

Almost-Asynchronous MPC with Faulty Minority^{*}

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Abstract. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to securely evaluate any agreed function of their inputs, even when up to t of the n parties are faulty. Protocols for *synchronous* networks (where every sent message is assumed to arrive within a constant time) tolerate up to $t < n/2$ faulty parties, whereas in the more realistic *asynchronous* setting (with no *a priori* information on maximal message delay) only security against $t < n/3$ is possible. Note that even asynchronous Byzantine agreement requires $t < n/3$.

In this paper, we are interested in the minimal synchronicity assumption for achieving security against $t < n/2$. It turns out that the bottleneck of asynchronous MPC is the distribution of the inputs: Once the inputs are correctly distributed, any deterministic function can be computed over a fully asynchronous network with $t < n/2$. Furthermore, we show that the inputs can be verifiably distributed with $t < n/2$, if a single round of synchronous broadcast is available.

Composing the above, we obtain the first MPC protocol that achieves security against $t < n/2$ without assuming a fully synchronous network. Actually our protocol guarantees security against any faulty minority in an *almost asynchronous* network, i.e. in a network with one single round of synchronous broadcast (followed by a fully asynchronous communication). Furthermore our protocol takes inputs of *all* parties (in a fully asynchronous network only inputs of $n - t$ parties can be guaranteed), and so achieves everything that is possible in synchronous networks (but impossible in fully asynchronous networks) at the price of just one synchronous broadcast round.

As tools for our protocol we introduce the notions of *almost non-interactive verifiable secret-sharing* and *almost non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge*, which are of independent interest as they can serve as efficient replacements for fully non-interactive verifiable secret-sharing and fully non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Multiparty Computation

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of n parties to securely evaluate any agreed function of their inputs, even if t of the parties are corrupted by a central adversary. In this paper we focus on an active adversary, that can take full control over the corrupted parties (i.e., read their internal state and make them send wrong messages). A protocol is called secure if the uncorrupted parties output the correct function values (*correctness*), and if the adversary does not learn anything that cannot efficiently be derived from the inputs and outputs of the corrupted parties (*privacy*).

The MPC problem dates back to Yao [Yao82], and the first generic solutions were presented in [GMW87,CDG87]. These protocols are secure for $t < n/2$, and this is known to be optimal when the protocols are guaranteed to be deadlock-free – i.e., they deliver outputs even when the adversary actively tries to make this not happen.

1.2 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous Communication

The above mentioned protocols, and most protocols following them [BGW88,CCD88,RB89,Bea89, ...], were for the *synchronous model*, where it is assumed that the delay of messages in the network connecting the parties is bounded by a *known* constant.

This synchronicity assumption is extremely powerful, because it allows MPC protocols to proceed in rounds, with the guarantee that every message sent in some round will be delivered at the beginning of the next round. This again allows a party P_j that did not receive an expected message from another party P_i to conclude that P_i is corrupted. A typical use of this ability is the following: If P_j does not receive some message $m_{i,j}$ that should have been sent by P_i according to the protocol, then P_j broadcasts a complaint on P_i . In response P_i must broadcast $m_{i,j}$.³ Now, all parties can see whether or not P_i sends the message in question. So, either the protocol can continue, or all parties agree that P_i is corrupted. In the last case, the secrets of P_i could be publicly reconstructed to allow the other parties to proceed without the help of P_i .

On the negative side, the assumptions of the synchronous model forces the implementation of synchronization to be secure in a cryptographic sense. If a party P_i is prevented from delivering a message, e.g. due to a cable being dug over or a flooding attack by some hacker, this might affect the *privacy* of P_i , and maybe even the privacy of other honest parties.⁴ The security level of the synchronization protocol must therefore be as high as that of e.g. the encryption schemes used by the protocol. To get this high security against even such simple attacks as a broken cable and a flooding attack, the timeouts probably should be hours, as a party taking part in the computation should have time to recover from such events before their privacy is broken by the other parties. Note that this has nothing to do with the round trip time of the network in normal operation! To be cryptographically secure, the timeouts must be able to handle any unintended delaying event which can occur with *non-negligible probability*. In fact,

³ Broadcasting $m_{i,j}$ is secure because either P_i did not send a message (and thus is corrupted) or P_j is lying about not having received it (and thus is corrupted), meaning that $m_{i,j}$ is already known to the adversary.

⁴ Some protocols publicly reconstruct the secrets of P_i , which might include its inputs and the shares of the secrets of other parties.

we do not know of a single published work which claims to implement a general synchronization mechanism suitable for emulating the synchronous cryptographic model in e.g. Internet-like environments.

Partially as a response to this, asynchronous protocols have been developed [CR93,BCG93,BKR94]. In the *asynchronous model*, arbitrary delays in the network are allowed, with the only restriction that eventually every sent message must be delivered. In order to model the worst case, the adversary is allowed to control the scheduling of messages in the network. The asynchronous model is much easier to implement. On the Internet it is e.g. more or less implemented by the secure socket layer (SSL).⁵ Furthermore, asynchronous protocols are best-effort protocols: When the message delays are short, the protocols are fast. This contrasts synchronous protocols, which have to allow each round to be long enough, such that all messages can get through, even in the very worst case.

