Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/661

New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia

Dongxia Bai and Leibo Li

Abstract: Camellia is one of the most worldwide used block ciphers, which has been selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we propose several new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia with 2 $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers, which turn out to be the first 7-round impossible differentials with 2 $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers. Combined with some basic techniques including the early abort approach and the key schedule consideration, we achieve the impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192, 12-round Camellia-192, and 14-round Camellia-256, and the time complexity are $2^{123.6}$, $2^{121.7}$, $2^{171.4}$ and $2^{238.2}$ respectively. As far as we know, these are the best results against the reduced-round variants of Camellia. Especially, we give the first attack on 11-round Camellia-128 reduced version with $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Camellia, Impossible Differential, Cryptanalysis, Impossible Differential Attack.

Date: received 7 Dec 2011

Contact author: baidx10 at mails tsinghua edu cn

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Version: 20111209:210208 (All versions of this report)

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