Implementing Pairing-Based Cryptosystems in USB Tokens

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Abstract. In the last decade, pairing-based cryptography has been one of the most intensively studied subjects in cryptography. Various optimization techniques have been developed to speed up the pairing computation. However, implementing a pairing-based cryptosystem in resource constrained devices has been less tried. Moreover, due to progress on solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), those implementations are no longer safe to use. In this paper, we report an implementation of a couple of pairing-based cryptosystems at a high security level on a 32-bit microcontroller in a USB token. It shows that USB token supporting secure pairing-based cryptosystems is viable. The presented curve parameters may also be used by other pairing-related cryptosystems to achieve stronger security than those given in the existing literature.

1 Introduction

Since the seminal work of Joux’s tripartite key agreement protocol [29] and Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara’s non-interactive identity-based key agreement [38], particularly after Boneh-Franklin [7] introduced identity-based encryption with pairings, there have been a flood of innovative work to create various new cryptosystems using pairings, including short signatures [14, 41], identity-based encryptions [5, 8], identity-based signatures [20, 15], attribute-based encryptions [24], etc. We refer the interested reader to the book "Identity-Based Cryptography" [30] for more references.

Meanwhile, because of its great complexity, computing pairings efficiently at proper security levels is also of great interest. During the past ten years, many optimizations to the Miller algorithm [27] have been proposed to speed up cryptographic pairings [13, 11, 25, 32, 35, 39, 3, 22]. Although, great progress has been made, the complexity of pairing computation is still much greater than the traditional cryptographic operations such as the elliptic curve scalar multiplication at the same security level. This explains why most of the work focuses on algorithm implementation on generic CPUs and only a few attempts to compute pairings in resource constrained devices [9, 36, 21, 34, 33, 40] have been reported.

In [9], Bertoni et al. described an implementation of Tate [13] pairing on a supersingular curve over a 512-bit prime base field on a ST22 processor aiming at RSA-1024 bit security level. With the increase of computation power, now the
digital society is moving towards a higher security level. It is generally verified that the Tate pairing on supersingular curves defined over prime fields is not a promising choice for high security levels, as it requires a large base field. Scott et al. attempted to improve the pairing efficiency on this platform by using Eta pairing [11] on a supersingular curve over a 379-bit binary field [36]. This implementation clearly shows better performance and was considered to be easier to scale to higher security levels. [33, 40] reported two Eta pairing implementations over elliptic curves in characteristic 2 and 3 fields separately on an ATmega128L microcontroller. Unfortunately recent progress [1] on computing DLPs in finite fields shows that it is insecure to use supersingular curves over characteristic 2 or 3 fields to implement pairing-based cryptosystems. In [21] Devegili et al. implemented the Ate pairing [25] on the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves [17] aiming at the RSA-3072 security level on the Philips HiPerSmart platform. Their implementation takes approximately 3 seconds to complete the computation. The performance of several implementations on 8-bit or 16-bit microcontrollers such as on MSP430 [34] is even worse because the computation capability of those chips is weaker.

Instead of proposing new hardware implementation for better performance or giving a slow implementation on an unsuitable architecture, we choose a 32-bit microcontroller AC4384 which is mainly used to make USB tokens for security applications such as executing ECC or RSA algorithms. We report an efficient implementation of a couple of identity-based cryptosystems on the chip. Particularly, we give a full implementation of identity-based encryption scheme SK-KEM [8] and identity-based signature scheme BLMQ-IBS [15], both are standardized in [28]. For the implementation, we not only need to choose proper curve parameters concerning the schemes but also consider various restrictions posed by the chosen chip. We shall make use of the existing arithmetic hardware module, which boosts medium size integer modular multiplications, to implement pairing at a high security level. The final product as a secure USB token can complete all the required cryptographic operations in just over half a second. The presented curve parameters may also benefit the security of other elliptic curve cryptosystems such as short signatures [6, 41].

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, pairing is briefly introduced. The implemented identity-based cryptosystems are reviewed in Section 3. The chosen chip is described in Section 4. Curve parameters for the cryptosystems are presented in Section 5. The details of implementation and computation performance analysis are reported in Section 6.