On the downside, protocols for the asynchronous model have two inherent drawbacks when compared with their synchronous counterparts:

INPUT DEPRIVATION: A slow honest party cannot be distinguished from a corrupted party not sending messages at all, and can therefore not be waited for. Therefore a fully asynchronous protocol will sometimes exclude up to t *honest* parties from providing their input to the computation. For some computations like auctions and elections, input deprivation is completely intolerable.

LOWER THRESHOLD: Since t honest parties can be excluded entirely from the computation due to delay, the actual computation might be performed by just $n - t$ parties, of which t might be corrupted. Since honest majority is still needed between the participating parties, this means that there must be $t + 1$ honest parties left among the $n - t$ parties, which requires that $t < n/3$. No fully asynchronous protocol can tolerate $t < n/2$, opposed to the best synchronous protocols.

1.3 Hybrid Network

The problem of input deprivation was addressed recently in [HNP05] and [BH07]. In order to achieve input guarantee without assuming a fully synchronous network, [HNP05] proposed a so-called hybrid network with few synchronous rounds followed by a body of asynchronous computation. Later, [BH07] showed that input guarantee can be achieved with only one synchronous round (followed by many asynchronous rounds). This is clearly optimal in the number of synchronous rounds, and can be practical even in settings where implementing synchronous communication is very inefficient. As an example, to run an auction one can have an initial deadline of a week for sealed bids to arrive – reasonable time to get a message through even when under attack. After this deadline the result is then securely computed using a completely asynchronous protocol.

However, the above protocols still suffer from the second problem of asynchronous protocols: they tolerate lower thresholds than their synchronous counterparts. In the cryptographic model, this means tolerating only $t < n/3$ instead of $t < n/2$.

⁵ To implement that all messages *eventually* get delivered, all that is needed on top of the SSL is a way to reestablish broken connections, resulting from e.g. broken cables or broken routers. This need not be speedy and the time to reestablish connections only affect the running time of the protocol when needed. So, connections just have to be reestablished eventually when they get broken – a manageable requirement.

1.4 Contributions

In this paper we present an MPC protocol for an almost-asynchronous network that achieves everything that is possible in the synchronous world (input guarantee and security threshold $t < n/2$). More precisely, we show that input guarantee and security $t < n/2$ is achievable with one single round of synchronous broadcast (followed by asynchronous computation). This way we get the best of both worlds: input guarantee and security threshold $t < n/2$ on one hand and minimal synchronicity assumptions on the other hand.

Our protocol starts by every party broadcasting an encryption of its inputs (along with a non-interactive proof of plaintext knowledge). Then the circuit is asynchronously evaluated gate-by-gate, such that every party eventually learns an encryption of every intermediate result, leading into every party eventually learning an encryption of the output, which is then decrypted.

However, as in a fully asynchronous network no Byzantine agreement is possible for $t \geq n/3$, after the synchronous broadcast round in the input phase our protocol runs without any further agreement on whatsoever. In particular, this means that the parties might get different *encryptions* of the (same correct) output.

Nevertheless, the following holds: once the encryptions of the inputs are consistently distributed among the parties, it is possible to securely compute any deterministic function in a *fully asynchronous* network with honest majority (and thus without any further agreement).

1.5 Related Work

The number of synchronous rounds of broadcast needed for a fully synchronous protocol has been studied in [BB89,BMR90,IK00,GIKR02], and is known to be 3. Lately Katz, Koo and Kumaresan [KK06,KK07,KKK08] have done important progress on the subject, by focusing on the number of synchronous rounds of point-to-point communication instead of insisting on all rounds being rounds of broadcast. This allows to do much better than emulating each of the three needed rounds of broadcast individually. Still, the models of Katz, Koo and Kumaresan insist on all rounds being synchronous, and therefore fall pray to known lower bounds on the number of synchronous rounds needed. Our result can, on the other hand, do with as little as one synchronous round of *point-to-point* communication, as discussed in the conclusions of this paper.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Model

We consider a set of n parties $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$, each P_i holding an input x_i .

The faultiness of parties is modeled by a central poly-time adversary who can corrupt up to $t < n/2$ of the parties (for a given threshold t) and make them deviate from the protocol in any desired matter. The number of actually corrupted parties is denoted by f .

The parties are connected by a network of authenticated point-to-point channels. Our protocol consists of two phases – a synchronous and a subsequent asynchronous phase.

In the synchronous phase, all communication is synchronous – there is a common clock and the message delay in the network is upper-bounded by a known constant. The synchronous phase proceeds in rounds, and every message sent in some round is delivered at the beginning of the next round.

In the asynchronous phase, the messages can be delayed arbitrarily and the order of the messages does not have to be preserved (however every sent message is eventually delivered). In this phase, the computation proceeds in steps. In every step one party is active – it is activated by receiving a message, then it performs some local computation and eventually sends out some messages. To model the worst case scenario of asynchronous communication, we give the power to schedule the message delivery to the adversary – he can choose in every step which of the messages in the network is to be delivered.

