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Paper 2011/072

AES Variants Secure Against Related-Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks

Jiali Choy and Aileen Zhang and Khoongming Khoo and Matt Henricksen and Axel Poschmann

Abstract

In this paper, we summarize the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. and present a framework for protection against these attacks. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Related-key attacksdifferential cryptanalysisboomerang attacksAES key schedule
Contact author(s)
cjiali @ dso org sg
History
2011-02-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/072
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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