You are looking at a specific version 20140703:023724 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2013/608

Towards Optimal Leakage Exploitation Rate in Template Attacks

Guangjun Fan and Yongbin Zhou and Hailong Zhang and Dengguo Feng

Abstract

Under the assumption that one has a reference device identical or similar to the target device, and thus be well capable of characterizing power leakages of the target device, Template Attacks are widely accepted to be the most powerful side-channel attacks. However, the question of whether Template Attacks are really optimal in terms of the leakage exploitation rate is still unclear. In this paper, we present a negative answer to this crucial question by introducing a normalization process into classical Template Attacks. Specifically, our contributions are two folds. On the theoretical side, we prove that Normalized Template Attacks are better in terms of the leakage exploitation rate than Template Attacks; on the practical side, we evaluate the key-recovery efficiency of Normalized Template Attacks and Template Attacks in the same attacking scenario. Evaluation results show that, compared with Template Attacks, Normalized Template Attacks are more effective. We note that, the computational price of the normalization process is of extremely low, and thus it is very easy-to-implement in practice. Therefore, the normalization process should be integrated into Template Attacks as a necessary step, so that one can better understand practical threats of Template Attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Side-Channel AttacksPower Analysis AttacksTemplate AttacksLeakage Exploitation Rate.
Contact author(s)
guangjunfan @ 163 com
History
2014-08-01: last of 17 revisions
2013-09-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/608
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.