2 Pairings

A pairing is a bilinear map \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_3 \) where \( G_1, G_2 \) are additive groups and \( G_3 \) is a multiplicative group. All three groups have prime order \( r \). For cryptographic purpose, a pairing should be well defined with bilinearity, non-degenerate and efficient to compute. In particular, for all \( (P, Q) \in G_1 \times G_2 \) and for all
Let $E(F_p)$ be an elliptic curve defined over field $F_p$. Let $k$ be the least positive integer such that $r \mid p^k - 1$ and $r^2 \nmid p^k - 1$. Such integer $k$ is called the embedding degree of $E$ over $F_p$ with respect to $r$. For every $Q \in E(F_{p^k})$ and integer $s$, let $f_{s,Q}$ be the $F_{p^k}$-rational function with divisor

$$f_{s,Q} = s(Q) - ([s]Q) - (s - 1)(\infty)$$

where $\infty$ represents the point at infinity.

On elliptic curves several pairings satisfying the cryptographic requirements can be defined. So far the most efficient one is the optimal Ate pairing [25, 39].

The Ate pairing over $G_2 \times G_1$ can be defined by

$$\hat{e}(Q, P) = f_{t-1,Q}(P)^{(p^k-1)/r},$$

where $G_1 = E[r] \cap \text{Ker}(\pi_p - [1]) = E(F_p)[r]$ and $G_2 = E[r] \cap \text{Ker}(\pi_p - [p]) \subseteq E(F_{p^k})[r]$ with the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi_p : E \to E$ given by $\pi_p(x, y) = (x^p, y^p)$. $t$ is the trace of Frobenius of the curve and $G_3 = F_{p^k}^* / (F_{p^k}^*)^r$.

To compute pairings, the Miller algorithm [27] is used to evaluate function $f_{t-1,Q}$ at point $P$. The complexity of the process is mainly determined by the number of Miller iterations $t$. Vercauteren [39] showed that the Miller iterations may be further reduced for certain curves to define the optimal Ate pairing. More details of such pairing with some chosen curve parameters will be given in Section 5.

3 Identity-Based Cryptosystems

We implement two identity-based cryptosystems SK-KEM [8] and BLMQ-IBS [15], both use the Sakai-Kasahara key generation algorithm [37] to generate identity private keys.

**Setup $G_{ID}(1^c)$**. On input $1^c$, the key generation algorithm works as follows:

1. Generate three cyclic groups $G_1$, $G_2$ and $G_3$ of prime order $r$ and a bilinear pairing map $\hat{e} : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_3$. Pick random generator $P_1 \in G_1^*$, $P_2 \in G_2^*$.
2. Pick a random $s \in Z_r^*$ and compute $P_{pub} = [s]P_1$.
3. Pick a cryptographic hash function $H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to Z_r^*$.
4. Output the master public key $M_{pf} = (G_1, G_2, G_3, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{pub}, H_1)$ and the master secret key $M_{sf} = s$.

**Extract $X_{ID}(M_{pf}, M_{sf}, ID_A)$**. Given an identifier string $ID_A \in \{0,1\}^*$ of entity $A$, $M_{pf}$ and $M_{sf}$, the algorithm returns $D_A = [\frac{1}{s + H_1(ID_A)}]P_2$. 


SK-KEM is an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism with the encapsulate algorithm $E_{\text{ID-KEM}}$ and decapsulate algorithm $D_{\text{ID-KEM}}$ as shown in Table 1, where

$H_2 : \mathbb{G}_3 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n,$
$H_3 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^\ast,$
$H_4 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l_d,$

for data encapsulation mechanism key length $l_d$ and random variable length $n$.

Table 1. SK-KEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$E_{\text{ID-KEM}}(M_{\text{pk}}, ID_A)$</th>
<th>$D_{\text{ID-KEM}}(M_{\text{pk}}, ID_A, D_A, (C_1, C_2))$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$m \leftarrow {0, 1}^n$</td>
<td>$\alpha \leftarrow \hat{e}(C_1, D_A)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x \leftarrow H_3(m)$</td>
<td>$m = C_2 \oplus H_2(\alpha)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(ID_A)]P_1$</td>
<td>$x \leftarrow H_3(m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1 = [x]Q_A$</td>
<td>$Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(ID_A)]P_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_2 = m \oplus H_2(\hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^x)$</td>
<td>$U \leftarrow [x]Q_A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K \leftarrow H_4(x)$</td>
<td>If $C_1 \neq U$, return ⊥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(K, (C_1, C_2))$</td>
<td>$K \leftarrow H_4(m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return $K$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BLMQ-IBS is an identity-based signature scheme with the Sign and Verify algorithms as shown in Table 2, where $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_3 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^\ast$ and $M$ is the signed message.

