

Scale-Invariant Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers^{*}

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Abstract. At Crypto 2012, Brakerski constructed a scale-invariant fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the LWE problem, in which the same modulus is used throughout the evaluation process, instead of a ladder of moduli when doing “modulus switching”. In this paper we describe a variant of the van Dijk et al. FHE scheme over the integers with the same scale-invariant property. Our scheme has a single secret modulus whose size is linear in the multiplicative depth of the circuit to be homomorphically evaluated, instead of exponential; we therefore construct a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This scheme can be transformed into a pure fully homomorphic encryption scheme using bootstrapping, and its security is still based on the Approximate-GCD problem.

We also describe an implementation of the homomorphic evaluation of the full AES encryption circuit, and obtain significantly improved performance compared to previous implementations: about 23 seconds (resp. 3 minutes) per AES block at the 72-bit (resp. 80-bit) security level on a mid-range workstation.

Finally, we prove the equivalence between the (error-free) decisional Approximate-GCD problem introduced by Cheon et al. (Eurocrypt 2013) and the classical computational Approximate-GCD problem. This equivalence allows to get rid of the additional noise in all the integer-based FHE schemes described so far, and therefore to simplify their security proof.

Keywords: Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Approximate-GCD, Homomorphic AES.

1 Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption. In 2009, Gentry constructed the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE), i.e. a scheme allowing a worker to evaluate any circuit on plaintext values while manipulating only ciphertexts. The first generation of FHE schemes [Gen09,DGHV10,SV10] and [GH11,BV11a,BV11b,CMNT11,CNT12,CCK⁺13] followed Gentry’s blueprint to achieve a fully homomorphic scheme.

The first step of Gentry’s blueprint is to construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme (SWHE) capable of evaluating “low degree” polynomials homomorphically. Inherent to this construction is the property that ciphertexts are “noisy”, and noises grow slightly with homomorphic additions and substantially with homomorphic multiplications. Thus ciphertexts need to be refreshed to maintain a low noise level and allow subsequent homomorphic operations. To obtain a FHE scheme, Gentry’s key-idea, referred to as *bootstrapping*, states that a SWHE capable of evaluating its own decryption procedure (and an additional multiplication) can be transformed into a FHE scheme. Bootstrapping consists in evaluating the decryption circuit of the SWHE scheme using the decryption key bits in encrypted form, thus resulting in a different encryption of the same plaintext but with

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reduced noise. In practice, the scheme parameters are generally determined so that the refreshed ciphertexts can handle one additional homomorphic multiplication [GH11,CMNT11,CNT12,CCK⁺13]. Unfortunately, the downside of these settings is that one needs to call the (very costly) bootstrapping procedure after each homomorphic multiplication.

Modulus Switching and Scale Invariance. To avoid bootstrapping a new noise management technique, called *modulus switching*, was introduced by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [BGV12]. The authors obtained a *leveled* FHE scheme: i.e. a scheme in which the noise grows *linearly* with the multiplicative depth instead of exponentially as in somewhat homomorphic encryption. Therefore any circuit with polynomial depth can be evaluated. The technique consists in scaling down the noise by converting a ciphertext modulo q into a ciphertext modulo a smaller q' ; the noise being reduced by roughly a factor q/q' . By carefully calibrating the ladder of moduli, the noise growth can then be made linear with the number of homomorphic multiplications. The technique was also adapted to the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers [DGHV10] in [CNT12]. Unfortunately for a circuit with L layers of multiplication, the technique requires to store the equivalent of L public-keys, yielding a huge storage requirement.

At Crypto 2012, Brakerski introduced a new tensor product technique for LWE-based leveled FHE [Bra12] so that the *same* modulus is used throughout the evaluation process instead of a layer of moduli; the noise growth is still linear in the number of homomorphic multiplications. This was achieved by considering ciphertexts such that $\langle \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = \lfloor q/2 \rfloor \cdot m + e \bmod q$, instead of $\langle \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = m + 2e \bmod q$, as in Regev’s initial scheme [Reg05].

Implementations of FHE Schemes. Independently at Crypto 2012, Gentry et al. benchmarked a LWE-based scheme by homomorphically evaluating an AES circuit [GHS12b], yielding to the first “real-world” circuit homomorphically evaluated by a FHE scheme. This implementation used the modulus switching technique of [BGV12] and additionally a batching technique [SV11,BGV12,GHS12a] that allows one to encrypt vectors of plaintexts in a single ciphertext, and to perform any permutation on the underlying plaintext vector while manipulating only the ciphertext. They obtained a timing of about 5 minutes *per AES block* homomorphically encrypted. Similar results were later obtained for the integer-based DGHV scheme [DGHV10], extending the batching technique and homomorphically evaluating AES on a desktop computer in about 12 minutes per block for 72 bits of security [CCK⁺13,CLT13].

Our Contributions. In this paper, we describe a variant of the DGHV scheme over the integers with the same scale-invariant property as in [Bra12]; i.e. our scheme does not use modulus switching and the noise grows linearly with the multiplicative depth. We obtain a DGHV variant with a single secret modulus p whose size is linear in the multiplicative depth (instead of exponential). Our technique is as follows.

In the original DGHV scheme, a ciphertext c of the bit message $m \in \{0, 1\}$ has the form

$$c = m + 2r + q \cdot p ,$$

where p is the secret key, q is a large random integer, and r is a small random integer (noise). The bit message is recovered by computing $m = (c \bmod p) \bmod 2$. Adding and multiplying ciphertexts over \mathbb{Z} respectively adds and multiplies the plaintexts modulo 2 while keeping them hidden. Unfortunately,




Fig. 1. Conversion of a ciphertext after a homomorphic multiplication

the noise grows exponentially with the number of homomorphic multiplications: if two ciphertexts c_1, c_2 have ρ -bit noise, the noise of $c_3 = c_1 \cdot c_2$ has $\approx 2\rho$ bits. Therefore to evaluate a circuit with L sequential layers of multiplications without bootstrapping, the bit-size η of the modulus p must satisfy $\eta > 2^L \rho$.

In our new scheme, similar to [Bra12], instead of encrypting the bit $m \in \{0, 1\}$ in the LSB of $[c \bmod p]$, we encrypt it in the MSB of $[c \bmod p]$; additionally we work modulo p^2 instead of modulo p . More precisely, the message m is now encrypted as

$$c = r + (m + 2r^*) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + q \cdot p^2, \quad (1)$$

where the ciphertext now contains two noises r and r^* . We decrypt c by computing $m = (2c \bmod p) \bmod 2$. Clearly adding two ciphertexts over \mathbb{Z} still adds the underlying bit messages m modulo 2. However, multiplication of two ciphertexts moves the bit message m from the MSB of $[c \bmod p]$ to the MSB of $[c \bmod p^2]$. Namely, a ciphertext c obtained as the multiplication of ciphertexts c_1 and c_2 for the respective bit messages m_1 and m_2 will have the form

$$c = 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2 = r + (m_1 \cdot m_2) \cdot \frac{p^2-1}{2} + q \cdot p^2, \quad (2)$$

where $r > p$ but still $r \ll p^2$. We then describe a procedure **Convert** that allows to publicly convert the result of a multiplication (i.e. a ciphertext as in Equation (2)) into a ciphertext reusable in subsequent homomorphic operations (i.e. a ciphertext as in Equation (1)), either keeping the same secret p (which requires, as usual, a circular security assumption) or using a different fresh p at each level (which requires a larger secret key). The bit length of the noise in the new ciphertext grows only by a constant additive factor with respect to the noise in c_1 and c_2 (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Therefore, our scheme is a variant of the DGHV scheme that is a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. It can be turned into a pure FHE scheme using bootstrapping (cf. [DGHV10, CMNT11, CNT12, CCK⁺13]). We also show that our scheme is semantically secure, under the Approximate-GCD assumption.

