Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/220

Total Break of Zorro using Linear and Differential Attacks

Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Zahra Ahmadian and Mahmood Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract: An AES-like lightweight block cipher, namely Zorro, was proposed in CHES 2013. While it has a 16-byte state, it uses only 4 S-Box per round. Its weak nonlinearity was widely criticized and caused serious vulnerabilities, insofar as it has been directly exploited in all the attacks reported by now, including the weak key, reduced round, and even full round attacks. In this paper, based on some observations discovered by Wang et. al., we present new differential and linear attacks on Zorro, both of which recover the full secret key with practical complexity. These attacks are based on very efficient distinguishers that have only two active sboxes per four rounds. The time complexity of our differential and linear attacks are $2^{52.74}$ and $2^{57.85}$ and the data complexity are $2^{55.15}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{45.44}$ known plaintexts, respectively. The results clearly show that the block cipher Zorro does not have enough security against differential and linear cryptanalysis.

Category / Keywords: Zorro, Lightweight Block Cipher, Differential Cryptanlysis, Linear Cryptanlysis

Date: received 25 Mar 2014

Contact author: rasoolzadeh shahram at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140327:133626 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]