD VPcyS KYHDC ESUn tqVrc LdvGE kyWem PFxnU IOhso
jaLeq vnWEI bTLPC JRPuU GupMN DleMq OhaNS VfYEd kJGiS PtLar fVWML bYEir xrVCP KACBN
KXhbK AGnVm aNjJC rmCxu AVXJT DxIpD cqhFH DLnAk euqIt DXOkN EwlXe SDpUO AjIan YiFJX
NPkny ldHtf sJcDt KygAm SHkpS EQQCV kJogF IuqkT HTnsd oKpPw RCLKh jsQXB GuFCJ uOdiJ
tGRSh qBYij dAKCL PlNyD ugERm nkAhP Mbjmw DvAhJ EsiUc nVIFa opuGL bfjHQ aHNqa SLiWS
oTnQi rxNTN GaFL
```

is decrypted using $K1$ as:

```
I WANDERED LONELY AS A CLOUD THAT FLOATS ON HIGH O-ER VALES AND HILLS, WHEN ALL AT
ONCE I SAW A CROWD, A HOST, OF GOLDEN DAFFODILS - BESIDE THE LAKE, BENEATH THE
TREES, FLUTTERING AND DANCING IN THE BREEZE.
```

but the same ciphertext when decrypted using $K2$ yields:

```
THIS IS THE FOREST PRIMEVAL. THE MURMURING PINES AND THE HEMLOCKS, BEARDED WITH
MOSS, AND IN GARMENTS GREEN, INDISTINCT IN THE TWILIGHT, STAND LIKE DRUIDS OF ELD,
WITH VOICES SAD AND PROPHEIC, STAND LIKE HARPERS HOAR, WITH BEARDS THAT REST ON
THEIR BOSOMS.
```

Another consequence of the interrelationship between complementary keys is the possibility of using such a key pair with the Core-cipher instead of randomly generating the null characters called for in the Handycipher encryption algorithm. This can be accomplished

by using a complementary key pair $K1$ and $K2$ to encrypt a message M in the following way.

First split M into two parts, $M1$ and $M2$, and encrypt each with the Core-cipher using $K1$ and $K2$, generating ciphertexts $C1$ and $C2$ respectively. Then randomly salt $C1$ with $C2$ with the salting procedure as $C \leftarrow \text{salt}(C1, C2)$ and take the resulting character string C as the encryption of M . In essence, C is the string that would result if $M1$ were to be encrypted with Handycipher using $K1$, but using $C2$ in place of the random string of nulls generated in Step 2 of the encryption algorithm, and likewise for $C2$ and $K2$, *mutatis mutandis*. Now C will be decrypted to $M1$ by Handycipher using $K1$, and to $M2$ using $K2$, and then joining $M1$ and $M2$ will yield M .

A slight complication arises because, due to the random nature of the salting algorithm, one cannot predict how much of $C2$ will actually be used in salting $C1$. If $C2$ is too long and not entirely consumed in salting $C1$, then some of $M2$ will be lost in decryption; if $C2$ is too short then additional $K1$ -nulls will have to be spliced on at its end, which will be decrypted as gibberish added at the end of $M2$. Therefore, by the choice of where to split M and by adjusting the amount of noise inserted in the two Core-cipher encryptions, the length of $C2$ should first be arranged not to exceed 84% of $C1$'s length, and then it should be lengthened by adding enough randomly chosen $K1$ -nulls to make it at least 16% longer than $C1$. Also, some distinctive marker such as "FINIS" should be added at the end of $M2$ to demarcate unambiguously the beginning of the added gibberish.

Modifying the Handycipher encryption algorithm in this way has two beneficial effects (although at the cost of requiring two 51-character keys instead of one): first, it reduces the cipher's expansion factor by requiring many fewer nulls to be inserted than would otherwise be in Step 2, and second, it avoids the potential vulnerability caused by the nulls (distributed evenly in terms of aggregate numbers) tending towards their expected frequency value, while the non-nulls diverge from their expected value to a statistically significant degree.