We also adapt our scale-invariant technique to the batch setting in [CCK⁺13] and homomorphically evaluate an AES encryption as in [GHS12b, CCK⁺13]. Our scheme offers competitive performances as it can evaluate the full AES circuit in about 23 seconds (resp. 3 minutes) per AES block at the 72-bit (resp. 80-bit) security level on a mid-range workstation, that is one order of magnitude faster than [CCK⁺13].

Finally, we prove the equivalence between the (error-free) computational Approximate-GCD problem [DGHV10,CMNT11,CNT12,CCK⁺13] and the (error-free) decisional Approximate-GCD problem introduced in [CCK⁺13,KLYC13]. From this equivalence, the additional noise added during encryption to draw the noises coming from the public key elements is no longer required. This yields automatic improvements in the parameters of all the fully homomorphic encryption schemes over the integers.

2 The Somewhat Homomorphic DGHV Scheme

In this section we first recall the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers of van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan (DGHV) in [DGHV10]. We denote by λ the security parameter, τ the number of elements in the public key, γ their bit-length, η the bit-length of the secret key p and ρ (resp. ρ') the bit-length of the noise in the public key (resp. in a fresh ciphertext).

For a real number x , we denote by $\lceil x \rceil$, $\lfloor x \rfloor$ and $\lceil x \rceil$ the upper, lower or nearest integer part of x . For integers z, p we denote the reduction of z modulo p by $(z \bmod p)$ or $[z]_p$ with $-p/2 < [z]_p \leq p/2$. For a specific η -bit odd integer p , we use the following distribution over γ -bit integers:

$$\mathcal{D}_{\gamma,\rho}(p) = \{\text{Choose } q \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^\gamma/p), r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) : \text{Output } x = q \cdot p + r\}.$$

DGHV. **KeyGen**(1^λ). Generate an η -bit random prime integer p . For $0 \leq i \leq \tau$, sample $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\gamma,\rho}(p)$.

Relabel the x_i 's so that x_0 is the largest. Restart unless x_0 is odd and $[x_0]_p$ is even. Let $\text{pk} = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_\tau)$ and $\text{sk} = p$.

DGHV. **Encrypt**($\text{pk}, m \in \{0, 1\}$). Choose a random subset $S \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, \tau\}$ and a random integer r in $(-2^{\rho'}, 2^{\rho'})$, and output the ciphertext:

$$c = \left[m + 2r + 2 \sum_{i \in S} x_i \right]_{x_0}. \quad (3)$$

DGHV. **Evaluate**($\text{pk}, C, c_1, \dots, c_t$). Given the circuit C with t input bits and t ciphertexts c_i , apply the addition and multiplication gates of C to the ciphertexts, performing all the additions and multiplications over the integers, and return the resulting integer.

DGHV. **Decrypt**(sk, c). Output $m \leftarrow (c \bmod p) \bmod 2$.

This completes the description of the scheme. The scheme is clearly somewhat homomorphic, i.e. a limited number of homomorphic operations can be performed on ciphertexts. More precisely given two ciphertexts $c = q \cdot p + 2r + m$ and $c' = q' \cdot p + 2r' + m'$ where r and r' are ρ' -bit integers, the ciphertext $c + c'$ is an encryption of $m + m' \bmod 2$ with a $(\rho' + 1)$ -bit noise and the ciphertext $c \cdot c'$ is an encryption of $m \cdot m'$ with noise bit-length $\simeq 2\rho'$. Therefore the scheme allows roughly η/ρ' successive multiplications on ciphertexts (since the noise must remain smaller than p for correct decryption).

As shown in [DGHV10] the scheme is semantically secure under the Approximate-GCD assumption.

Definition 1 (Approximate GCD). *The (ρ, η, γ) -Approximate-GCD problem consists, given a random η -bit odd integer p and given polynomially many samples from $\mathcal{D}_{\gamma,\rho}(p)$, in outputting p .*

3 Scale-Invariant DGHV Scheme

In this section we describe our variant of the DGHV scheme with the scale-invariant property. We first explain the two main ideas of our scheme, namely 1) moving the plaintext bit from the LSB to the MSB of $[c \bmod p]$ and working modulo p^2 , and 2) converting the result of a ciphertext multiplication back to a ciphertext usable in subsequent homomorphic operations. We then provide the full description of our scheme.

3.1 Ciphertexts and Homomorphic Operations

As explained in introduction, instead of encrypting the plaintext $m \in \{0, 1\}$ in the LSB of $[c \bmod p]$, m is now encrypted in the MSB of $[c \bmod p]$ as

$$c = r + (m + 2r^*) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + q \cdot p^2, \quad (1)$$

where the ciphertext has now two noises r and r^* of respective bit-length ρ and ρ^* . We call such ciphertext a *Type-I ciphertext* and we say that c has noise length (ρ, ρ^*) . To decrypt c , one computes $(2c \bmod p) \bmod 2 = m$.

Homomorphic additions are performed as additions over \mathbb{Z} : namely given two Type-I ciphertexts c_1 and c_2 of noise (ρ, ρ^*) :

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= r_1 + (m_1 + 2r_1^*) \cdot (p-1)/2 + q_1 \cdot p^2 \\ c_2 &= r_2 + (m_2 + 2r_2^*) \cdot (p-1)/2 + q_2 \cdot p^2 \end{aligned}$$

we get

$$c_1 + c_2 = r_3 + (m_1 + m_2 + 2r_3^*) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + q_3 \cdot p^2,$$

for some integers r_3, r_3^* and q_3 , with $\log_2 |r_3| \leq \rho + 1$ and $\log_2 |r_3^*| \leq \rho^* + 1$.

Next, to homomorphically multiply the ciphertexts c_1 and c_2 , one computes $c_3 = 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2$ over \mathbb{Z} . This gives

$$\begin{aligned} c_3 &= 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2 = 2r_1r_2 + (r_1(m_2 + 2r_2^*) + r_2(m_1 + 2r_1^*)) \cdot (p-1) + \\ &\quad (m_1 + 2r_1^*) \cdot (m_2 + 2r_2^*) \cdot \frac{(p-1)^2}{2} + q'_3 \cdot p^2 \\ &= r'_3 + (m_1 + 2r_1^*) \cdot (m_2 + 2r_2^*) \cdot \frac{(p-1)^2}{2} + q'_3 \cdot p^2 \end{aligned}$$

for some integers q'_3 and r'_3 , with $\log_2 |r'_3| \leq \eta + \rho + \rho^* + 3$, where η is the bit-size of p . We use $\eta \gg \rho, \rho^*$. Then, there exist integers r_3 and q_3 such that

$$c_3 = r_3 + m_3 \cdot \frac{p^2 - 1}{2} + q_3 \cdot p^2, \quad (2)$$

where $m_3 = m_1 \cdot m_2$. We call an integer c verifying Equation (2) a *Type-II ciphertext*. The bit-length of noise r_3 satisfies $\log_2 |r_3| \leq \eta + \rho + \rho^* + 4$, assuming $\rho^* < \rho$. We refer to Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the homomorphic multiplication.

