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Paper 2014/123
FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes
Mohammad Sadeq Dousti and Rasool Jalili
Abstract
This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Authenticated Key Exchange ProtocolForward SecurityKey Evolving SchemesProvable SecuritySecurity Model
- Contact author(s)
- msdousti @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-11-23: last of 4 revisions
- 2014-02-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/123
- License
-
CC BY