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Paper 2011/634
Security of Multiple-Key Agreement Protocols and Propose an Enhanced Protocol
Mohammad Sabzinejad Farash and Mahmoud Ahmadian Attari and Majid Bayat
Abstract
Multiple key agreement protocols produce several session keys instead of one session key. Most of the multiple key agreement protocols do not utilize the hash functions in the signature schemes used for identification. Not using hash function in these protocols causes that the protocols do not satisfy some requirement security properties. In this paper we review the multiple key agreement protocols and perform attacks on some of them. Then we introduce a new multiple key agreement protocol and show that the proposed protocol is more secure than the existent multiple key agreement protocols.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- agreement protocolsMultiple-key agreement protocolsSignature schemes
- Contact author(s)
- sabzinejad @ tmu ac ir
- History
- 2011-11-26: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/634
- License
-
CC BY