3.2 Conversion from Type-II Ciphertext to Type-I Ciphertext

We show that we can efficiently convert a Type-II ciphertext back to a Type-I ciphertext, using only the public-key. Our procedure `Convert` uses essentially the same technique as the modulus switching technique for DGHV in [CNT12]. Namely modulus switching in [CNT12] enables to convert a classical DGHV ciphertext modulo a prime p into a new ciphertext modulo a prime p' , with noise scaled by a factor p'/p . Similarly, our `Convert` procedure converts a Type-II ciphertext modulo p^2 back to a ciphertext where the noise is modulo p (therefore the noise is scaled by a factor $p/p^2 = 1/p$), but still somehow encrypted modulo p^2 .

More precisely, we start from a Type-II ciphertext:

$$c = r + \frac{p^2 - 1}{2} \cdot m + q \cdot p^2 \quad (4)$$

where $|r| \leq 2^{\rho'}$. Let κ be such that $|c| < 2^\kappa$. Let \mathbf{z} be a vector of Θ rational numbers in $[0, 2^\eta)$ with κ bits of precision after the binary point, and let \mathbf{s} be a vector of Θ bits such that

$$\frac{2^\eta}{p^2} = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \varepsilon \pmod{2^\eta}, \quad (5)$$

where $|\varepsilon| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$. Here Θ is a parameter to be chosen later for security. We use the same `BitDecomp` and `PowersofTwo` procedures as in [BGV12].

- `BitDecomp $_\eta$` (\mathbf{v}): For $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, let $\mathbf{v}_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be such that $\mathbf{v} \pmod{2^\eta} = \sum_{i=0}^{\eta-1} \mathbf{v}_i \cdot 2^i$. Output the vector

$$(\mathbf{v}_0, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{\eta-1}) \in \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot \eta}.$$

- `PowersofTwo $_\eta$` (\mathbf{w}): For $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, output the vector

$$(\mathbf{w}, 2 \cdot \mathbf{w}, \dots, 2^{\eta-1} \cdot \mathbf{w}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \cdot \eta}.$$

Given the vector \mathbf{s} from (5), we let $\mathbf{s}' = \text{PowersofTwo}_\eta(\mathbf{s})$, and let

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma} = \mathbf{q} \cdot p^2 + \mathbf{r} + \left\lfloor \mathbf{s}' \cdot \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor \quad (6)$$

be an “encryption” of the vector \mathbf{s}' , where $\mathbf{q} \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^\gamma/p^2))^{\eta \cdot \Theta}$ and $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z} \cap (-2^\rho, 2^\rho))^{\eta \cdot \Theta}$. We can now define the `Convert` algorithm:

`Convert`($\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}, c$). First compute $\mathbf{c} = (\lfloor c \cdot z_i \rfloor \pmod{2^\eta})_{1 \leq i \leq \Theta}$ and its decomposition $\mathbf{c}' = \text{BitDecomp}_\eta(\mathbf{c})$.

Finally, output

$$c' \leftarrow 2 \langle \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \mathbf{c}' \rangle.$$

The following Lemma shows that our procedure `Convert` enables one to transform a Type-II ciphertext back to a Type-I ciphertext. We provide the proof in the next section.

Lemma 1. *Let ρ' be such that $\rho' \geq \eta + \rho + \log_2(\eta\Theta)$. The procedure `Convert` above converts a Type-II ciphertext with noise size ρ' into a Type-I ciphertext with noise $(\rho' - \eta + 5, \log_2 \Theta)$.*

Assume that initially the two ciphertexts c_1, c_2 are Type-I ciphertexts with noise $(\rho_1, \log_2 \Theta)$. After computing $c_3 = 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2$ which has noise size at most $\rho' = \eta + \rho_1 + \log_2 \Theta + 4$ (see previous section) one can convert c_3 back into a Type-I ciphertext with noise (ρ_3, ρ_3^*) with $\rho_3 = \rho_1 + \log_2 \Theta + 9$ and $\rho_3^* = \log_2 \Theta$, from Lemma 1. Therefore the noise length in bits has only grown by an additive factor $\log_2 \Theta + 9$. Therefore the ciphertext noise grows only linearly with the number of homomorphic multiplications.

Remark 1. To make public conversion of ciphertexts possible, one has to publish σ , which is an “encryption” of the secret key dependent vector s' . As a result, one has to assume circular security of the underlying encryption scheme, as usual in constructions of FHE.

Alternatively, as in other modulus switching-based schemes, it is also possible to define σ as an encryption of s' under a fresh secret key p' , in which case $\text{Convert}(z, \sigma, c)$ yields a Type-I ciphertext under p' . Defining a different secret prime for each level of multiplication and publishing the corresponding conversion vectors σ makes it possible to avoid circular security assumptions, but of course it increases public key size, and it is also less convenient insofar as homomorphic operations are only supported between ciphertexts at the same level.

3.3 Proof of Lemma 1

We start from a Type-II ciphertext as given by (4) with $|r| \leq 2^{\rho'}$. From

$$\sigma = p^2 \cdot \mathbf{q} + \mathbf{r} + \left\lfloor \mathbf{s}' \cdot \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor$$

we have:

$$c' = 2 \langle \sigma, c' \rangle = 2p^2 \cdot \langle \mathbf{q}, c' \rangle + 2 \langle \mathbf{r}, c' \rangle + 2 \left\langle \left\lfloor \mathbf{s}' \cdot \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor, c' \right\rangle. \quad (7)$$

Since the components of c' are bits, we have using $2 \lfloor x/2 \rfloor = x + \nu$ with $|\nu| \leq 1$:

$$2 \left\langle \left\lfloor \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \cdot \mathbf{s}' \right\rfloor, c' \right\rangle = \left\langle \frac{p}{2^\eta} \cdot \mathbf{s}', c' \right\rangle + \nu_2 = \frac{p}{2^\eta} \cdot \langle \mathbf{s}', c' \rangle + \nu_2, \quad (8)$$

where $|\nu_2| \leq \Theta \cdot \eta$. From the definition of BitDecomp and PowersofTwo , we have $\langle \mathbf{s}', c' \rangle = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c} \rangle \bmod 2^\eta = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c} \rangle + q_2 \cdot 2^\eta$. Moreover

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{\Theta} s_i \lfloor c \cdot z_i \rfloor + \Delta \cdot 2^\eta = \sum_{i=1}^{\Theta} s_i \cdot c \cdot z_i + \delta_1 + \Delta \cdot 2^\eta = c \cdot \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \delta_1 + \Delta \cdot 2^\eta,$$

for some $\Delta \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $|\delta_1| \leq \Theta/2$. Using $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{z} \rangle = 2^\eta/p^2 - \varepsilon - \mu \cdot 2^\eta$ for some $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}$, and $c = q \cdot p^2 + m \cdot (p^2 - 1)/2 + r$, this gives

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c} \rangle = c \cdot \left(\frac{2^\eta}{p^2} - \varepsilon - \mu \cdot 2^\eta \right) + \delta_1 + \Delta 2^\eta = q \cdot 2^\eta + m \cdot 2^{\eta-1} - m \cdot \frac{2^\eta}{2p^2} + r \cdot \frac{2^\eta}{p^2} - c \cdot \varepsilon + \delta_1 + (\Delta - c \cdot \mu) \cdot 2^\eta.$$