Encrypting the 229-character Williams quote example from Section 3 in this way, using the same two complementary keys, yields the following 885-character ciphertext:

```

islxq LfWir GQfTu WurdH onWlI xQxNr Wofiq sLdou vsFjM dLalI jSWSM QudSd Gaviu oNifx
sdLWo Fdsal TajiN MFluL QnIqT aisIn orudL lMwno SxS1L ldniu xolsH FdiaG Tvoun QoxWM
alLus diSoS WsQuG fljQx Mnrfl Wrxqo isLdl xrjQn NjuQF GilTv rjHsf odFlx FarfM WGxrN
TMir1 xQnrq ldQfj uLQSo MWqLj uivQo uqxif TLMoa srnxd vLGFu qnIan oLFTa NQjGN uWMQ1
SjFld NlnGn qiulL nuHqa GdoSQ ulSIj xQuGs fnWoS QsnLf arvNa jNTMi ljFaT GsLMS juIwn
qTHsF IWNMq Gnjom SIlnO IsiIn MFGLn xvndu ovNri lSfis rxvoL ufGul SIxja WoMds QWHLo
lqjxI lsFnS GaTWx FLvuQ fvGFx ldnov xrQnW GfjQJ tPyhD EXCEk OBRcX meEKA EYXDc hKtPb
VEK0m PYgKw PbCRb UmkKm JcOUR EgwGA DUXED PpcmJ tCmkg pkKtJ cXPec tekha gRhBE CtPgX
AObeP kKJyE OAbJP bOGAm pEgBR AUXER JwbCm AECJc pOhAk eYthR JOykb REcCU YOHR whDCP
hmpkg VEJbc CUECy YXgJD hOXEB DmpeU CREPC XKDUy mPOUg bRcAY KXKCO UAYce gRyPO AbKeY
bPpcK pVtVE cgkAJ mUGRc OJmUm ewVcp PtVyB YgEKc DVptD hbEJh bKePt OUVba hPEDy OhykY
CRmDc tVPJO PcBEX KmWVO YJtDe mDpkO hPcRB UBXPc KgtYK AXtmy bJVeh YtBPU gymJC YCDtE
ghpRJ cAKep XOGmV BAYUm EkhWx bchPt KYbhk tVDac ytKJP

```

which is decrypted by the first key as

IT HAUNTS ME, THE PASSAGE OF TIME. I THINK TIME IS A MERCILESS THING. I THINK LIFE
IS A PROCESS OF BURNING ONESELF OUT AND T

and by the second as

IME IS THE FIRE THAT BURNS YOU. BUT I THINK THE SPIRIT OF MAN IS A GOOD ADVERSARY.
-- TENNESSEE WILLIAMSFINISU--JDBIJ,IYPQVC,-Y^VVZEXCJ

Thus dividing the plaintext into two parts and using complementary Core-cipher encryptions of each in place of random null-strings for the other, yields a ciphertext only 12 characters longer than the 873-character core-cipher encryption of the same plaintext in Section 3, yet with no less security than that achieved by a full Handycipher encryption which would require more than 1,600 characters.

6 Deniable Encryption

The ploy, considered in the previous section, of using a pair of complementary keys and randomly interspersing the two ciphertexts produced by encrypting a different message with each key can be exploited to achieve a deniable encryption scheme as defined by Canetti, et. al.[1]

Consider a situation in which the transmission of encrypted messages is intercepted by an adversary who can later ask the sender to reveal the random choices (and also the secret key, if one exists) used in generating the ciphertext, thereby exposing the cleartext. An encryption scheme is deniable if the sender can generate ‘fake random choices’ that will make the ciphertext ‘look like’ an encryption of a different cleartext, thus keeping the real cleartext private.

A deniable encryption scheme can be based on Handycipher in the following way. Let us suppose that $M2$ is a real message to be encrypted as a ciphertext C , using a real secret shared key $K2$. However, in case an adversary might be able to intercept C and force the sender (or the recipient) to reveal both message and key, it would be desirable to be able to provide an “innocent” fake message $M1$ and fake key $K1$ such that $M1$ would also be encrypted as the same ciphertext C , using the fake secret shared key $K1$.

To accomplish this a key complementary to $K2$ is randomly chosen as $K1$, and each message is Core-cipher encrypted using the corresponding key. I.e.,
 $C1 \leftarrow E(M1, K1)$ and $C2 \leftarrow E(M2, K2)$.

Then the characters of $C1$ and $C2$ are randomly interleaved by salting $C1$ with $C2$,
 $C \leftarrow salt(C1, C2)$

and C will be decrypted as the real message by Handycipher using the real key, but decrypted as the fake message using the fake key. I.e.,

$M2 \leftarrow D^\dagger(C, K2)$ and $M1 \leftarrow D^\dagger(C, K1)$.

