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Paper 2009/044
Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB
Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir
Abstract
With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDLPNHB+Trusted-HB
- Contact author(s)
- dmitry frumkin @ gmail com
- History
- 2009-01-29: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/044
- License
-
CC BY