Therefore we can write

$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{c} \rangle = q_1 \cdot 2^\eta + m \cdot 2^{\eta-1} + r^*$$

for some $r^* \in \mathbb{Z}$, with $|r^*| \leq 2^{\rho' - \eta + 3}$ (because Θ is small). We get from Equation (8):

$$2 \left\langle \left\lfloor \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \cdot \mathbf{s}' \right\rfloor, c' \right\rangle = \frac{p}{2^\eta} \cdot ((q_1 + q_2) \cdot 2^\eta + m \cdot 2^{\eta-1} + r^*) + \nu_2 = q_3 \cdot p + m \cdot \frac{p}{2} + \frac{p}{2^\eta} \cdot r^* + \nu_2,$$

with $|q_3| \leq \Theta$; namely the components of $(p/2^{\eta+1}) \cdot \mathbf{s}'$ are smaller than p and \mathbf{c}' is a binary vector. This gives

$$2 \left\langle \left\lfloor \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \cdot \mathbf{s}' \right\rfloor, \mathbf{c}' \right\rangle = (2q_3 + m) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + r_2^*,$$

with again $|r_2^*| \leq 2^{\rho'-\eta+4}$. Therefore we obtain from (7):

$$\begin{aligned} c' &= 2p^2 \cdot \langle \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{c}' \rangle + 2 \langle \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{c}' \rangle + (2q_3 + m) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + r_2^* \\ c' &= 2q'' \cdot p^2 + (2q_3 + m) \cdot \frac{p-1}{2} + r'. \end{aligned}$$

where $|r'| \leq |r_2^*| + \eta\Theta 2^{\rho+1} \leq 2^{\rho'-\eta+4} + \eta\Theta 2^{\rho+1}$, which proves the Lemma. \square

3.4 Description of the Public-Key Leveled Fully Homomorphic Scheme

We are now ready to describe our scale-invariant version of the DGHV encryption scheme. For a specific η -bit odd integer p and an integer q_0 in $[0, 2^\gamma/p^2)$, we define the set:

$$\mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho = \{q \cdot p^2 + r : q \in \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, q_0), r \in \mathbb{Z} \cap (-2^\rho, 2^\rho)\}.$$

SIDGHV.KeyGen(1^λ). Generate an odd η -bit integer p and a γ -bit integer $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p^2 + r_0$ with $r_0 \leftarrow (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$ and $q_0 \leftarrow [0, 2^\gamma/p^2) \cap \mathbb{Z}$. Let $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho$ for $1 \leq i \leq \tau$. Let also $y' \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho$ and $y = y' + (p-1)/2$.

Let \mathbf{z} be a vector of Θ numbers with $\kappa = 2\gamma + 2$ bits of precision after the binary point, and let \mathbf{s} be a vector of Θ bits such that

$$\frac{2^\eta}{p^2} = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \varepsilon \pmod{2^\eta},$$

with $|\varepsilon| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$. Now, define

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma} = \mathbf{q} \cdot p^2 + \mathbf{r} + \left\lfloor \text{PowersofTwo}_\eta(\mathbf{s}) \cdot \frac{p}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor,$$

where the components of \mathbf{q} (resp. \mathbf{r}) are randomly chosen from $[0, q_0) \cap \mathbb{Z}$ (resp. $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$).

The secret-key is $\mathbf{sk} = \{p\}$ and the public-key is $\mathbf{pk} = \{x_0, x_1, \dots, x_\tau, y, \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \mathbf{z}\}$.

SIDGHV.Encrypt($\mathbf{pk}, m \in \{0, 1\}$). Choose a random subset $S \subset \{1, \dots, \tau\}$ and output

$$c \leftarrow \left[m \cdot y + \sum_{i \in S} x_i \right]_{x_0}.$$

SIDGHV.Add(\mathbf{pk}, c_1, c_2). Output $c \leftarrow c_1 + c_2 \pmod{x_0}$.

SIDGHV.Convert(\mathbf{pk}, c). Output $c' \leftarrow 2 \cdot \langle \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \text{BitDecomp}_\eta(c) \rangle$ where $\mathbf{c} = (\lfloor c \cdot z_i \rfloor \pmod{2^\eta})_{1 \leq i \leq \Theta}$.

SIDGHV.Mult(\mathbf{pk}, c_1, c_2). Output $c' \leftarrow \text{SIDGHV.Convert}(\mathbf{pk}, 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2) \pmod{x_0}$.

SIDGHV.Decrypt(\mathbf{sk}, c). Output $m \leftarrow ((2c) \pmod{p}) \pmod{2}$.

Remark 2. This describes a *leveled* fully homomorphic encryption scheme, because the noise growth is only linear in the number of levels. As in [DGHV10,CCK⁺13], the scheme can be bootstrapped to obtain a (pure) fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

3.5 Constraints on the Parameters

The parameters of the scheme must meet the following constraints (where λ is the security parameter):

- $\rho = \Omega(\lambda)$ to avoid brute force attack on the noise [CN12,CNT12],
- $\eta \geq \rho + \mathcal{O}(L \log \lambda)$ where L is the multiplicative depth of the circuit to be evaluated,
- $\gamma = \omega(\eta^2 \cdot \log \lambda)$ in order to thwart lattice-based attacks (see [DGHV10,CMNT11,CH12]),
- $\Theta^2 = \gamma \cdot \omega(\log \lambda)$ to avoid lattice attacks on the subset sum (see [CMNT11]),
- $\tau \geq \gamma + 2\lambda$ in order to apply the Leftover Hash Lemma (see Section 3.6).

To satisfy the above constraints one can take $\rho = 2\lambda$, $\eta = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(L + \lambda)$, $\gamma = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(L^2\lambda + \lambda^2)$, $\Theta = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(L\lambda)$ and $\tau = \gamma + 2\lambda$.

3.6 Semantic Security

We show that the semantic security of our scheme can be based on the following variant of the decisional problem introduced in [KLYC13], called the Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem. Roughly speaking, it should be hard to distinguish integers from \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^ρ from completely uniform integers modulo x_0 , where:

$$\mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho = \{q \cdot p^2 + r : q \in \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, q_0), r \in \mathbb{Z} \cap (-2^\rho, 2^\rho)\}.$$

Definition 2 ((ρ, η, γ) -Decisional-Approximate-GCD). *Let p be a random odd integer of η bits, q_0 an integer uniformly distributed in $[0, 2^\gamma/p^2)$, r_0 an integer uniformly distributed in $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho)$. Given $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p^2 + r_0$, polynomially many samples from \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^ρ and $y \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho + (p-1)/2$, determine $b \in \{0, 1\}$ from $c = x + b \cdot r \bmod x_0$ where $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p,q_0}^\rho$ and $r \leftarrow [0, x_0) \cap \mathbb{Z}$.*

The following theorem shows that our scheme is semantically secure under the Decisional-Approximate-GCD assumption; below we only consider a subset of our scheme without the procedure Convert, i.e. without the public parameters \mathbf{z} and σ . To prove the semantic security of the full scheme it suffices to include \mathbf{z} and σ in the above decisional assumption.⁵

Theorem 1. *The above scale-invariant DGHV scheme without the parameters \mathbf{z} , σ is semantically secure under the (ρ, η, γ) -Decisional-Approximate-GCD assumption.*

To prove the theorem, we use a preliminary Lemma from [KLYC13] stating that the distribution of the public-key elements is indistinguishable from random elements in $[0, x_0)$ if the Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is hard; the proof follows from a standard hybrid argument (see Appendix A).

