You are looking at a specific version 20100116:062510 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2010/023

Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys

Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga

Abstract

This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. This paper is the English version of the publication in the Japanese domestic symposium, Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2010, which will be held on Jan. 19-22, 2010.
Contact author(s)
takahashi junko @ lab ntt co jp
History
2010-01-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/023
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.