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Paper 2010/618
A Forgery Attack on the Candidate LTE Integrity Algorithm 128-EIA3
Thomas Fuhr and Henri Gilbert and Jean-Renë Reinhard and Marion Videau
Abstract
In this note we show that the message authentication code 128-EIA3 considered for adoption as one of the integrity algorithms of the emerging mobile standard LTE is vulnerable to a simple existential forgery attack. This attack allows, given any message and the associated MAC value under an unknown integrity key and an initial vector, to predict the MAC value of a related message under the same key and the same initial vector with a success probability 1/2.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- message authentication codesforgery attacks
- Contact author(s)
- henri gilbert @ ssi gouv fr
- History
- 2010-12-08: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/618
- License
-
CC BY