Our protocol can be proved statically secure in the UC framework [Can01]. We conjecture that using the techniques that were used by [DN03] in order to present an adaptively UC-secure version of [CDN01], our protocol can be modified to be adaptively secure in the UC framework as well. Since the focus of the present paper is not on adaptive security, the considerable complications needed to obtain adaptive security would, however, only blur the focus of the paper.

2.2 Threshold Signatures

We use a threshold signature scheme with threshold t , where $t < n/2$ is the maximal number of corrupted parties the protocol is meant to tolerate. There is a publicly known *verification key* vk and a secret *signature key* sk . Each P_i holds a *signature key share* sk_i . Given a message m the party P_i can compute a *signature share* σ_i on m and can prove to any other party, using a two-party zero-knowledge protocol, that σ_i is a correct signature share on m . Given the verification key vk and $t + 1$ distinct, correct signature shares, anyone can compute a signature $\sigma = \sigma_{sk}(m)$. The system is unforgeable by a poly-time adversary knowing up to t of the shares sk_i – it takes a signature share from at least one honest party to create a valid signature on m under vk . The system from [Sho00] meets these requirements.⁶

2.3 Threshold Homomorphic Encryption

Our protocols will use ideas from [HNP05], which uses threshold homomorphic encryption to implement asynchronous MPC. One possible instantiation of threshold homomorphic encryption is using Paillier’s encryption system [Pai99] as used in [CDN01]. The details are described in [HNP05], but all we need for the level of discussion in this extended abstract is the following.

Threshold Decryption. In a threshold system, with threshold t , there is an *encryption key* ek and a *decryption key* dk . The encryption key is known by all parties and dk is shared among the parties, with each P_i holding a share dk_i . Given ek , a *plaintext* x and a *randomizer* r anyone can compute a *ciphertext* $X = E_{ek}(x; r)$. For a ciphertext X each P_i can compute a *decryption share* X_i and can prove, using a two-party zero-knowledge protocol, that X_i is a correct decryption share. Given the encryption key ek and $t + 1$ correct decryption shares, from different parties, anyone can compute the plaintext $x = D_{dk}(X)$. The system is IND-CPA secure against an adversary knowing t of the shares dk_i .

If such a system has been setup and $t < n/2$, then any party P_d , which is allowed to, can decrypt a ciphertext X asynchronously: The party sends X to all parties. Each party which agrees that P_d is allowed to decrypt X sends a decryption share to P_d and

⁶ The system from [Sho00] uses the random oracle model to be non-interactive. To avoid the random oracle we simply use interactive proofs, as described in e.g. [Nie02].

proves to P_d that the decryption share is correct. The party P_d waits for $n - t$ shares to arrive for which valid proofs were provided. Since there are $n - t$ honest parties, if P_d is allowed to decrypt X , then this is deadlock free. And, since $n - t \geq t + 1$, P_d gets enough shares to compute $x = D(X)$.

Homomorphic Encryption. We assume that the encryption is homomorphic modulo some publicly known integer N . There exists some operation \boxplus on ciphertexts such that $E_{ek}(x; r) \boxplus E_{ek}(y; s) = E_{ek}(x + y \bmod N; t)$ for some randomizer t , which can be computed efficiently from x, r, y, s if these are known. We also assume that given $X = E_{ek}(x; r)$ one can compute $X' = E_{ek}(N - x; s)$ for some randomizer s , which can be computed efficiently from x and r . We assume that these operations can be performed efficiently given just the encryption key ek . We use $C \in E(x)$ to mean that there exists a randomizer r such that $C = E_{ek}(x; r)$. Note that by combining the homomorphic properties one can take any ciphertext $B \in E(b)$ and any integer $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and efficiently compute an encryption $C \in E(ab \bmod N)$ using double-and-add. We call this *multiplication by a constant* and write $C = a \boxminus B$. We also assume that it is possible to take any ciphertext $C \in E(c)$ and efficiently compute a *uniformly random* ciphertext $C' \in_R E(c)$, using just the encryption key. We write $C' \leftarrow [C]$ and call this *re-randomization*. We write $C' = [C](r)$ when we want to make explicit the randomness r used for re-randomization. To guarantee robustness of some of our protocols we assume that there exists a concurrent, non-malleable zero-knowledge (ZK) proof which allows a party having computed $C' = [a \boxminus B](r)$ to prove to another party that it knows a such that there exists r such that $C' = [a \boxminus B](r)$ – the verifier is expected to know just ek , B and C' .