Table 2. BLMQ-IBS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign$(M_{\text{pk}}, D_A, M)$</th>
<th>Verify$(M_{\text{pk}}, ID_A, M, (h, S))$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^\ast$</td>
<td>$Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(ID_A)]P_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y \leftarrow \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^y$</td>
<td>$y' \leftarrow \hat{e}(Q_A, S) \cdot \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{-h}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h \leftarrow H_2(M, y')$</td>
<td>$h' \leftarrow H_2(M, y')$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S = [x + h]D_A$</td>
<td>If $h \neq h'$, return Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(h, S)$</td>
<td>Return OK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SK key generation algorithm bases its security on the following $\ell$-SDH assumption [8, 15].
Assumption 1 $\ell$-Strong Diffie-Hellman ($\ell$-SDH) Let $P$ be an element of prime order $r$ in an Abelian group. For a positive integer $\ell$, and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$, given $([\alpha]P, [\alpha^2]P, \ldots, [\alpha^\ell]P)$, computing $(h, [\frac{1}{\alpha+h}]P)$ for some $h \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ is hard.

Cheon presented an algorithm showing that the computational complexity of $\ell$-SDH can be reduced by $O(\sqrt{\ell})$ from that of the DLP in the group [19]. Here we restate Cheon’s two main results:

**Theorem 1** Let $P$ be an element of prime order $r$ in an Abelian group. Suppose that $\ell$ is a positive divisor of $r - 1$. If $P, P_1 = [\alpha]P$ and $P_\ell = [\alpha^\ell]P$ are given, $\alpha$ can be computed in $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{(r-1)/\ell} + \sqrt{\ell}))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{(r-1)/\ell}, \sqrt{\ell}\})$ memory.

**Theorem 2** Let $P$ be an element of prime order $r$ in an Abelian group. Suppose that $\ell$ is a positive divisor of $r + 1$. If $P_i = [\alpha^i]P$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 2\ell$ are given, $\alpha$ can be computed in $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{(r+1)/\ell + \ell}))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{(r+1)/\ell}, 2\ell\})$ memory.

We assume that the adversary can obtain private keys because the adversary may be the user of the system and may also compromise other users’ private keys. By assuming an adversary $A$ has gathered $\ell$ different pairs of public/private keys $(h_i, [\frac{1}{\alpha+h_i}]P_2)$ with $h_i = H_1(1\text{ID}_i)$, using Cheon’s algorithm $A$ can recover the master secret key in the following manner.

- Randomly sample $h_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ different from $h_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq \ell$.
- Set $\alpha = s + h_0$ which $A$ does not know, and
  \[ Q = \left[ \frac{1}{(s + h_1) \cdots (s + h_\ell)} \right] P_2. \]
- For $j = 0, \ldots, \ell - 1$, $A$ computes
  \[ [\alpha^j]Q = \left[ \frac{(s + h_0)^j}{(s + h_1) \cdots (s + h_\ell)} \right] P_2 = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} c_{ij} \right] P_2 \]
  where $c_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_r$ are computable from $h_i$’s.
- Given $[\alpha^j]Q$ for $0 \leq j \leq \ell - 1$, use Cheon’s algorithm to compute $\alpha$ and so
  \[ s = \alpha - h_0. \]

By Theorem 2 the complexity of the above attack to recover the master secret key $s$ in SK-KEM/BLMQ-IBS is with $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{2(r+1)/\ell + \ell/2}))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{2(r+1)/\ell}, \ell\})$ memory. Note that if there is a divisor $d$ of $r - 1$ with $d \leq \ell$ and $d \approx \ell$, then the attack still works with similar computational complexity by Theorem 1.

To defend against Cheon’s attack on SK key generation algorithm, it is better to have both $r - 1$ and $r + 1$ with as few as possible small divisors. In Section 5, we show such curve parameters can be found.
4 The AisinoChip’s AC4384 Architecture

AC4384 is a microcontroller supplied by AisinoChip [2]. The chip has a 32-bit RISC core designed specifically for secure applications including USB tokens or smart cards. This core has a 32-bit load/store architecture and is able to complete 32x16 multiplication in a single cycle. It equips with 16 32-bit general purpose registers and can complete a branch execution in two cycles. The chip has 4K CPU cache, 32K SDRAM and 384K eflash. The maximum clock speed is 100MHz.

For the purpose of high speed security applications such as ECC or RSA, the chip is incorporated with an arithmetic module which is capable of computing 192 to 1024-bit integer modular multiplication at high speed. The module supports modular multiplication pre-computation. The pre-computation is done once for every different modular and the pre-computed value is loaded before each modular multiplication. This module shall be used to boost the underlining field multiplication in pairing.

