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Paper 2009/397

Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT

Joo Yeon Cho

Abstract

PRESENT is a hardware-oriented block cipher suitable for resource constrained environment. In this paper we analyze PRESENT by the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis method. We claim that our attack can recover the 80-bit secret key of PRESENT up to 25 rounds out of 31 rounds with around $2^{62.4}$ data complexity. Furthermore, we showed that the 26-round version of PRESENT can be attacked faster than key exhaustive search with the $2^{64}$ data complexity by an advanced key search technique. Our results are superior to all the previous attacks. We demonstrate our result by performing the linear attacks on reduced variants of PRESENT. Our results exemplify that the performance of the multidimensional linear attack is superior compared to the classical linear attack.

Note: Section 3.2 and 3.3 have been revised. Thanks to Kaisa Nyberg.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. CT-RSA 2010
Keywords
Block CiphersLightweight CryptographyPRESENTMultidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
joo cho @ tkk fi
History
2010-01-25: last of 4 revisions
2009-08-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/397
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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