2.4 Concurrent, Non-malleable ZK

All ZK proofs mentioned above, and in the following sections, can be implemented as in [CDN01,HNP05] by transforming three-move, public-randomness, honest-verifier ZK proofs as described in [Dam00]. This yields concurrent, non-malleable ZK proofs for the common reference string model. The same transformation can be performed in the model where each party has a registered public key. In fact, one can prove that the resulting proof system is a static, universally composable ZK proof of *membership* in this setting, and in addition a proof of *knowledge* when one is allowed to rewind the adversary [Nie03, Corollary 5.2].⁷

3 Protocol Overview

Our protocol follows the standard approach with homomorphic threshold encryption, along the lines of [FH96,CDN01,HNP05]. At the beginning, all parties distribute encryptions of their inputs. Then, the agreed function is evaluated gate-by-gate, where for each gate, an encryption of its value is computed. Finally, the value of the output gate(s) is decrypted using threshold decryption.

As we require only $t < n/2$, no agreement on whatsoever can be achieved (provably, with $t \geq n/3$ BA is impossible). Hence, without any synchronicity assumptions, the

⁷ We note that the fact that the proofs are only proofs of *knowledge* when *rewinding* is allowed is not a problem for the UC security, where the simulator is not allowed to rewind. The extractor will not be used by the UC simulator, but by the *analysis* of the UC simulator. This is by now a standard trick (cf. [DN03]). In Appendix B we sketch how our protocol is UC simulated using standard techniques. In the main text we focus on describing the new techniques specific to our protocol.

parties could not reach agreement on the encryptions of the inputs. We therefore employ one round of synchronous broadcast which allows to consistently and verifiably distribute the inputs.⁸ Once the inputs are distributed, the body of the computation is performed fully asynchronously, without any further agreement, with $t < n/2$. This implies that the function to be evaluated must be *deterministic*. However, probabilistic functions can easily be computed by evaluating a deterministic function on the actual inputs and some additional random inputs provided by the parties. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity we assume that the function has public outputs only. Also this restriction can easily be overcome by letting the parties input random pads that are XORed on their local outputs. Thus the function to be computed is deterministic with public outputs. It is expressed as an arithmetic circuit over \mathbb{Z}_N – the plaintext space of the encryption scheme. Each P_i has some input wires associated. Internal gates either add or multiply modulo N , and then there are some output wires which will hold a representation of the outputs.

In the following section, we describe the fully asynchronous MPC protocol with predistributed inputs. In the subsequent section, we describe the input stage when given a single round of synchronous broadcast. Finally, we discuss under which assumptions this broadcast round can be simulated.

4 Fully-Asynchronous MPC with $t < n/2$ and Predistributed Inputs

In this section we present a *fully asynchronous* MPC protocol which allows to distributively evaluate an agreed function on predistributed inputs. This protocol tolerates $t < n/2$ corrupted parties, which means (among other things), that Byzantine agreement cannot be achieved.

The function is evaluated in the usual gate-by-gate manner. Starting with the given input encryptions, the parties jointly compute encryptions of each intermediary value (one after the other), until eventually an encryption of the output is available and jointly decrypted (using threshold decryption). As asynchronous BA is not possible for $t < n/2$, agreement on the *encryptions* of intermediary values cannot be guaranteed (however, agreement on the intermediary values is possible, as they can be deterministically derived from the predistributed inputs).

We solve the issue of inconsistent views on encryptions by evaluating the whole circuit many times in parallel, once for every party, denoted as *king*. The other parties act as *slaves* and help the king evaluating his copy of the circuit. When the king is honest, then all slaves will have consistent views on all encryptions. When the king is faulty, inconsistencies will occur, but we will show that they do not violate privacy (by cheating the king learns either the correct output or some uniformly random value).

The protocol proceeds in two phases: In the *computation phase*, the circuit is evaluated n times in parallel, once for every king. In the subsequent *termination phase*, the parties ensure that all parties have learned the output, and hence all programs can safely be stopped. Note that not necessarily all kings can (or must) finish their copy of the circuit; once $t + 1$ kings have finished *with the same output*, then obviously this must be the correct output, and all parties adopt this value and stop.

⁸ It is clear that in a real-life network, like the Internet, this round of broadcast itself has to be simulated using synchronous point-to-point communication. We return to how this one round of broadcast can be implemented in a point-to-point network in the conclusions of this paper.

4.1 Computation Phase

We assume that for every input wire, the parties have agreement on the ciphertext $X = E(x)$ of the input value x . Then every king P_k runs (with the help of the other parties acting as slaves) his own circuit evaluation, learning an encryption of the output of every gate. Throughout the whole computation it holds that: whenever an honest party holds a ciphertext X for the output wire of some gate, then indeed $x = D(X)$ is the correct value of that wire; however, we do not require that different slaves hold the same encryption X of a wire when the king is faulty. To every gate a unique *gate id* gid is assigned. In the following, we present the protocols for addition, output, and multiplication gates.

Addition Gate:

Whenever a slave P_i of P_k holds ciphertexts X and Y of the input wires of an addition gate gid , he computes $Z = X \boxplus Y$ as encryption of the output wire.

Output Gates:

Whenever a slave P_i of P_k holds a ciphertext Z of an output gate gid , he sends to P_k a decryption share of Z , and gives (interactive) proofs that the decryption share is correct for Z . Once P_k holds a ciphertext Z of the output gate gid , and receives $t + 1$ valid decryption shares for this Z , he computes the output z for gate gid .

