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Paper 2013/235

Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations

Ben Smyth and David Bernhard

Abstract

We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.

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Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Keywords
anonymityapplicationsballot independenceballot secrecyelection schemesfoundations
Contact author(s)
research @ bensmyth com
History
2014-10-10: last of 2 revisions
2013-04-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/235
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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