Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/235

Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations

Ben Smyth and David Bernhard

Abstract: We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.

Category / Keywords: foundations / anonymity, applications, ballot independence, ballot secrecy, election schemes, foundations

Publication Info: ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Date: received 23 Apr 2013, last revised 10 Oct 2014

Contact author: research at bensmyth com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20141010:082554 (All versions of this report)

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