Lemma 2. *For the parameters (ρ, η, γ) , let $\mathbf{pk} = (x_0, \{x_i\}_i, y)$ and $\mathbf{sk} = p$ be chosen as in the KeyGen procedure. Define $\mathbf{pk}' = (x_0, \{x'_i\}_i, y)$ for x'_i uniformly generated in $[0, x_0)$. Then \mathbf{pk} and \mathbf{pk}' are indistinguishable under the Decisional-Approximate-GCD assumption.*

⁵ Usually in FHE we first show the semantic security of a restricted scheme, and then a ‘circular security’ assumption is used to get the semantic security of the entire FHE; that is we assume that the encryption scheme remains secure even when the adversary is given encryptions of the individual bits of the private-key.

Here we first prove that the scheme is secure without the terms \mathbf{z} and σ . If the scheme is ‘circular secure’ (secure even with encryptions of the invariant switching, i.e. \mathbf{z} and σ) then it remains semantically secure. This circular security assumption can be avoided by using the classical modulus switching technique [CNT12] instead of our scale-invariance technique.

Proof (of Theorem 1). Under the attack scenario the attacker first receives the public key, and an encryption of a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. The attacker outputs a guess b' and succeeds if $b' = b$. We use a sequence of games and denote by S_i the event that the attacker succeeds in **Game** $_i$.

Game $_0$: This is the attack scenario. We simulate the challenger by running **KeyGen** to obtain pk and sk .

Game $_1$: We replace the x_i 's in the public key by elements uniformly drawn in $[0, x_0)$. By Lemma 2, we have

$$|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_0]| \leq \tau \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{dagcd}} .$$

Game $_2$: By the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 6 in Appendix B), $\sum_{i \in S} x_i \bmod x_0$ is ε -statistically indistinguishable from uniform modulo x_0 , with $\varepsilon = 2^{(\gamma-\tau)/2}$. Therefore we can replace the challenge ciphertext by a uniform integer modulo x_0 ; this no longer gives any information on b and therefore $\Pr[S_2] = 1/2$. Moreover we have $|\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_1]| \leq \varepsilon$. This gap can be made negligible by satisfying the constraints on the parameters from Section 3.5, which concludes the proof. \square

Remark 3. We show in Section 6 that the (Error-Free) Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is equivalent to the computational (Error-Free) Approximate-GCD problem. Thus our scheme is automatically based on the *computational* Approximate-GCD problem as in previous works on the DGHV schemes [DGHV10, CMNT11, CNT12].

4 Generalization to Batch Scale-Invariant DGHV Scheme

We now describe a generalization of the previous scheme to the batch setting (as in RLWE-based schemes [BV11a, BV11b] and integer schemes [CCK⁺13]). The goal is to pack ℓ plaintext bits $m_0, \dots, m_{\ell-1}$ into a single ciphertext. Homomorphic addition and multiplication will then apply in parallel and component-wise on the m_i 's.

Our batch generalization is similar to [CCK⁺13]. A ciphertext encrypting a vector $\mathbf{m} = (m_0, \dots, m_{\ell-1})$ has the form:

$$c = \text{CRT}_{q_0, p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2} \left(q, r_0 + (2r_0^* + m_0) \cdot \frac{p_0 - 1}{2}, \dots, r_{\ell-1} + (2r_{\ell-1}^* + m_{\ell-1}) \cdot \frac{p_{\ell-1} - 1}{2} \right) \quad (9)$$

for a tuple of $\ell + 1$ coprime integers $q_0, p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}$, where we denote by $\text{CRT}_{b_i}(a_i)$ the unique integer u such that $0 \leq u < \prod_i b_i$ and $u \bmod b_i = a_i$ for all i . We call such ciphertext a *batch Type-I ciphertext*. Modulo each of the p_j 's the ciphertext c behaves as in the **SIDGHV** scheme in Section 3. Accordingly, the addition of two ciphertexts yields a new ciphertext that decrypts to the componentwise sum modulo 2 of the original plaintexts.

To homomorphically multiply two ciphertexts c_1 and c_2 , as previously one computes $c_3 = 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2$ in \mathbb{Z} . As previously there exists small integers $r_{3,j}$ such that

$$c_3 \equiv r_{3,j} + m_j \cdot \frac{p_j^2 - 1}{2} \pmod{p_j} \quad \text{for } j = 0, \dots, \ell - 1, \quad (10)$$

where each m_j is the product of the corresponding plain text components of c_1 and c_2 . We call c_3 a *batch Type-II ciphertext*. Modulo each of the p_j 's, the ciphertext c_3 behaves as a Type-II ciphertext given by Equation (2); therefore the message bit m_j is the MSB of $[c \bmod p_j^2]$ for all j . As in Section 3, there exists an efficient conversion procedure **Convert** to convert any Type-II

ciphertext to a new Type-I ciphertext. As shown below the procedure `Convert` is actually the same as in Section 3, with adapted public parameters.

Namely let \mathbf{z} be a vector of Θ rational numbers in $[0, 2^\eta)$ with κ bits of precision after the binary point (where $|c| < 2^\kappa$), and let (\mathbf{s}_j) be a set of ℓ vectors of Θ bits such that, for all $j = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$,

$$\frac{2^\eta}{p_j^2} = \langle \mathbf{s}_j, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \varepsilon_j \pmod{2^\eta}$$

where $|\varepsilon_j| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$. Let $\mathbf{s}'_j = \text{PowersofTwo}_\eta(\mathbf{s}_j) \in \mathbb{Z}^{\eta\Theta}$. Define $\boldsymbol{\sigma} = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\eta\Theta})$ so that, for all $1 \leq i \leq \eta\Theta$:

$$\sigma_i = \text{CRT}_{q_0, p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2} \left(q_i, r_{0,i} + \left\lfloor s'_{0,i} \cdot \frac{p_0}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor, \dots, r_{\ell-1,i} + \left\lfloor s'_{\ell-1,i} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell-1}}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor \right)$$

is an encryption of $(s'_{j,i})_{1 \leq j \leq \ell}$. For `Convert` we use the same algorithm as in Section 3:

`Convert`($\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}, c$). First compute $\mathbf{c} = (\lfloor c \cdot z_i \rfloor \pmod{2^\eta})_{1 \leq i \leq \Theta}$ and then its decomposition $\mathbf{c}' = \text{BitDecomp}_\eta(\mathbf{c})$. Finally, output

$$c' \leftarrow 2 \langle \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \mathbf{c}' \rangle \pmod{x_0}.$$

The proof of the following lemma follows directly from the proof of Lemma 1 applied modulo each of the p_j 's.

Lemma 3. *The procedure `Convert` above converts a Type-II ciphertext with noise size ρ' into a Type-I ciphertext with noise $(\rho' - \eta + 5, \log_2 \Theta)$, for $\rho' - \eta \geq \rho + \log_2(\eta\Theta)$.*

4.1 Description of the Public-Key Batch Leveled Fully Homomorphic Scheme

For coprime integers of η bits $p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}$ of product π and $q_0 \in [0, 2^\gamma/\pi^2)$ coprime with the p_j 's, we consider the following set:

$$\mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho = \left\{ \text{CRT}_{q_0, p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2} (q, r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1}) : q \in \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, q_0), r_0, \dots, r_{\ell-1} \in \mathbb{Z} \cap (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \right\}.$$

`SIBDGHV.KeyGen`(1^λ). Generate η -bit coprime integers $p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}$ of product π and a γ -bit integers

$$x_0 = q_0 \cdot \pi^2 + \text{CRT}_{p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2} (r_{0,0}, \dots, r_{0,\ell-1}),$$

with $r_{0,j} \leftarrow (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$ and $q_0 \leftarrow [0, 2^\gamma/\pi^2)$ an integer coprime with the p_j 's. Generate $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho$ for $i = 1, \dots, \tau$ and $y'_j \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$ and define

$$y_j = y'_j + \frac{p_j - 1}{2} \cdot \prod_{\substack{i=0 \\ i \neq j}}^{\ell-1} p_i^2.$$