Table 3 shows the time of main operations in a 256-bit prime field. The modular addition and subtraction are implemented in assembly code. From the table we can see the timing ratio between modular multiplication and addition or subtraction with random values is about 3.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Timing ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A + B \mod P$</td>
<td>$A + B &lt; P$</td>
<td>0.0024ms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A + B \mod P$</td>
<td>$A + B \geq P$</td>
<td>0.0047ms</td>
<td>$\approx 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A - B \mod P$</td>
<td>$A \geq B$</td>
<td>0.0024ms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A - B \mod P$</td>
<td>$A &lt; B$</td>
<td>0.0047ms</td>
<td>$\approx 2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A \times B \mod P$</td>
<td>pre-computation</td>
<td>0.012ms</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A \times B \mod P$</td>
<td>no pre-computation</td>
<td>0.024ms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Curve Parameters

For pairing-based cryptosystems, one should keep the right balance between the intended security level and system efficiency. Pairings may be used to convert DLP in $G_1$ or $G_2$ into the corresponding problem in $G_3$. For pairings defined on elliptic curves, this has serious security implications. There exist algorithms for solving the DLP in the finite fields running much faster than the best known general algorithms for the elliptic curve DLP. This requires $G_3$ to be large enough to make sure the DLP in $G_3$ at least has the same complexity as those in $G_1$ and $G_2$. On the other hand, pairing computation involves many operations in $G_3$ and if $G_3$ is too large, the computation would become very slow.
BN curves [17] defined over a 256-bit prime field is the de facto standard choice to implement pairing-based cryptosystems at the RSA-3072 security level. To benefit the computation with the lazy reduction technique [3], a 254-bit prime $p$ was also proposed to implement pairings. The standard Weierstrass representation of the curves is

$$Y^2 = X^3 + B.$$ 

The characteristic $p$ of the prime field, the prime group order $r$ of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$, the trace $t$ of the Frobenius of the curves are parameterized by the variable $u$ as follows:

$$p(u) = 36u^4 + 36u^3 + 24u^2 + 6u + 1$$

$$r(u) = 36u^4 + 36u^3 + 18u^2 + 6u + 1$$

$$t(u) = 6u^2 + 1$$

A BN curve admits a sextic twist $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$. The D-type sextic twist is defined as $Y^2 = X^3 + B/\xi$, where $\xi \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is an element that is neither a square nor a cube in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ [21].

The optimal Ate pairing on $E$ is defined as [39]

$$e_{\text{opt}}(Q, P) = [f_{z, Q}(P) \cdot \lambda_{z}(Q_1, \pi_{p}(Q_1)(P) \cdot \lambda_{z}(Q_2, \pi_{p}(Q_2)(P))]^{(p^{12} - 1)/r}$$

where $z = 6u + 2$ and $\lambda_{Q_1, Q_2}(P)$ is the equation of the line corresponding to the addition of $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ and its evaluation at $P$.

The BN curve parameters in the literature [21, 26, 12, 3] were proposed mainly to improve pairing computation efficiency and Cheon’s attack was not treated as a serious security concern when curve parameters were selected. $r - 1$ or $r + 1$ of all these curve parameters have 20-30 bit divisors. On the other hand some may overstate the impact of Cheon’s attack. For example Boyen claimed that for cryptographic schemes such as BB2, SK, and Gentry’s, it is “necessary to increase the size of the groups (by up to 50% more bits) for any given security level” to defend against Cheon’s attack [18]. Here we show that by carefully selecting curve parameters we can achieve both security and system efficiency in practice.

Regarding to the implemented cryptosystems, to defend against Cheon’s attack, we may choose $r$ such that both $r - 1$ and $r + 1$ have as few as possible small divisors. At the same time to keep the Miller iterations few, $|z|$ should have low Hamming weight or its non-adjacent form (NAF) should have low weight. Here NAF-weight refers to the number of non-zero bits in an NAF representation. Low weight NAF of $|u|$ also benefits the final exponentiation in pairing computation.

