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Paper 2013/610

Key-recovery Attacks on Various RO PUF Constructions via Helper Data Manipulation

Jeroen Delvaux and Ingrid Verbauwhede

Abstract

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are emerging as hardware security primitives. They are mainly used to generate secret keys which are inherently unique for every manufactured sample of a chip. Ring Oscillator (RO) PUFs are among the most widely researched PUFs. In this work, we claim various RO PUF constructions to be vulnerable against manipulation of their public helper data. Partial/full key-recovery is a threat for the following constructions, in chronological order. (1) Temperature-aware cooperative RO PUFs, proposed at HOST 2009. (2) The sequential pairing algorithm, proposed at HOST 2010. (3) Group-based RO PUFs, proposed at DATE 2013. (4) Or more general, all entropy distiller constructions proposed at DAC 2013.

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Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
jeroen delvaux @ esat kuleuven be
History
2014-03-19: last of 2 revisions
2013-09-23: received
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Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/610
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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