Let \mathbf{z} be a vector of Θ numbers with $\kappa = 2\gamma + 2$ bits of precision after the binary point, and let (\mathbf{s}_j) be a set of ℓ vectors of Θ bits such that, for all $j = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$,

$$\frac{2^\eta}{p_j^2} = \langle \mathbf{s}_j, \mathbf{z} \rangle + \varepsilon_j \pmod{2^\eta}$$

with $|\varepsilon_j| \leq 2^{-\kappa}$. Let $\mathbf{s}'_j = \text{PowersofTwo}_\eta(\mathbf{s}_j) \in \mathbb{Z}^{\eta\Theta}$. Then, define $\boldsymbol{\sigma} = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\eta\Theta})$ so that, for all $1 \leq i \leq \eta\Theta$:

$$\sigma_i = \text{CRT}_{q_0, p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2} \left(q_i, r_{0,i} + \left\lfloor s'_{0,i} \cdot \frac{p_0}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor, \dots, r_{\ell-1,i} + \left\lfloor s'_{\ell-1,i} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell-1}}{2^{\eta+1}} \right\rfloor \right)$$

where q_i (resp. $r_{j,i}$) are randomly chosen from $[0, q_0]$ (resp. $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho)$).

The secret-key is $\text{sk} = (p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1})$ and the public-key is $\text{pk} = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_\tau, y_1, \dots, y_\ell, \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \mathbf{z})$.

SIBDGHV. Encrypt($\text{pk}, \mathbf{m} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$). Choose a random subset $S \subset \{1, \dots, \tau\}$ and output

$$c \leftarrow \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} m_j \cdot y_j + \sum_{i \in S} x_i \right]_{x_0}.$$

SIBDGHV. Add(pk, c_1, c_2). Output $c \leftarrow [c_1 + c_2]_{x_0}$.

SIBDGHV. Convert(pk, c). Output $c' \leftarrow 2 \cdot \langle \boldsymbol{\sigma}, \text{BitDecomp}_\eta(c) \rangle$ where $\mathbf{c} = ([c \cdot z_i] \bmod 2^\eta)_{1 \leq i \leq \Theta}$.

SIBDGHV. Mult(pk, c_1, c_2). Output $c' \leftarrow [\text{SIBDGHV. Convert}(\text{pk}, 2 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2)]_{x_0}$.

SIBDGHV. Decrypt(sk, c). Output $m_j \leftarrow ((2c) \bmod p_j) \bmod 2$ for $j = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$

Remark 4. Here again this describes a batch *leveled* fully homomorphic encryption scheme, but can be turned into a (pure) batch fully homomorphic encryption scheme [CCK⁺13].

4.2 Semantic Security

We show that the batch variant above is semantically secure under a variant of the previous Decisional-Approximate-GCD assumption with error-free x_0 . We use the same approach as in [CCK⁺13]: first we introduce a batch variant of the Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem; then we show that our scale-invariant batch DGHV scheme is semantically secure under the batch decisional assumption; finally we show that the batch decisional assumption is actually equivalent to the non-batch decisional assumption (with error-free x_0).

Definition 3 ((ρ, η, γ) - ℓ -Decisional-Approximate-GCD). *Let $p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}$ be coprime random η -bit integers of product π , q_0 an integer uniformly distributed in $[0, 2^\gamma/\pi^2]$ coprime to the p_j 's, $r_{0,j}$ integers uniformly distributed in $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho)$. Given $x_0 = q_0 \cdot \pi^2 + \text{CRT}_{p_0^2, \dots, p_{\ell-1}^2}(r_{0,0}, \dots, r_{0,\ell-1})$ and polynomially many samples from $\mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho$, and $y_j = y'_j + (p_j - 1)/2 \cdot \prod_{i \neq j} p_i^2$ where $y'_j \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho$ for $0 \leq j < \ell$, determine $b \in \{0, 1\}$ from $c = x + b \cdot r \bmod x_0$ where $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p_0, \dots, p_{\ell-1}, q_0}^\rho$ and $r \leftarrow [0, x_0] \cap \mathbb{Z}$.*

Theorem 2. *The scale-invariant batch DGHV scheme with parameters $(\ell, \rho, \eta, \gamma)$ with $\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is semantically secure under the (ρ, η, γ) - ℓ -Decisional-Approximate-GCD assumption.*

Proof (Sketch). The proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 1: after having switched from a valid public key to a false public-key (with uniform elements over $[0, x_0]$) which are indistinguishable by a straightforward generalization of Lemma 2, when receiving the challenge messages $\mathbf{m}_0 \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and $\mathbf{m}_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ from the adversary, we encrypt \mathbf{m}_b with the false public-key which by the Leftover Hash Lemma gives no information on \mathbf{m}_b . \square

We recall the following Lemma from [KLYC13], showing that the batch and non-batch decisional assumptions are equivalent when using an error-free x_0 .

Lemma 4. *The (ρ, η, γ) -Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem with error-free x_0 is reducible to the (ρ, η, γ) - ℓ -Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem with error-free x_0 .*

Remark 5. Here again by Section 6, our batch scheme with error-free x_0 is automatically based on a *computational* problem as in the previous work on the batch DGHV scheme [CCK⁺13].

5 Practical Implementation

In this section, we provide concrete parameters and timings for a homomorphic evaluation of AES with our batch scale-invariant DGHV scheme. For homomorphic AES evaluations we compare our timings with the RLWE-based leveled-FHE scheme in [GHS12b] and with the batch (bootstrapping-based) DGHV scheme in [CCK⁺13, CLT13]. We use the following existing optimizations:

1. Subset-sum: as in [CMNT11] we use β -bit integers b_i instead of bits in the subset sum, to reduce the value of τ . Namely the condition becomes $\beta \cdot \tau \geq \gamma + 2\lambda$.
2. Public-key compression: the technique in [CNT12, CLT13] enables to compress the ciphertexts in the public-key from γ to roughly $\ell \cdot \eta$ bits.
3. Ciphertext expand [CNT12]: the technique consists in generating the z_i 's with a special structure instead of pseudo-random. Let δ be a parameter to be specified later. One generates a random z with $\kappa + \delta \cdot \Theta \cdot \eta$ bits of precision after the binary point, and one defines the z_i 's for $\ell + 1 \leq i \leq \Theta$ as

$$z_i = \left[z \cdot 2^{i \cdot \delta \cdot \eta} \right]_{2^\eta},$$

keeping only κ bits of precision after the binary point for each z_i as previously. We fix z_1, \dots, z_ℓ so that the previous equalities hold. Then the ciphertext expansion can be computed as follows, for all $\ell + 1 \leq i \leq \Theta$:

$$c_i = \lfloor c \cdot z_i \rfloor \bmod 2^\eta = \lfloor c \cdot z \cdot 2^{i \cdot \delta \cdot \eta} \rfloor \bmod 2^\eta.$$

Therefore computing all the z_i 's (except the first ℓ) is now essentially a single multiplication $c \cdot z$. A lattice attack against this optimization is described in [CNT12]; the authors show that the attack is thwarted by selecting δ such that $\delta \cdot \Theta \cdot \eta \geq 3\gamma$.