Table 4 presents two curve parameter examples. One is defined over a 264-bit field for better security, the other is defined over a 254-bit field for better performance. According to [31], while the special form of $p$ can be used to construct a more efficient number field sieve, the complexity of DLP in $\mathbb{G}_3$ reduced to $L_p(1/3, (80)^{1/3})$ is still greater than the one of the integer factorization problem. The parameters of Curve 1 provides security at the RSA-3072 security level.
Table 4. New BN Curve Parameters

- BN Curve 1: p is 264-bit prime.

\[ B = 2 \]
\[ u = 18000000002840543 \]
\[ p(u) = B640000004C6A1FDAB8C03C8A47B7DAB6E6C3DC8 \]
\[ D9E7C76F1D30469A1D3A840E9B \]
\[ r(u) = B640000004C6A1FDAB8C03C8A47B7DABD943DC8 \]
\[ D9E4F2E931D0443A84D04DF165 \]
\[ r(u) - 1 = 2^7 \times 3 \times 5 \times 68D1EC4A0419(47-bit) \times \]
\[ 4CCCCCGCD4D9AA7(63-bit) \times \]
\[ 18BA64ED5711C5DBB8D755A70745054D0AB9(149-bit) \]
\[ r(u) + 1 = 2^7 \times 3 \times 5 \times 73 \times 30E236F939FA7D(54-bit) \times \]
\[ 7BF6E71655DDCA91C1(71-bit) \times \]
\[ 1EDB6DB6DBD537B3E924E9148FA2C4D51(129-bit) \]
\[ |z| = 9000000000F181F94 \]

Hamming-weight(|u|) = 10  
NAF-weight(|u|) = 10  
Hamming-weight(|z|) = 16  
NAF-weight(|z|) = 10

- BN Curve 2: p is a 254-bit prime.

\[ B = 3 \]
\[ u = 4000000001E11061 \]
\[ p(u) = 2400000004A64DAD02FABEC83B0BDA0A0A60F7F \]
\[ 7E1723468B1BFE94F48327 \]
\[ r(u) = 2400000004A64DAD02FABEC83B0BDA0A0A60F7F \]
\[ 873F2238B06CE0DADCE6E6A1 \]
\[ r(u) - 1 = 2^5 \times 3 \times 7 \times 92492424D70257(60-bit) \times \]
\[ 18000000021D326D800FE3F982A38E58BACBA39D99 \]
\[ F77C7(185-bit) \]
\[ r(u) + 1 = 2 \times 5 \times 29 \times 13C1F0BB9E04B(49-bit) \times \]
\[ 8941614B4F7A84E65(72-bit) \times \]
\[ 3000000002D19892400A97FBAE4DF67(126-bit) \]
\[ |z| = 1800000000B466248 \]

Hamming-weight(|u|) = 10  
NAF-weight(|u|) = 8  
Hamming-weight(|z|) = 13  
NAF-weight(|z|) = 13

against Cheon’s attack if an attacker collects less than \(2^{47}\) private keys. For the parameters of Curve 2, if an attacker collects less than \(2^{49}\) private keys, using Cheon’s attack he needs \(2^{122}\) group operations to break the system.

A few more curve parameter sets with \(|u|\) having lower Hamming weight or lower NAF weight are presented in the Appendix. We note that one may use the 286-bit BN curve in [23] with similar performance as the 264-bit curve given here but to achieve greater security.
The given curve parameters may also be used for other elliptic curve cryptosystems such as [6, 41] in practice to shield attacks making use of access to a Static Diffie-Hellman oracle [10, 19].

6 Implementation Issues

Since Barreto et al.’s major improvement [13] to the Miller algorithm, during the years, steady improvements have been made, one over the other. Now pairings on BN curves at the RSA-3072 security level may be computed on general CPUs within a millisecond [3].

Our implementation makes use of those techniques suitable for the chosen architecture with a few exceptions. First, as the chip has a hardware module for modular multiplications (but no inversion), we use the homogeneous projective coordinate and do not consider the lazy reduction optimization [3]. Second, on the chip the timing of modular square (SQR) and modular multiplication (MUL) is the same and the ratio between MUL and addition (ADD) or subtraction (SUB) (3.4 as shown in Table 3) is not high. Hence, those tricks intended to make use the timing difference between SQR and MUL should be avoided if they increase ADD or SUB operations. Third, when the efficiency of the implemented cryptosystems is above the acceptable level, reducing the code size and storage requirement become the first priority. Those speed optimizations requiring extra complicated functions or extra memory is excluded.

In the following, we list the optimization techniques to the Miller algorithm adopted in the implementation:


– Represent the first input of \( a_{\text{opt}} \) on the sextic twist of the BN curve, i.e, \( Q \) now is in \( E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[r] \) [21]. \( Q \) is untwisted back to \( E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}) \) during the line evaluation \( l_r(\cdot) \) in Algorithm 1.