Multiplication Gates:

For multiplication, first the slaves help the king to generate a random multiplication triple [Bea91]. This triple consists of two encrypted random factors and the corresponding encrypted product. The actual multiplication is then evaluated with help of this prepared triple.

Intuitively, the generation of the multiplication triple proceeds as follows: P_k starts with the *initial triple* $(A_0, B_0, C_0) = (E(1; \epsilon), E(1; \epsilon), E(1; \epsilon))$, where ϵ denotes some fixed agreed-upon randomness for encryption. Trivially, (A_0, B_0, C_0) is a correct multiplication triple (though far from being random). Then, in turn for $j = 0, \dots, t$, P_k sends (A_j, B_j, C_j) to some party, who randomizes it to $(A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1}) = (A_j \boxplus E(u), B_j \boxplus E(v), C_j \boxplus E(uv) \boxplus (u \boxtimes B_j) \boxplus (v \boxtimes A_j))$ for randomly chosen $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and sends back to P_k the new triple $(A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})$ along with a ZK proof that it was correctly generated. Clearly, $(A_{t+1}, B_{t+1}, C_{t+1})$ is still a correct multiplication triple. Furthermore, as $t + 1$ parties have randomized the triple, at least one of them being honest, the resulting triple is a random multiplication triple.

We first present the protocol that allows a party P_i to randomize a triple (A_j, B_j, C_j) to $(A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})$, and get the new triple certified to be a correct j -th randomization for gate gid by party P_i for king P_k .

Protocol RandomizeTriple:

0. P_i has input P_k, gid, j , and (A_j, B_j, C_j) .
1. P_i picks uniformly random plaintexts $u, v \in_R \mathbb{Z}_N$ and computes $U \leftarrow E(u)$, $V \leftarrow E(v)$, $X \leftarrow [u \boxtimes B_j]$, $Y \leftarrow [v \boxtimes A_j]$ and $Z \leftarrow [u \boxtimes V]$. It sends (A_j, B_j, C_j) and (U, V, X, Y, Z) to all parties and gives a concurrent, non-malleable ZK proof of knowledge to each party of:
 - u such that $U \in E(u)$ and $X \in [u \boxtimes B_j]$,
 - v such that $V \in E(v)$ and $Y \in [v \boxtimes A_j]$, and

- u such that $U \in E(u)$ and $Z \in [u \boxplus V]$.
- 2. Any $P \in \mathcal{P}$ receiving (A, B, C) and (U, V, X, Y, Z) , along with accepting proofs, computes $A_{j+1} = A_j \boxplus U$, $B_{j+1} = B_j \boxplus V$, $C_{j+1} = C_j \boxplus X \boxplus Y \boxplus Z$, and sends a signature share on $((A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1}))$ to P_i .
- 3. P_i waits for $t + 1$ valid signature shares on $((A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1}))$, computes a signature σ , and outputs $[(A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i, \sigma), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})]$.

The following protocol allows the king (with help of the other parties) to generate a random multiplication triple (with gid gid). The idea is to start with an initial triple (i.e., encryption of $(1, 1, 1)$) and randomize it $t + 1$ times – each time by a different party. For this the king first sends a randomization request for the initial triple to *every* party. Then he waits for the first correct answer and sends it as the second randomization request to all other parties (except the provider of the first randomization). Then again the first correct answer is used for the next randomization, etc. In every round, all but the first correct answers are ignored.

Protocol GenerateTriple:

0. P_k : Initialize $j = 0$ and $(A_0, B_0, C_0) = (E(1; \epsilon), E(1; \epsilon), E(1; \epsilon))$.
1. For $j = 0$ to t do
 - 1.1 Send a randomization request $[P_k, \text{gid}, j, (A_j, B_j, C_j)]$ to every party P_i of whom no randomization for gid has been stored so far.
 - 1.2 P_i : Upon receiving a randomization request $[P_k, \text{gid}, j, (A_j, B_j, C_j)]$, employ the protocol `RandomizeTriple` to obtain $[(A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i, \sigma), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})]$, and send it to P_k . This is performed only once per gid and j .
 - 1.3 P_k : Upon receiving (from some party P_i for which no randomization for gid is stored so far) the first (correct) randomization answer $[(A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i, \sigma), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})]$, store this answer. Further answers from other parties (for the same j) are ignored.
2. P_k : Send $[(A_j, B_j, C_j), (P_k, \text{gid}, j, P_i, \sigma_j), (A_{j+1}, B_{j+1}, C_{j+1})]$ for $j = 0, \dots, t$ to every $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, who accepts $(A, B, C) = (A_{t+1}, B_{t+1}, C_{t+1})$ as the final multiplication triple for gid if the following holds: For $j = 0, \dots, t$, the j -th output triple is equal to $(j + 1)$ -th input triple, there are $t + 1$ *different* parties that have randomized, and all transitions are correctly signed.

