Paper 2010/613

Better Key Sizes (and Attacks) for LWE-Based Encryption

Richard Lindner and Chris Peikert

Abstract

We analyze the concrete security and key sizes of theoretically sound lattice-based encryption schemes based on the ``learning with errors'' (LWE) problem. Our main contributions are: (1)~a new lattice attack on LWE that combines basis reduction with an enumeration algorithm admitting a time/success tradeoff, which performs better than the simple distinguishing attack considered in prior analyses; (2)~concrete parameters and security estimates for an LWE-based cryptosystem that is more compact and efficient than the well-known schemes from the literature. Our new key sizes are up to $10$ times smaller than prior examples, while providing even stronger concrete security levels.

Note: Contains corrected final security estimates from (withdrawn) eprint report 2010/592.