Of course, the same concerns about adjusting the relative lengths of $C1$ and $C2$ considered in Section 5 apply here as well, so that the Core-cipher encryption of the fake message

must be salted with that of the real message to which enough fake key nulls have been added.

It should be noted that disclosing the fake key would reveal the null set of the real key so that all the real-key nulls could then be dropped from the ciphertext, reducing the security of the real encryption to that afforded by the core-cipher alone.

7 Extended Handycipher

Extended Handycipher operates with the same plaintext and ciphertext alphabets, and encrypts a message M using a key K by first generating a random session key K' , and encrypting M with Handycipher using K' to produce an intermediate ciphertext C' . K' is then encrypted with Handycipher using K , and then embedded in C' at a location based on K and the length of M , producing the final ciphertext C .

Extending Handycipher in this way confers several advantages in security at little computational cost. Because each plaintext message is encrypted with a different randomly generated session key, the primary secret key is less exposed to any attack that depends on having a lot of ciphertext to work with, and the security of the cipher is less compromised by encrypting multiple messages with the same key.

Extended Handycipher Encryption Algorithm: $C \leftarrow E^*(K, M)$

1. Generate a random 51-character **session key** K' with associated table $T_{K'}$ and coding substitution $\xi_{\bar{K}'}$.
2. Transcribe K' into plaintext characters by inserting a “-” before each run of uppercase letters and a “.” before each run of lowercase letters, and then changing all lowercase letters to uppercase.⁸
3. Encrypt the transcribed K' with Handycipher and K , yielding K'' . Adjust K'' if necessary ensuring that for the last character m of the transcribed K' to be encrypted, no null characters are interspersed with $\sigma(m)$ and that K'' terminate with exactly one null character.⁹
4. Encrypt M with Handycipher and K' , yielding C' .
5. Adjust C' if necessary, by inserting more nulls, ensuring that $|C'| + |K''| \geq 700$ and also that $N \geq 30 - R$ where $|C'| = 31 \cdot N + R$, $0 \leq R < 31$.
6. Calculate $j = \lfloor (|C'| + |K''| - 700)/31 \rfloor \cdot \{[\xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{A}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{B}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{C})] \pmod{31}\} + [\xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{D}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{E}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{F})] \pmod{31}$.¹⁰
7. Insert K'' into C' immediately following position j as calculated in step 6, yielding C .

⁸ E.g., the Section 2 key QjufGctwbUSNLqHAgVDOoansIhyBKJWFdxvPk^peXMTlirYRmcE is transcribed as -Q.JUF-GC.TWB-USNL.Q-HA.G-VDO.OANS-I.HY-BKJWF.DXV-P.K^PE-XMT.LIR-YR.MC-E

⁹ This is necessary so that in Step 3 of the decryption algorithm the end of K'' can be recognized.

¹⁰ Here $\lfloor x \rfloor$ denotes the integer part of x and $|C|$ denotes the length of C . The formula is designed merely to make the value of j depend on K (and it's sub-key \bar{K}) and $|C|$. The adjustments in Step 5 ensure that $j \leq |C|$. (See Appendix 2.)

Extended Handycipher Decryption Algorithm: $M \leftarrow D^*(K, C)$

1. Calculate $j = \lfloor (|C| - 700) / 31 \rfloor \cdot \{[\xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{A}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{B}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{C})] \pmod{31}\} + [\xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{D}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{E}) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(\mathbf{F})] \pmod{31}$ and begin decrypting the substring of C immediately following position j with Handycipher and K .
2. Transcribe all letters between a “.” and a following “-” into lowercase and then delete all occurrences of those two symbols.
3. Continue until 51 such characters have been decrypted, yielding the session key, K' .
4. Remove the decrypted substring from C , leaving C' .
5. Decrypt C' with Handycipher and K' , yielding M .

8 Cryptanalytic Vulnerability

The way that the random choices are made in Steps 1 and 3 of the core-cipher encryption algorithm, and also in the null character insertion process of the Handycipher encryption algorithm, will have a significant effect on the cipher’s vulnerability to statistically based attacks. In Step 1, the choices of $R_1 - R_5$, $C_1 - C_5$, and $D_1 - D_{10}$ should all be equally probable, and in Step 3, each permutation of the string $\sigma(m)$ should be equally probable. This can be accomplished with the use of a single six-sided die (as described, for example, by Reinhold[7]) or one can improve one’s skill at behaving randomly by visiting Chris Wetzel’s website[11]. For very short messages, it might be sufficient for these choices merely to be made nondeterministically, but as message length increases any departure from choosing randomly is likely to compromise the cipher’s security against statistically based attacks.

