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Paper 2010/191

On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes

Michal Rjaško and Martin Stanek

Abstract

Designated verifier signature schemes allow a signer to convince only the designated verifier that a signed message is authentic. We define attack models on the unforgeability property of such schemes and analyze relationships among the models. We show that the no-message model, where an adversary is given only public keys, is equivalent to the model, where an adversary has also oracle access to the verification algorithm. We also show a separation between the no-message model and the chosen-message model, where an adversary has access to the signing algorithm. Furthermore, we present a modification of the Yang-Liao designated verifier signature scheme and prove its security. The security of the modified scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, while the original scheme requires strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
rjasko @ dcs fmph uniba sk
History
2010-06-29: last of 2 revisions
2010-04-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/191
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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