Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/366

Securing Circuits Against Constant-Rate Tampering

Dana Dachman-Soled and Yael Tauman Kalai

Abstract: We present a compiler that converts any circuit into one that remains secure even if a constant fraction of its wires are tampered with. Following the seminal work of Ishai et al. (Eurocrypt 2006), we consider adversaries who may choose an arbitrary set of wires to corrupt, and may set each such wire to 0 or to 1, or may toggle with the wire. We prove that such adversaries, who continuously tamper with the circuit, can learn at most logarithmically many bits of secret information (in addition to black-box access to the circuit). Our results are information theoretic.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / side-channel attacks, tampering, circuit compiler, PCP of proximity

Publication Info: Crypto 2012

Date: received 28 Jun 2012

Contact author: dadachma at microsoft com

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Version: 20120629:144545 (All versions of this report)

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