The purpose of randomly inserting noise and null characters into the ciphertext is to defeat potential hill-climbing attacks against the otherwise undisguised ciphertext which would be vulnerable without that insertion. Although it might be sufficient for shorter messages merely to insert null characters nondeterministically, as the message length increases it becomes more important that they be inserted in the statistically balanced way described in the encryption algorithm to avoid their being detectable by statistical analysis.

It seems reasonable that any successful attack method will involve identifying the set of null characters for a given key, which is likely to be difficult since this set can be any of the approximately $1.3 \cdot 10^{14}$ 25-character subsets of a 50-character ciphertext alphabet. Moreover, even if the set of nulls were to be discovered this would give no information about where the divisions occur in the ciphertext, and when removed the remaining ciphertext still remains quite secure through the insertion of noise characters and because of the homophonic nature of the cipher, using a great many cipher tokens. With any key, of the 31 characters comprising the plaintext alphabet A : five are mapped into one of 5 ciphertext unigrams, ten are mapped into one of $20 \cdot 2! = 40$ ciphertext bigrams, ten are mapped into one of $20 \cdot 3! = 120$ ciphertext trigrams, five are mapped into one of $20 \cdot 4! = 480$ ciphertext 4-grams, and one is mapped into one of $20 \cdot 5! = 2,400$ ciphertext 5-grams; thus there are a

total of 3,045 cipher tokens available for use in the cipher's homophonic substitution before (and an unlimited number after) the insertion of noise or null characters.

The alternating reversal of coding direction might as well only be necessary for longer messages; on the other hand, it could be strengthened by building into the key an indication of which one of some other arbitrary patterns of alternation is to be followed—for example, the choice of null character used to mark the end of the embedded session key in Extended Handycipher could be so used. However, the most secure way of encrypting a very long message would seem to be to divide it into shorter ones and encrypt each using Extended Handycipher so that none of the randomly generated session keys will be exposed by encrypting a very long plaintext.

With respect to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext resistance, the homophonic nature of the cipher and the fact that each token is composed of a variable length string of symbols, together form a very strong counter to such attacks. In effect an attacker must try all possible symbol lengths to try to synchronize with the text he knows. Also, the use of session keys would further limit the benefits of chosen or known-plaintext as such text only betrays itself. Similarly, the risk of the same message being encrypted twice with different keys is reduced.

The cipher would clearly be vulnerable to a chosen text of long repetitions of characters (e.g., the five singletons would ultimately reveal the five rows of the session-key-matrix) but it seems unlikely a hand cipher user would be trapped in this way. However it does imply that Handycipher would be a poor choice to implement in a micro controller with a fixed key.

9 Challenge Cryptograms

Two plaintext messages $M1$ and $M2$ have each been encrypted with Extended Handycipher using the same key K , yielding the two cryptograms $C1$ and $C2$ contained in Appendix 3, not necessarily in that order. The first 229 characters of $M1$ consist of the Williams quotation in Section 3. The combined length of the two messages is between 1,700 and 1,800 characters.

The Handycipher variation described in Section 5 has been used, whereby each message was divided into two parts, and a randomly chosen complementary pair of session keys was used to Core-cipher encrypt the two parts, producing two ciphertexts which were then randomly interleaved to yield an intermediate cryptogram C' for each message.

Instead of just one 51-character random session key K' , the 102-character concatenation of the random complementary pair of session keys used to Core-cipher encrypt the two parts of each message was transcribed, encrypted, and inserted into C' in the Extended Handycipher encryption.

Four challenges in increasing order of difficulty are offered:

1. Determine whether $C1$ is the encryption of $M1$ or of $M2$.
2. Reveal the plaintext following the first 229 characters of $M1$.
3. Reveal $M2$.
4. Reveal K .

10 Implementation Notes

- 10.1 Although the process is tedious, with a bit of practice one can reasonably expect to encrypt or decrypt messages with Handycipher at a rate of approximately three plaintext characters per minute. At that rate the 229 character Williams quotation takes about an hour and a quarter to encrypt and perhaps an additional 30 minutes to generate, encrypt, and insert a session key.
- 10.2 In pen-and-paper work with strings of upper and lowercase letters the author has found it convenient to adopt a pronunciation convention as suggested by this example: the 10-tuple `AbcDEFghiJ` is read as
“cap-A (pause) bc caps-DEF (pause) ghi cap-J.”
