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Paper 2014/125

Removing Erasures with Explainable Hash Proof Systems

Michel Abdalla and Fabrice Benhamouda and David Pointcheval

Abstract

An important problem in secure multi-party computation is the design of protocols that can tolerate adversaries that are capable of corrupting parties dynamically and learning their internal states. In this paper, we make significant progress in this area in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. More precisely, we first revisit the notion of projective hash proofs and introduce a new feature that allows us to explain any message sent by the simulator in case of corruption, hence the notion of Explainable Projective Hashing. Next, we demonstrate that this new tool generically leads to efficient PAKE and OT protocols that are secure against semi-adaptive adversaries without erasures in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We then show how to make these protocols secure even against adaptive adversaries, using non-committing encryption, in a much more efficient way than generic conversions from semi-adaptive to adaptive security. Finally, we provide concrete instantiations of explainable projective hash functions that lead to the most efficient PAKE and OT protocols known so far, with UC-security against adaptive adversaries, with or without erasures, in the single global CRS setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Oblivious TransferErasuresUniversal ComposabilityAdaptive Adversaries
Contact author(s)
fabrice ben hamouda @ ens fr
History
2014-10-13: revised
2014-02-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/125
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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