Paper 2013/253

CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels

Goran Doychev, Dominik Feld, Boris Köpf, Laurent Mauborgne, and Jan Reineke


We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channels. CacheAudit takes as input a program binary and a cache configuration, and it derives formal, quantitative security guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel adversaries, namely those based on observing cache states, traces of hits and misses, and execution times. Our technical contributions include novel abstractions to efficiently compute precise over-approximations of the possible side-channel observations for each of these adversaries. These approximations then yield upper bounds on the information that is revealed. In case studies we apply CacheAudit to binary executables of algorithms for symmetric encryption and sorting, obtaining the first formal proofs of security for implementations with countermeasures such as preloading and data-independent memory access patterns.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
AESCache Side ChannelsProgram Analysis
Contact author(s)
boris koepf @ imdea org
2013-05-08: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Goran Doychev and Dominik Feld and Boris Köpf and Laurent Mauborgne and Jan Reineke},
      title = {CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of   Cache Side Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/253},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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