– Represent \( \mathbb{F}_{p^{12}} \) as a tower of finite extensions as suggested in [21]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{F}_{p^2} & = \mathbb{F}_p[X]/(X^2 - \beta), \text{ where } \beta \text{ is a non-quadratic in } \mathbb{F}_p \\
\mathbb{F}_{p^6} & = \mathbb{F}_{p^2}[Y]/(Y^3 - \xi), \text{ where } \xi \text{ is neither a square nor a cube in } \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \\
\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}} & = \mathbb{F}_{p^6}[Z]/(Z^2 - \mu), \text{ where } \mu \text{ is a non-quadratic in } \mathbb{F}_{p^6}
\end{align*}
\]

For the two curves listed in Section 5, \( \beta, \xi, \mu \)’s value is listed in Table 5.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Parameters for Extension Field Representation}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Curve & \( \beta \) & \( \xi \) & \( \mu \) \\
\hline
1 & -2 & \(-1 - \sqrt{\beta}\) & \(\sqrt{\xi}\) \\
2 & -1 & \(1 + \sqrt{\beta}\) & \(\sqrt{\xi}\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

– Use the efficient formulas proposed in [4] to evaluate \( l_r(\cdot) \) in Algorithm 1, particularly pre-computed \(-P\) is used.
Use the fact that the value of $l \cdot (\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1 is sparse in $F_{p^{12}}$ to improve the efficiency of field multiplication in line 4, 6, 8, 13 and 15 [3].

Use the method in [35] to compute the final exponentiation in line 16 in Algorithm 1. Exponentiation to power of $p$ are computed using Frobenius map with only one pre-computation [21].

Use NAF to represent both $|z|$ in Algorithm 1 and $|u|$ in the final exponentiation computation.

Replace any inversion in $F_{p^{12}}$ with conjugation $conj$ if possible as suggested in [3].

Use Lucas ladder [16] to compute the cryptographic scheme involved exponentiations in $G_3$ if the pre-computation is not applied.

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**Algorithm 1:** BKLS Algorithm for Optimal Ate Pairing on BN Curve

**Input:** $P \in G_1, Q \in G_2, u, |z| = 6u \equiv 2 \equiv (1, z_{s-1}, \ldots, z_0)_{NAF}$

**Output:** $a_{opt}(Q, P)$

1. $Z \leftarrow Q, f \leftarrow 1$
2. for $i \leftarrow s_1; i \geq 0; i -- do$
   
   3. $f \leftarrow f^2$
   
   4. $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_z, Z(-P), Z \leftarrow [2]Z$
   
   5. if $z_i = 1$ then
      
      6. $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_z, Q(P), Z \leftarrow Z + Q$
   
   7. if $z_i = -1$ then
      
      8. $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_z, -Q(P), Z \leftarrow Z - Q$
   
   9. if $u < 0$ then
      
      10. $f \leftarrow conj(f)$
      
      11. $Z = -Z$
   
   12. $T \leftarrow \pi_p(Q)$
   
   13. $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_z, T(P), Z \leftarrow Z + T$
   
   14. $T \leftarrow -\pi_p(T)$
   
   15. $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_z, T(P), Z \leftarrow Z + T$
   
   16. $f \leftarrow f^{(p^{12} - 1) / r}$

17. return $f$

The performance of the optimal Ate pairing and scalar multiplication is measured on two platforms: the AC4384 microcontroller and the i7-4650U 1.70GHz (boosted to 2.3GHz\(^1\)). On the i7 machine, prime field elements are in Montgomery representation and underlying integer operations are completed with the GMP library v5.1.2. The whole library is compiled using GCC v4.4.7 with option $-O2$. On AC4384 microcontroller the code is compiled in favor of small

\(^1\) Though the performance metrics may not be fully accurate whence the CPU is boosted, the tables below reflect the general performance of pairings with the given parameters on the i7 CPU.
code size instead of efficiency. Hence here instead of going after a speed record, we merely show that implementation of IBC on such type of chips may achieve reasonably good performance.

The pairing is computed with at most 131 variables in $\mathbb{F}_p$, each is stored in a 36-byte array. The total 4716 bytes are reserved in advance from a global memory shared with other routines implemented in the USB token.

SK-KEM uses identity private keys in $G_2$ to reduce ciphertext size and improves encryption/decryption speed. BLMQ-IBS may use identity private keys in $G_1$ for smaller signature size and faster signing operation. If a user has only one identity private key used in both schemes, it is better to map the private key in $G_2$ because the signing operation in BLMQ-IBS has no heavy pairing operation and the scalar multiplication in $G_2$ can be completed fairly fast. In this case, to reduce the code size the scalar multiplication in $G_2$ may be computed with the same $t, (\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1 but without evaluating on point $P$.