Given the multiplication triples (A, B, C) from `GenerateTriple`, and given encryptions X and Y to be multiplied, the following protocol computes an encryption of the product Z .

Protocol Multiply:

0. Every P_i has input (A, B, C) , X and Y .
1. P_i : send to P_k and all slaves decryption shares of $F = X \boxplus A$ and $G = Y \boxplus B$, and give proofs that the decryption shares are correct.
2. P_i and P_k : If $t + 1$ valid decryption shares for F and G arrive, compute $f = x + a \bmod N$ and $g = y + b \bmod N$ and let $Z = E(fg) \boxplus (-f \boxplus B) \boxplus (-g \boxplus A) \boxplus C$.

We first analyze the generation of the multiplication triple, then the multiplication protocol.

4.2 Analysis of Computation Phase

Analysis of GenerateTriple:

Although there is no agreement among the parties on the multiplication triple (A, B, C) (as such an agreement cannot be achieved with $t \geq n/3$) we are given certain guarantees about the triple (except with negligible probability):

- When an honest slave P_i accepts a triple (A, B, C) , then A and B are encryptions of values a and b , and C is an encryption of ab . Furthermore, the set of corrupted parties (the adversary) cannot distinguish a and b from uniformly random values. This is formalized by a game, where the adversary has to distinguish $(D(A), D(B), D(C))$ from (a, b, ab) with uniformly random $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ with non-negligible advantage. Correctness follows from the correctness of the initial triple and the proofs of correct randomization. The indistinguishability follows from the fact that A and B result from $t+1$ randomizations, so A and B were randomized by at least one honest party P_i . Therefore a and b sum over the u_i respectively the v_i contributed by P_i . Furthermore, every randomizing party P_j proves knowledge of its randomizers u_j and v_j (using a concurrent, non-malleable proof of knowledge, see Section 2.4). Hence we can, by rewinding, extract the u_j and v_j from the view of the adversary. So, for the adversary, distinguishing a and b from uniformly random is equivalent to distinguishing u_i and v_i from uniformly random for at least one honest P_i , which is impossible by the semantic security of the cryptosystem and the proofs given by P_i being concurrent zero-knowledge.
- When an honest slave P_i accepts a triple (A, B, C) for a gate gid , then the plaintexts of A and B are indistinguishable from uniformly random values which are *statistically independent* from the plaintexts of any triple accepted for any other gate $gid' \neq gid$. This does not follow from the above property which addresses the distribution of individual triples, but follows trivially from the fact that honest parties use different randomizers when contributing to different multiplication gates gid .
- When for the same multiplication gate gid , two honest parties accept the triples (A, B, C) and (A', B', C') , respectively, then either the plaintexts of (A, B, C) and (A', B', C') are indistinguishable from uniformly random, statistically independent values to the adversary, or the adversary knows the plaintexts of $A - A'$ and $B - B'$. This follows from the fact that either there is at least one honest party P_i that has randomized one triple in some position, but not the other one in the same position with the same (u_i, v_i) (then the plaintexts of the two triples are indistinguishable from uniformly random statistically independent values), or both triples have been randomized by exactly the same set of honest parties P_i in exactly the same positions with exactly the same (u_i, v_i) . In this case only the adversarially chosen randomizers are different, and they are known to the adversary in the sense that they can be extracted from the adversary in expected polynomial time.

We now argue termination. Note that as long as at most t parties have randomized the triple, there are still $(n - t) - t \geq 1$ honest parties P_i which did not yet do so and thus, when requested, will eventually produce a randomization for gid and send it to P_k . Therefore, eventually a chain of $t + 1$ randomizations will be achieved.

Analysis of Multiply:

If P_k is honest, then all slaves will constantly agree on all ciphertexts X for each wire, and therefore the computation will terminate and will yield correct encryptions for all

wires. When P_k is corrupted we do not *per se* care about the correctness of P_k , so what remains is to argue privacy.

The first important observation is that if an honest slave P_i associates X to some wire, then X is an encryption of the correct value for that wire. This holds for input wires by assumption and is maintained by addition. As for multiplication gate $z = xy$, we can assume that X and Y decrypt to correct values. If (A, B, C) was accepted by P_i as a correct triple, it is indeed a correct multiplication triple, except with negligible probability. From this it follows that if P_i computes some Z , then P_i computes a correct Z , except with negligible probability. Different parties might, however, hold different Z if P_k is corrupted – only the plaintexts are guaranteed to be the same.

