Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/500

Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

Nils Reimers

Abstract: This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it's possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity. This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis, key recovery, stream cipher

Date: received 11 Oct 2009

Contact author: Rnils at web de

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20091020:105322 (All versions of this report)

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