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Paper 2014/063

Cryptanalysis on “Secure untraceable off-line electronic cash system”

Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou

Abstract

Recently, Baseri et al. proposed a secure untraceable off-line electronic cash system. They claimed that their scheme could achieve security requirements of an e-cash system such as, untraceability, anonymity, unlinkability, double spending checking, un-forgeability, date-attachability, and prevent forging coins. They further prove the un-forgeability security feature by using the hardness of discrete logarithm problems. However, after cryptanalysis, we found that the scheme cannot attain the security feature, untraceability. We, therefore, modify it to comprise this desired requirement, which is very important in an e-cash system.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
digital signaturesdiscrete logarithm problemcryptanalysisRSAelectronic commerce and payment
Contact author(s)
jschou @ mail nhu edu tw
History
2014-01-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/063
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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