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Paper 2013/240

Algebraic analysis of Trivium-like ciphers

Sui-Guan Teo and Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong and Harry Bartlett and Leonie Simpson and Ed Dawson

Abstract

Trivium is a bit-based stream cipher in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we apply the approach of Berbain et al. to Trivium-like ciphers and perform new algebraic analyses on them, namely Trivium and its reduced versions: Trivium-N, Bivium-A and Bivium-B. In doing so, we answer an open question in the literature. We demonstrate a new algebraic attack on Bivium-A. This attack requires less time and memory than previous techniques which use the F4 algorithm to recover Bivium-A's initial state. Though our attacks on Bivium-B, Trivium and Trivium-N are worse than exhaustive keysearch, the systems of equations which are constructed are smaller and less complex compared to previous algebraic analysis. Factors which can affect the complexity of our attack on Trivium-like ciphers are discussed in detail.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Stream ciphersTriviumTrivium-NBivium-ABivium-Balgebraic attacks
Contact author(s)
teosuiguan @ gmail com
History
2013-04-29: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/240
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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