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Paper 2011/424

Cryptanalysis of AZUMI: an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Standard Compliant RFID Authentication Protocol

Masoumeh Safkhani and Nasour Bagheri and Majid Naderi

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security of AZUMI protocol which is compliant with the EPC-Class-1 Generation-2 standard and recently has been proposed by Peris \textit{et al.} This protocol is an improvement to a protocol proposed by Chen and Deng which has been cryptanalysed by Peris \textit{et al.} and Kapoor and Piramuthu. However, our security analysis clearly shows that the designers were not successful in their attempt to improve the Chen and Deng protocol. More precisely, we present an efficient attack to disclose the tag and the reader secret parameters. In addition, we present a simple tag impersonation attack against this protocol. The success probability of all attacks are almost ``1'' and the cost of given attacks are at most eavesdropping two sessions of protocol. However, the given secrets disclosure attack also requires $O(2^{16}) $ off-line evaluation of a $PRNG$ function.

Note: Work on progress

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptographi protocolsRFIDEPC-C1 G2Mutual AuthenticationSecret DisclosureTag Impersonation.
Contact author(s)
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
2011-08-29: revised
2011-08-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/424
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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