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Paper 2010/479

Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems

R.M. Avanzi and S. Hoerder and D. Page and M. Tunstall

Abstract

Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by [19], and novel countermeasures against such attack.

Note: Added a reference that appeared after we've written the paper but before we submitted it to eprint.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
post-quantum cryptographyMcElieceNiederreiterside-channel attacks
Contact author(s)
hoerder @ compsci bristol ac uk
History
2010-09-14: revised
2010-09-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/479
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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