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Paper 2014/251
Forgery on Stateless CMCC
Guy Barwell
Abstract
We present attacks against CMCC that invalidate the claimed security of integrity protection and misuse resistance. We exploit the fact zero-padding is used on both the message and authenticated data and demonstrate how one may generate a forgery with a single call to the encryption oracle. From this we calculate the ciphertext of the chosen message, yielding a forgery and so breaking INT-CTXT. In the nonce-reuse setting, existence of a forgery leads directly to a 2-query distinguisher.
Note: Added author contact information to body of paper
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- CAESARcmccauthenticated-encryption
- Contact author(s)
- guy barwell @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2014-04-22: revised
- 2014-04-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/251
- License
-
CC BY