It’s also helpful to read “w” as “dub,” “.” as “dot,” and “?” as “query.”
- 10.3 In order to facilitate visualizing the extended diagonals it’s helpful to think of the key-matrix as a 5×5 chess board (where the rows, columns, and diagonals wrap around the edges) and recognize that for any given square, 16 of the remaining 24 squares are colinear while just 8—those that are a knight’s move away—are non-colinear.
- 10.4 Although there is little propagation of errors in both encrypting and decrypting (except for possibly disturbing synchrony as discussed in 10.5 below) special care should be taken when processing the session key K' since any error introduced into a key obviously will be propagated.
- 10.5 If an error is made in keeping track of the alternating direction of encrypting plaintext characters or decrypting groups of ciphertext characters (or if some other error causes such a disruption), the receiver will immediately notice what has happened and can adjust to keep in synchrony. (It might even be a useful ploy to do this intensionally several times to thwart some types of attack.)
- 10.6 Noise and null characters should certainly be introduced in encrypting the session key so that its length is less predictable, and the encryption of the 51st session key character must contain only a single null character at its end to ensure that its boundary is demarcated in the decryption process.
- 10.7 The frequency distribution of ciphertext characters can be further randomized by modifying K' , in Step 1 of the Extended Handycipher encryption algorithm, so that the most common plaintext letters will not be encrypted by K' into unigrams, 4-grams, or 5-grams.

- 10.8 Similarly, to avoid having to insert many hyphens into the plaintext, K' can be modified so that no very common plaintext bigram is among the five that cannot be encrypted by K' .
- 10.9 Before proceeding to Step 3 of the Extended Handycipher encryption algorithm, K' should also be modified, if necessary, so that the transcribed K' generated in Step 2 contains none of the five plaintext bigrams that cannot be encrypted by K .
- 10.10 Source code for a full Python implementation of Handycipher and Extended Handycipher, as well as several additional Handycipher-based challenges, are available at MTC3.[6]

11 Version History

The earliest versions posted in the *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive* (April, 2014 V1.3 and July, 2014 V2.1) quickly succumbed to hill-climbing attacks predicated on the ability to discover and remove the very small set of only five nulls.[2][3]

A subsequent version (December, 2014 V4.4) addressed this weakness by adding ten characters to the ciphertext alphabet, using a 41-character key instead of 31, increasing the number of null characters from five to fifteen, increasing the number of diagonals used from two to ten, and alternating the direction of encoding plaintext characters between top-down/left-right and bottom-up/right-left. These changes significantly strengthened the cipher, as evidenced by the efforts over the past twelve months of a small community of knowledgeable cryptanalysts[6] in successfully breaking it only when it's been intentionally weakened in various ways; the one successful ciphertext-only attack on the non-weakened cipher required a workload of eight hours running on two Intel Core i7 computers and was totally dependent on knowing the exact plaintext length.

The current version has been further strengthened by adding another ten characters to the ciphertext alphabet, using a 51-character key instead of 41, increasing the number of null characters from 15 to 25, and by interweaving random non-null “noise” characters in the Core-cipher encryption before the null characters are added.


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
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A Appendix 1


In processing the n th character m_n of a plaintext message $m_1 \dots m_{n-1} m_n m_{n+1} \dots m_N$ some combination of choices made in Steps 1 and 3 of the core encryption algorithm will generate a $\xi(m_n)$ satisfying all the restrictions of Steps 1 and 3, provided that neither $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_{n-1}) \cdot \xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n)$ nor $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n) \cdot \xi_{\bar{K}}(m_{n+1})$ equal 16. It is fairly straightforward, although somewhat tedious, to show this by considering the distribution of colinear and non-colinear characters with respect to any given character in the 5×5 matrix $M_{\bar{K}}$. For any such character the remaining 24 characters comprise 16 colinear and 8 non-colinear characters which can be diagrammed as follows, where the symbol \bigcirc indicates the position of a character non-colinear with the character located at \mathbf{X} (see implementation note 10.3):




D1




D2




D3




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
D7




D8



D11



D12



D13

The other 16 possible locations for \mathbf{X} result in six diagrams (D4, D5, D9, D10, D14, and D15) horizontally symmetric to six of these nine (D1, D2, D6, D7, D11, and D12), six diagrams (D16, D17, D18, D21, D22, and D23) vertically symmetric to six of these nine (D1, D2, D3, D6, D7, and D8), and four diagrams (D19, D20, D24, and D25) centrally symmetric to four of these nine (D1, D2, D6, and D7).