5.1 Optimization of Scalar Product

We describe an additional optimization for computing the scalar product $c' = 2\langle \sigma, c' \rangle$ computed in `Convert`, similar to the ciphertext expand optimization above. The vectors σ and c' have $\eta\Theta$ elements. We first divide the vectors σ and c' into subvectors of Θ elements, and we compute the scalar products of the subvectors separately. In the following for simplicity we keep the same notations and now assume that σ and c' have Θ elements each.

We generate the vector $\sigma \in \mathbb{Z}^\Theta$ such that:

$$\sigma_i = \left[\sigma \cdot 2^{i \cdot \delta \cdot \eta} \right] + v_i$$

Table 1. Benchmarking of a C++ implementation of our scale-invariant batch DGHV scheme with a compressed public key on an Intel Xeon E5-2690 at 2.9 GHz on the state-wise AES implementation, using GMP [Gt13].

| Instance | λ | ℓ | ρ | η | $\gamma \times 10^{-6}$ | τ, Θ | pk size | KeyGen | Encrypt | Decrypt | Mult | Convert |
|---------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|----------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|------|---------|
| Toy | 42 | 9 | 42 | 971 | 0.27 | 135 | 3.2 MB | 0.5s | 0.0s | 0.0s | 0.0s | 0.1s |
| Small | 52 | 35 | 52 | 976 | 1.1 | 525 | 45 MB | 11s | 0.2s | 0.0s | 0.0s | 0.3s |
| Medium | 62 | 140 | 62 | 981 | 4.2 | 2100 | 704 MB | 5min | 3s | 0.2s | 0.0s | 2.8s |
| Large | 72 | 569 | 72 | 986 | 15.8 | 8535 | 11 GB | 2h 50min | 45s | 3.3s | 0.1s | 33s |
| Extra | 80 | 1875 | 86 | 993 | 35.9 | 28125 | 100 GB | 213h | 5min | 24s | 0.3s | 277s |

| Instance | λ | $\ell = \#$ of enc. in parallel | AddRoundKey | SubBytes | ShiftRows | MixColumns | Total Time | Time/AES block |
|---------------|-----------|---------------------------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|
| Toy | 42 | 9 | 0.0s | 1.5s | 0.0s | 0.0s | 15.1s | 1.7s |
| Small | 52 | 35 | 0.1s | 9.9s | 0.0s | 0.0s | 1min 40s | 2.9s |
| Medium | 62 | 140 | 0.3s | 80.5s | 0.0s | 0.1s | 13min 29s | 5.8s |
| Large | 72 | 569 | 2.1s | 21min | 0.0s | 0.6s | 3h 35min | 23s |
| Extra | 80 | 1875 | 6.9s | 10h 9min | 0.1s | 1.6s | 102h | 195s |

for small public corrections $|v_i| \leq 2^{\eta-\ell}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq \Theta$, where the large public random σ has $\delta\eta\Theta$ bits of precision after the binary point, and $\gamma + \delta\eta\Theta$ bits in total. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
 c' &= 2\langle \sigma, c' \rangle = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \left[\sigma \cdot 2^{i\delta\eta} \right] \cdot c'_i + 2\langle v, c' \rangle = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\sigma \cdot 2^{i\delta\eta} + u_i \right) \cdot c'_i + 2\langle v, c' \rangle \\
 &= 2\sigma \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c'_i \cdot 2^{i\delta\eta} \right) + 2\langle v, c' \rangle + u = \left[2\sigma \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c'_i \cdot 2^{i\delta\eta} \right) \right] + 2\langle v, c' \rangle + u',
 \end{aligned}$$

where $|u_i| \leq 1/2$, $|u| \leq \Theta$, and $u' \in \mathbb{Z}$ is such that $|u'| \leq \Theta + 1$. Then the scalar product becomes essentially one multiplication and another scalar product but with much smaller entries v_i 's instead of σ_i 's.

Therefore with vectors σ and c' with $\eta\Theta$ elements each instead of Θ , the scalar product $2\langle \sigma, c' \rangle$ becomes essentially η multiplications and another scalar product but with much smaller entries v_i 's instead of σ_i 's. Note that the size of c' is now $\gamma + \Theta\delta\eta$ bits instead of γ ; therefore one must increase κ by twice the same additive factor (to support multiplications of two such converted ciphertexts).

Finally we use the following straightforward optimization: instead of using `BitDecomp` and `PowersofTwo` with bits, we use words of size ω bits instead. This decreases the size of the vector σ by a factor ω , at the cost of increasing the resulting noise by roughly ω bits. In particular the scalar product $2\langle \sigma, c' \rangle$ then requires essentially $\lceil \eta/\omega \rceil$ multiplications and another scalar product but with smaller entries v_i 's instead of σ_i 's. In our code we used $\omega = 64$.

5.2 Concrete Parameters and AES Evaluation

In Table 1 we derive concrete parameters as in [CNT12,CCK⁺13], taking into account the known attacks on the Approximate-GCD problem [CMNT11,CNT12,CN12,CH12].

AES evaluation has become a standard evaluation circuit for FHE [GHS12b,CCK⁺13]. The main difference between [GHS12b] and [CCK⁺13] (apart from the underlying FHE scheme) is that bootstrapping was used in the later while in the former the parameters could be made large enough so that no bootstrapping was required to evaluate the full-fledged AES circuit (thanks to the linear growth of the noise). In our scheme we also chose large enough parameters so that the entire AES evaluation could be performed without bootstrapping.

In practice we have evaluated the AES circuit using the state-wise bitslicing variant described in [CLT13] and we obtained the results in Table 1. In this variant, the state is represented as an array of 128 ciphertexts, each ciphertext representing one bit of the state of ℓ different AES blocks encrypted in parallel. In [CCK⁺13,CLT13], the authors obtained a time per AES block of 12 min 46 s on a 4-core machine at 3.4 GHz whereas we obtained 23 s on a 16-core machine at 2.9 GHz for the same security level (72 bits of security); which is *one order of magnitude faster*. For 80 bits of security, timings are competitive with [GHS12b] (3 min vs. 5 min).

6 Equivalence between the (Error-Free) Decisional and Computational Approximate-GCD Problems

In this section, we show the equivalence between the (error-free) decisional and computational Approximate-GCD problems. As a consequence, it follows directly that the additional noises in the fully homomorphic encryption schemes over the integers [DGHV10,CMNT11,CNT12,CLT13] can be removed (as in [CCK⁺13, Section 3]), simplifying both the schemes and the security proofs. In the following for simplicity we only consider integers $r \in [0, 2^\rho)$ instead of $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho)$. One can always go from one distribution to another by an appropriate centering. Therefore, for a η -bit integer p and $q_0 \in [0, 2^\gamma/p)$, we consider the following distribution over γ -bit integers:

$$\mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0) = \{\text{Choose } q \leftarrow [0, q_0), r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^\rho) : \text{Output } y = q \cdot p + r\}.$$

Let us recall the definition of the computational and decisional Error-Free Approximate-GCD problems.

Definition 4 (Error-Free (Computational) Approximate-GCD). *The (ρ, η, γ) -error-free Approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η -bit prime p , given a γ -bit 2^{λ^2} -rough integer $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p$ where q_0 is a random integer in $[0, 2^\gamma/p)$, and polynomially many samples from $\mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$, output p .*

Definition 5 (Error-Free Decisional Approximate-GCD). *The (ρ, η, γ) -error-free Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η -bit prime p , given a γ -bit 2^{λ^2} -rough integer $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p$ and polynomially many samples from $\mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$, determine $b \in \{0, 1\}$ from $z = x + r \cdot b \pmod{x_0}$ where $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$ and $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, x_0)$.*

We also consider the following decisional problem.