Table 6 lists the timing of optimal Ate pairing and scalar multiplication in $G_2$ over Curve 1 and 2. Table 7 lists the timing of SK-KEM decryption and BLMQ-IBS signing operation over Curve 1 and 2 with identity private keys generated in $G_2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Timing of Group Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC4384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-4650U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^{opt}<em>{G</em>{254}}$ Pairing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.52s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.65ms/1.37ms$^{(*)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^{opt}<em>{G</em>{264}}$ Pairing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.79ms/1.55ms$^{(*)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalar Multiplication in $G_{254}^{1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.27ms$^{(<em>)}$/0.17ms$^{(</em>)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalar Multiplication in $G_{264}^{1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33ms$^{(<em>)}$/0.20ms$^{(</em>)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalar Multiplication in $G_{254}^{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99ms$^{(<em>)}$/0.25ms$^{(</em>)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalar Multiplication in $G_{264}^{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11ms$^{(<em>)}$/0.30ms$^{(</em>)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exponentiation in $G_{254}^{1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.94ms/0.47ms$^{(*)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exponentiation in $G_{264}^{1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06ms/0.56ms$^{(*)}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

& Pre-computation result.

A scalar multiplication in $G_1$ and $G_2$ is computed with the standard slide window method and may be optimized with the endomorphism map and less memory allocation.
Table 7. Timing of Decrypt/Sign Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AC4384</th>
<th>i7-4650U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SK-KEM(_{254}^+)</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>0.66s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK-KEM(_{264}^+)</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>0.61s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLMQ-IBS(_{254}^+)</td>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>0.55s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLMQ-IBS(_{264}^+)</td>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>0.53s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$ Pre-computation of scalar multiplication with \(Q_A\) and \(\hat{e}(\cdot, D_A)\) is applied.
* Pre-computation of scalar multiplication with private key \(D_A\) and exponentiation with \(\hat{e}(P_1, P_2)\) is applied.

Two platforms show different performance behaviors. Curve 2 involves significantly more ADD/SUB operations for pairing computation, scalar multiplication in \(G_2\) and exponentiation in \(G_3\) than Curve 1, while there is no timing difference between 254 and 264-bit MUL on AC4384. Hence the schemes implemented with Curve 1 perform slightly better on AC4384 even if a few more MULs are computed. On the other hand, with the lazy reduction on i7 CPU, the cost of extra ADD/SUB operations is compensated with the gain of fewer and faster MUL operations on Curve 2, so schemes implemented with Curve 2 are faster than with Curve 1 on i7 CPU.

7 Conclusion

Pairing-based cryptosystems have been intensively studied for more than ten years. Several identity-based schemes from pairings have already been standardized and deployed in practice. Many optimization techniques have been developed to improve such systems’ efficiency. In this paper, by carefully choosing curve parameters and adopting many state-of-art improvements, we have successfully implemented two important identity-based cryptosystems on a 32-bit microcontroller. The final product as a USB token shows that identity-based cryptography is able to perform reasonably well at a high security level in a resource constrained device. The presented curves parameters may also be used for other pairing-related schemes to improve security in practice.

Acknowledgements

We’d like to thank Mike Scott for his many comments and valuable suggestions. We also want to thank reviewers for many comments and particularly one reviewer brought the 286-bit BN curve in [23] to our notice.
References

Appendix

Here we give several extra curve parameter sets of which $|u|$ has slightly low Hamming weights and $r(u) - 1$ or $r(u) + 1$ has divisors of around 40 bits. The implementation of optimal Ate pairing on these curve parameters on the i7 CPU is slower than on the ones given in Section 5. If one is willing to accept parameters with $r(u) - 1$ or $r(u) + 1$ having divisors of around 30 bits one may use those parameters resulting in better system efficiency such as those with $u = -40000FEFF7FFFFF6$.

- BN Curve 3: $p$ is 264-bit prime.

\[
\begin{align*}
B &= 5 \\
u &= -18000200000013804 \\
p(u) &= B6403C0079A50C3B29813F9F84313D3F674ECB9C9F13987248B1DB77E88C069 \\
r(u) &= B6403C0079A50C3B29813F9F84313D3E5ED72ACB9B1DB493D50851DAE94CE4C09 \\
r(u) - 1 &= 2^3 \times 3^2 \times 200002AAAAAC4AB(62\text{-bit}) \times 14400510006C315F9CBA1917E923B4A9109C293CF609A8292B(197\text{-bit}) \\
r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 5 \times 297B8FF5B95(42\text{-bit}) \times 29A7F38A869F523593FA651(90\text{-bit}) \times 2B333A6666B3796752A67999B61F219AD(130\text{-bit})
\end{align*}
\]

