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Paper 2011/175
Analysis of reduced-SHAvite-3-256 v2
Marine Minier, Maria Naya-Plasencia, and Thomas Peyrin
Abstract
In this article, we provide the first independent analysis of the (2nd-round tweaked) 256-bit version of the SHA-3 candidate SHAvite-3. By leveraging recently introduced cryptanalysis tools such as rebound attack or Super-Sbox cryptanalysis, we are able to derive chosen-related-salt distinguishing attacks on the compression function on up to 8 rounds (12 rounds in total) and free-start collisions on up to 7 rounds. In particular, our best results are obtained by carefully controlling the differences in the key schedule of the internal cipher. Most of our results have been implemented and verified experimentally.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Extended version of the paper accepted at FSE 2011
- Keywords
- rebound attackSuper-SboxcollisiondistinguisherSHAvite-3SHA-3
- Contact author(s)
- marine minier @ insa-lyon fr
- History
- 2011-04-05: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2011/175
- License
-
CC BY