We address the privacy. Assume that party P_i holds encryptions $X^{(i)}$ and $Y^{(i)}$ of the factors, and gets the multiplication triple $(A^{(i)}, B^{(i)}, C^{(i)})$ from P_k . At the same time, P_j holds encryptions $X^{(j)}$ and $Y^{(j)}$ of the factors, and gets the multiplication triple $(A^{(j)}, B^{(j)}, C^{(j)})$ from P_k . Then, P_k might learn the decryptions $f^{(i)} = x^{(i)} + a^{(i)} \bmod N$ and $g^{(i)} = y^{(i)} + b^{(i)} \bmod N$ as well as the decryptions $f^{(j)} = x^{(j)} + a^{(j)} \bmod N$ and $g^{(j)} = y^{(j)} + b^{(j)} \bmod N$. However, by the invariant that the values $X^{(i)}$ and $Y^{(i)}$ held by P_i (and the values $X^{(j)}$ and $Y^{(j)}$ held by P_j) encrypt correct wire values x and y , we have $x^{(i)} = x^{(j)} = x$ and $y^{(i)} = y^{(j)} = y$. Furthermore, from $(A^{(i)}, B^{(i)}, C^{(i)})$ and $(A^{(j)}, B^{(j)}, C^{(j)})$ being correct multiplication triples for the same gate *gid*, it follows that either 1) they encrypt values $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)})$ and $(a^{(j)}, b^{(j)})$ which are uniformly random and independent, or 2) they encrypt values $(a^{(i)}, b^{(i)})$ and $(a^{(j)}, b^{(j)})$ which are individually uniformly random and $(a^{(j)}, b^{(j)}) = (a^{(i)}, b^{(i)}) + (\delta_a, \delta_b)$ for (δ_a, δ_b) *known*⁹ to the adversary. In the first case, $(f^{(i)}, g^{(i)})$ and $(f^{(j)}, g^{(j)})$ are uniformly random and independent and thus together leak no information to the adversary. In the second case, $(f^{(i)}, g^{(i)})$ is uniformly random, and therefore leaks no information to the adversary, and $(f^{(j)}, g^{(j)}) = (f^{(i)}, g^{(i)}) + (\delta_a, \delta_b)$ and therefore leaks no more information than $(f^{(i)}, g^{(i)})$ to the adversary, as the adversary can compute it from $(f^{(i)}, g^{(i)})$ in expected poly-time.

In Appendix B we sketch how the above properties are used in the analysis of a UC simulation.

4.3 Termination Phase

As for now no party can terminate until it knows that all honest parties for which it acts as slave terminated. However, this condition cannot be checked. Instead, we add the following simple procedure inspired by [CKS00] to terminate the protocol: When a king P_k learns the result z , it sends a signature share on (“**result**”, z) to all parties and continues to act as slave. When it received signature shares from $t + 1$ parties on (“**result**”, z), it constructs a signature σ on (“**result**”, z), sends ((“**result**”, z), σ) to all parties and terminates with output z . Any party ever receiving a value of the form (“**result**”, z, σ) where σ is a valid signature on (“**result**”, z) sends it to all parties, and terminates with output z . Eventually all $n - t \geq t + 1$ honest P_k learn z and thus some honest party eventually receives $t + 1$ correct signature shares. After this all honest parties will eventually terminate.

5 Almost-Asynchronous Input-Distribution with $t < n/2$

In this section, we describe how the inputs can be distributed. Note that in a fully asynchronous network, input-guarantee is not possible (up to t possibly honest inputs

⁹ In the sense that we can extract them from the adversary in expected poly-time.

are ignored). Furthermore, when $t \geq n/3$, input-distribution (even of a subset of parties) is impossible, as consistent distribution of a single input implies BA. In the following, we show how *all inputs* can be distributed with $t < n/2$ with a single synchronous broadcast round. See Section 6 for a discussion of implementing this one round of broadcast.

In the input phase, every party P_i computes $X = E(x; r)$ for each of its inputs x and broadcasts X along with a ZK proof of plaintext knowledge (*PoPK*).¹⁰ This ensures *input correctness*, in the sense that if P_i is honest, then $D_{dk}(X) = x$, and *input privacy*, in the sense that as long as at most t parties are corrupted, the input x of an honest P_i remains unknown to the adversary. This follows from the threshold IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme and the PoPK being ZK. Finally, the ZK proof of *knowledge* of x ensures *input knowledge*, meaning that P_i knows $D_{dk}(X)$ for his X .

The proof of plaintext knowledge could be based on standard assumptions by resorting to generic NIZK. In the following, we give a much more efficient proof, which exploits the fact that the proofs do not need to be fully non-interactive, but asynchronous interaction (with $t < n/2$) is allowed for verifying the proof. We call such proofs *almost non-interactive proofs*.

The intuition of our almost non-interactive proof is the following: The prover sends along with the encrypted input a *transcript* of many instances of an interactive zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with binary challenges. For each instance, the prover provides the answers for *both challenges*, but encrypts them with the threshold encryption scheme. To verify the proof, for each instance exactly one response (depending on an agreed-upon challenge) is decrypted. The challenge is generated simultaneously, by letting every party P_i broadcast an encryption R_i of a random value r_i , where the encryption scheme has the property that both the parties jointly as well as P_i alone can decrypt.¹¹ Then the parties decrypt all contributions and compute the challenge r as the sum.

In the next section, we describe how to generate the random challenge (using almost non-interactive VSS). Subsequently, we describe in more detail how to construct the almost non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge.