$|z| = 90000C00000075016$

Hamming-weight($|u|$) = 8
NAF-weight($|u|$) = 7
Hamming-weight($|z|$) = 12
NAF-weight($|z|$) = 11

$\beta = -5$
$\xi = \sqrt{\beta}$
$\mu = \sqrt[3]{\xi}$
– **BN Curve 4:** \(p\) is a 256-bit prime.

\[
\begin{align*}
B &= 2 \\
u &= 5FFC00802000000E \\
p(u) &= B621A5B26BEE70C85697DAAC6CBE08F08C2AD77F018FD1644FD7369AC016AED5 \\
r(u) &= B621A5B26BEE70C85697DAAC6CBE08EFB43CD4DE899450653A76E285C016AA3D \\
r(u) - 1 &= 2^2 \times 3 \times 7 \times 8CBE6D4AC8E9F(52\text{-bit}) \times 6DB249B70000001(59\text{-bit}) \times 9342741CBC39A3CBB186E03F83A4E00990D(140\text{-bit}) \\
r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 19 \times 22955BB891B(42\text{-bit}) \times 160A36593CD71(49\text{-bit}) \times 4200997FDB328B4AEDD(75\text{-bit}) \times 63E65529DDC6CA1DEF585B(87\text{-bit}) \\
|z| &= 23FE80300C0000056 \\
\text{Hamming-weight}(|u|) &= 17 \\
\text{NAF-weight}(|u|) &= 7 \\
\text{Hamming-weight}(|z|) &= 19 \\
\text{NAF-weight}(|z|) &= 12 \\
\beta &= -2 \\
\xi &= \sqrt{\beta} \\
\mu &= \sqrt[3]{\xi}
\end{align*}
\]

– **BN Curve 5:** \(p\) is a 254-bit prime.

\[
\begin{align*}
B &= 5 \\
u &= -400010000000F108 \\
p(u) &= 24002400D82209306E179BB4521C1FD7FCDF4058082AFC194453316D2D7D1 \\
r(u) &= 24002400D82209306E179BB4521C1FD1FCDC4057A7FDC034CCE452DC5327651 \\
r(u) - 1 &= 2^4 \times 3 \times 7 \times 19864F3D291(41\text{-bit}) \times 124929249249697(57\text{-bit}) \times B35CE76183E5F192B(68\text{-bit}) \times 1578F9956E01AB6113375(81\text{-bit}) \\
r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 11 \times 13 \times 17A65654589170D(61\text{-bit}) \times 27F3D6A82B6CE201(62\text{-bit}) \times 8BA32E8BABA7048106F17464D3D2023(124\text{-bit}) \\
|z| &= 1800600000005A62E \\
\text{Hamming-weight}(|u|) &= 8 \\
\text{NAF-weight}(|u|) &= 6 \\
\text{Hamming-weight}(|z|) &= 14 \\
\text{NAF-weight}(|z|) &= 13 \\
\beta &= -5 \\
\xi &= \sqrt{\beta} \\
\mu &= \sqrt[3]{\xi}
\end{align*}
\]
- **BN Curve 6:** $p$ is a 254-bit prime.

\[
B = 2
\]
\[
u = -40000FEFF7FFFFFE
\]
\[
p(u) = 240023DBFB65022FBD6B6D42EF2DF822F34ECBEEA7A2
\]
\[
7C120863C9C54B006147D
\]
\[
r(u) = 240023DBFB65022FBD6B6D42EF2DF822ED4EC8F1A8C3
\]
\[
3C13884C414D0F0061225
\]
\[
r(u) - 1 = 2^2 \times 3 \times 200007F7FBFFFB (62-bit) \times
\]
\[
180011EDFB770057C1AAF589E76801269F7B793E7FFE
\]
\[
619(189-bit)
\]
\[
r(u) + 1 = 2 \times 193 \times 54BC6217D(35-bit) \times 290DB508C7F(42-bit) \times
\]
\[
4AF782A8D59(43-bit) \times 417BD1FB7B63B(51-bit) \times
\]
\[
1774D71493CDEA971C7B(77-bit)
\]
\[
|z| = 180005F9FCFFFC2
\]
\[
\text{Hamming-weight}(|u|) = 41
\]
\[
\text{NAF-weight}(|u|) = 6
\]
\[
\text{Hamming-weight}(|z|) = 39
\]
\[
\text{NAF-weight}(|z|) = 10
\]
\[
\beta = -2
\]
\[
\xi = \sqrt{\beta}
\]
\[
\mu = \sqrt[3]{\xi}
\]