Paper 2013/075
Improved Security for a Ring-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Joppe W. Bos and Kristin Lauter and Jake Loftus and Michael Naehrig
Abstract
In 1996, Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman introduced an efficient lattice based encryption scheme dubbed NTRUEncrypt. Unfortunately, this scheme lacks a proof of security. However, in 2011, Stehle and Steinfeld showed how to modify NTRUEncrypt to reduce security to standard problems in ideal lattices. At STOC 2012, Lopez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan proposed a fully homomorphic scheme based on this modified system. However, to allow homomorphic operations and prove security, a non-standard assumption is required in their scheme. In this paper, we show how to remove this non-standard assumption via techniques introduced by Brakerski at CRYPTO 2012 and construct a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme from the Stehle and Steinfeld version based on standard lattice assumptions and a circular security assumption. The scheme is scale-invariant and therefore avoids modulus switching, it eliminates ciphertext expansion in homomorphic multiplication, and the size of ciphertexts is one ring element. Moreover, we present a practical variant of our scheme, which is secure under stronger assumptions, along with parameter recommendations and promising implementation results. Finally, we present a novel approach for encrypting larger input sizes by applying a CRT approach on the input space.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Leveled homomorphic encryptionfully homomorphic encryptionring learning with errors
- Contact author(s)
- mnaehrig @ microsoft com
- History
- 2013-09-30: revised
- 2013-02-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/075
- License
-
CC BY