Definition 6 (Error-Free LSB Approximate-GCD Problem). *The (ρ, η, γ) -error-free LSB Approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η -bit prime p , given a γ -bit 2^{λ^2} -rough integer $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p$ and polynomially many samples from $\mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$, determine $b \in \{0, 1\}$ from $z = q \cdot p + 2r + b \cdot c$ where $q \leftarrow [0, q_0)$, $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^{\rho-1})$ and $c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.*

One can show that the problems from Definitions 4 and 6 are equivalent. Indeed, we can construct a high-accuracy LSB predictor subroutine (cf. Algorithm 1 below) using an adversary \mathcal{A} having a non-negligible advantage ϵ against the (ρ', η, γ) -Error-Free LSB Approximate-GCD problem (with $\rho' > \log_2(\tau + 1) + \rho + \lambda$)⁶, and by using it in Step 2 of the security proof of [DGHV10], we automatically get the equivalence.

⁶ The additional noise is used to draw the noise due to the public key elements and z .

Algorithm 1 Learn-LSB(z, pk)

Input: $z = qp + r \in [0, 2^\gamma)$ with $|r| \leq 2^\rho$, and $x_0 = q_0 \cdot p$.

Output: The least significant bit of q

Generate $x_1, \dots, x_\tau \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$

for $j = 1$ **to** $\text{poly}(\lambda/\epsilon)$ **do**

 Choose randomly and uniformly a noise $r_j \leftarrow [0, 2^{\rho'})$, a bit $\delta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and a random subset $S_j \subset \{1, \dots, \tau\}$

 Set $y_j = z + \delta + 2r_j + 2 \sum_{i \in S_j} x_i \bmod x_0$

 Call \mathcal{A} to get a prediction of $(r \bmod 2) \oplus \delta$: $a_j \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y_j)$

 Set $b_j \leftarrow a_j \oplus \text{parity}(z) \oplus \delta$

end for

Output the majority vote among the b_j 's

Let us show that Definitions 5 and 6 are equivalent. We consider the sequence of distributions for $\rho \leq i \leq \eta + \lambda$:

$$\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i) = \left\{ \text{Choose } q \leftarrow [0, q_0), r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^i) : \text{Output } y = q \cdot p + 2^{\lambda+\eta-i} \cdot r \bmod x_0 \right\} .$$

Note that in the distribution $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i)$ above the size of the random r is i -bit instead of ρ -bit. For $i = \rho$, the distribution of y is the same as the distribution $\mathcal{D}_\rho(p, q_0)$, up to a factor $2^{\lambda+\eta-\rho}$ modulo x_0 . One can show that for $i = \eta + \lambda$, the distribution $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i)$ is $2^{-\lambda}$ -statistically close to uniform modulo x_0 . Therefore by a standard hybrid argument, if a distinguisher solves the Error-Free Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem with some non-negligible advantage, then he must be able to distinguish between two successive distributions $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i)$ and $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i + 1)$ for some i .

Let us consider the challenge from the Error-Free LSB Approximate-GCD problem:

$$z = q \cdot p + 2r + b \cdot c$$

where $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^{\rho-1})$ and $c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. We let:

$$y = 2^{\lambda+\eta-i-1} \cdot (2^\rho \cdot u + z) \bmod x_0$$

where $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^{i+1-\rho})$. This gives:

$$\begin{aligned} y &= q' \cdot p + 2^{\lambda+\eta-i-1} \cdot (2^\rho \cdot u + 2r + b \cdot c) \bmod x_0 \\ &= q' \cdot p + 2^{\lambda+\eta-i-1} \cdot (2r' + b \cdot c) \end{aligned}$$

for some $q' \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^i)$.

If $b = 0$ then we get $y = q' \cdot p + 2^{\lambda+\eta-i} \cdot r'$ which corresponds to the distribution $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i)$. If $b = 1$ then we get $y = q' \cdot p + 2^{\lambda+\eta-i-1} \cdot r''$ where $r'' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z} \cap [0, 2^{i+1})$, which corresponds to the distribution $\mathcal{D}'_\rho(p, q_0, i + 1)$. Therefore we can use the previous distinguisher to solve the Error-Free LSB Approximate-GCD problem.

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A Proof of Lemma 2

Assume that there exists a polynomial-time distinguisher \mathcal{B} distinguishing \mathbf{pk} from \mathbf{pk}' with advantage ε . Using \mathcal{B} we can construct a polynomial-time distinguisher \mathcal{A} solving the Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem with advantage ε/τ . For $r = 0, \dots, \tau$, define

$$\mathbf{pk}^{(r)} = (x_0, \{x_1^{(r)}, \dots, x_r^{(r)}, x_{r+1}^{(r)}, \dots, x_\tau^{(r)}\}, y),$$

where $x_1^{(r)}, \dots, x_r^{(r)} \leftarrow [0, x_0)$ and $x_{r+1}^{(r)}, \dots, x_\tau^{(r)} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{p, q_0}^\rho$. Thus \mathcal{B} has advantage ε to distinguish $\text{pk}^{(0)} = \text{pk}$ from $\text{pk}^{(\tau)} = \text{pk}'$. By a standard hybrid argument, there exists a r so that \mathcal{B} distinguish $\text{pk}^{(r)}$ and $\text{pk}^{(r+1)}$ with advantage ε/τ ; therefore letting $x_r^{(r)} = c$ where c is the Decisional-Approximate-GCD challenge, \mathcal{B} allows us to solve the Decisional-Approximate-GCD problem with advantage ε/τ . \square

B Leftover Hash Lemma

We recall the classical Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL), following [DGHV10]. A family \mathcal{H} of hash functions from X to Y , both finite sets, is said to be pairwise-independent if for all distinct $x, x' \in X$, $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(x) = h(x')] = 1/|Y|$. A distribution D is ε -uniform if its statistical distance from the uniform distribution is at most ε , where the statistical distance $\Delta(D_1, D_2)$ between two distributions D_1, D_2 over a finite domain X is given by $\Delta(D_1, D_2) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in X} |D_1(x) - D_2(x)|$.

Lemma 5 (Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99]). *Let \mathcal{H} be a family of pairwise hash functions from X to Y . Suppose that $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ and $x \leftarrow X$ are chosen uniformly and independently. Then, $(h, h(x))$ is $\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{|Y|/|X|}$ -uniform over $\mathcal{H} \times X$.*

From the LHL one can deduce the following Lemma for finite sums modulo an integer M , as proved in [DGHV10]:

Lemma 6. *Set $x_1, \dots, x_m \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_M$ uniformly and independently, set $s_1, \dots, s_m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, and set $y = \sum_{i=1}^m s_i \cdot x_i \bmod M$. Then (x_1, \dots, x_m, y) is $1/2\sqrt{M/2^m}$ -uniform over \mathbb{Z}_M^{m+1} .*

Proof. We consider the following hash function family \mathcal{H} from $\{0, 1\}^m$ to \mathbb{Z}_M . Each member $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is parameterized by the elements $(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_M^m$. Given $\mathbf{s} \in \{0, 1\}^m$, we define $h(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_{i=1}^m s_i \cdot x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_M$. The hash function family is clearly pairwise independent. Therefore by Lemma 5, $(h, h(x))$ is $1/2\sqrt{M/2^m}$ -uniform over \mathbb{Z}_M^{m+1} . \square