We prove the assertion inductively by describing an iterative process which chooses a $\sigma(m_n)$ satisfying all restrictions and also “looks ahead” eliminating the choice of any row that would make it impossible to encrypt m_{n+1} when $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_{n+1})$ is a power of 2.

Initially, for $n = 1$, any of the 20 lines of M_K can be chosen to encrypt m_1 , unless $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_2) = 2^k$ for some k , in which case row R_{k+1} is eliminated, or unless $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_1) = 2^j$ for some j , in which case $\sigma(m_1)$ must be chosen as one of the five characters in row R_{5-j} and clearly this is always possible unless $k + 1 = 5 - j$ or $j + k = 4$, i.e., $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_1) \cdot \xi_{\bar{K}}(m_2) = 16$.

In general, for $n > 1$, taking \mathbf{X} as the location of the last character of $\sigma(m_{n-1})$ in each of the nine diagrams, it can be seen by inspection that for any of the 31 possible values of $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n)$ some permutation of the required characters in some line can be chosen to encrypt m_n satisfying all restrictions.

For example, consider the case in which location \mathbf{X} is as in diagram D7. Expressing $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n)$ in binary as abcde, and assuming n is odd, in order to make the first character of $\sigma(m_n)$ colinear with the last character of $\sigma(m_{n-1})$:

- I. if $a = 1$, one can identify these twelve lines: $R_1, R_2, R_3, C_1, C_2, C_3, D_1, D_2, D_3, D_6, D_7, \text{ or } D_8$
- II. if $c = 1$, one can identify these twelve lines: $R_1, R_2, R_3, C_1, C_2, C_3, D_1, D_4, D_5, D_8, D_9, \text{ or } D_{10}$
- III. if $d = 1$, one can identify these twelve lines: $R_2, R_4, R_5, C_2, C_4, C_5, D_1, D_2, D_4, D_7, D_8, \text{ or } D_{10}$
- IV. if $e = 1$, one can identify these twelve lines: $R_2, R_4, R_5, C_2, C_4, C_5, D_1, D_3, D_5, D_6, D_8, \text{ or } D_9$

If at least two of the four cases I-IV obtain then some permutation of the required characters in one of the lines identified in both those two cases that is not used to encrypt m_{n-1} (except any row which is eliminated by looking ahead at m_{n+1}) begins with a colinear character and therefore satisfies all restrictions.

If just one of I-IV is true then $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n) = 16, 4, 2, \text{ or } 1$ and the required non-colinear character in $C_1, C_3, C_4, \text{ or } C_5$ can be chosen for $\xi(m_n)$ satisfying all restrictions.

If none of I-IV is true then $\xi_{\bar{K}}(m_n) = 8$ and, by induction, it can be assumed that R_2 was not used to choose $\sigma(m_{n-1})$ and so any character in R_2 other than the one at location \mathbf{X} can be chosen for $\xi(m_n)$ satisfying all restrictions.

B Appendix 2

Given that $|C'| + |K''| \geq 700$ and also $N \geq 30 - R$ where $|C'| = 31 \cdot N + R$, $0 \leq R < 31$ we show that $j \leq |C'|$.

$|K'| \leq 101$ after transcription, therefore it may be safely assumed that $|K''| \leq 700$, and so $|C'| + |K''| - 700 \leq |C'|$.

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}
 j &= \lfloor (|C'| + |K''| - 700)/31 \rfloor \cdot \{[\xi_{\bar{K}}(A) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(B) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(C)] \pmod{31}\} \\
 &\quad + [\xi_{\bar{K}}(D) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(E) + \xi_{\bar{K}}(F)] \pmod{31} \\
 &\leq \lfloor |C'|/31 \rfloor \cdot 30 + 30 = N \cdot 30 + 30 \\
 &\leq N \cdot 30 + N + R = N \cdot 31 + R = |C'|
 \end{aligned}$$

C Appendix 3

C1

```

bxSv0 HVL1L acTns tmjRC tYlHy JByme VKwOQ YHYUc skodn laofP VeQib AFUaw WNKpf olsYr
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KTagR olmer AGByv NewBj GmHgL FNEub SCdRT UMxjv XNDdT qAlhk jgRAo LckgH JUjLM yorKv
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C2

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