5.1 Almost Non-Interactive VSS

The following protocol allows a sender P_S to verifiably secret share a secret x with threshold $t < n/2$, using a single round of synchronous broadcast. The reconstruction of the shared value is fully asynchronous. We call this *almost non-interactive VSS* (*ANI-VSS*).

The ANI-VSS requires a setup – for every P_S there is an independent random key pair (pk_S, sk_S) for a threshold cryptosystem such that the public key pk_S is known to all parties and the secret key sk_S is shared among the other parties with threshold t (such that correct decryption shares from $t + 1$ parties are enough to decrypt under sk_S). We also require that P_S knows sk_S . If not already the case, this can be ensured by all parties once-and-for-all sending their shares of sk_S to P_S .¹² The protocol proceeds as follows:

Synchronous sharing: P_S computes $X \leftarrow E_{pk_S}(x)$ and broadcasts X (using synchronous broadcast).

Asynchronous reconstruction:

¹⁰ The details of the PoPK are given below.

¹¹ This way no PoPK for R_i is necessary.

¹² In fact, the fact that they *could* do this is sufficient for the analysis.

1. Each P_i computes a decryption share of X using his share of sk_S and sends the share to all parties along with a proof of correctness.
2. Each P_j waits for $t + 1$ correct decryption shares and reconstructs $x = D_{sk_S}(X)$.

Analysis:

We assume that the encryption schemes have perfect decryption. This means that the broadcasted message X uniquely defines a secret $x = D_{sk_S}(X)$. Reconstruction will always terminate as at least the $n - t \geq t + 1$ honest parties send correct decryption shares.

In terms of simulation security, an ANI-VSS is extracted by decrypting X . This is possible as the honest parties hold enough decryption key shares to compute sk_S . When P_S is honest, an ANI-VSS is opened to any x' simply by simulating the decryption of X to hit x' .

5.2 Almost Non-Interactive ZKPoK

We now describe a system which allows a prover P to give a ZK proof of knowledge (*ZKPoK*) towards all parties such that all parties agree on the outcome of the proof. The protocol uses only one round of synchronous broadcast, followed by an asynchronous computation. We call it an *ANI-ZKPoK*.

We consider some NP relation R and assume that P holds an (instance, witness)-pair (x, w) . We assume that there is a standard three-move Σ -protocol for R , where P computes the first message a , gets a challenge $e \in \{0, 1\}$ and replies with some response z . The verifier accepts or rejects based on (x, a, e, z) . We use that from two accepting conversations $(x, a, 0, z_0)$ and $(x, a, 1, z_1)$ one can compute (in PPT) a witness w such that $(x, w) \in R$. The protocol proceeds as follows:

Synchronous proof: The synchronous round proceeds as follows:

- Prover P : For $k = 1, \dots, \kappa$, compute a first message $a^{(k)}$ and a reply $z_0^{(k)}$ to the challenge $e = 0$ and a reply $z_1^{(k)}$ to the challenge $e = 1$. Then broadcast x and each $a^{(k)}$ and ANI-VSS each $z_0^{(k)}$ and $z_1^{(k)}$.
- Each other party P_i : ANI-VSS a uniformly random value $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$.

Asynchronous verification: The verification of the proof is asynchronous, and proceeds as follows:

1. Reconstruct each r_i and compute $(e_1, \dots, e_\kappa) = \oplus_{i=1}^n r_i$.
2. For $k = 1, \dots, \kappa$ in parallel: Reconstruct $z_{e_k}^{(k)}$ and accept the proof iff $(a^{(k)}, e_k, z_{e_k}^{(k)})$ is an accepting conversation for $k = 1, \dots, \kappa$.

Analysis:

After the first (synchronous) part, all parties will hold consistent proof transcripts $(a^{(1)}, Z_0^{(1)}, Z_1^{(1)}), \dots, (a^{(\kappa)}, Z_0^{(\kappa)}, Z_1^{(\kappa)})$ (as broadcasted by the prover) as well as consistent encryptions of challenge-contributions $R_i \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ of every party P_i (as broadcasted by P_i). It follows that in the asynchronous part all parties will reconstruct the same r_1, \dots, r_n leading to the same (e_1, \dots, e_κ) and thus leading to the same outcome of the verification test. It is clear that if the prover is honest, this outcome will be accepting. Since each reconstruction eventually terminates, the proof eventually terminates.

Assume that P broadcasted $(a^{(1)}, Z_0^{(1)}, Z_1^{(1)}), \dots, (a^{(\kappa)}, Z_0^{(\kappa)}, Z_1^{(\kappa)})$ without knowing a witness for x . Then for each k there exists e'_k such that $(a^{(k)}, e'_k, z_{e'_k}^{(k)})$ is not accepting. Thus there is at most one challenge $e = (e_1, \dots, e_\kappa)$ for which the verification of the

proof is not rejecting, namely $(1 - e'_1, \dots, 1 - e'_\kappa)$. As the prover had to choose and broadcast $(a^{(1)}, Z_0^{(1)}, Z_1^{(1)}), \dots, (a^{(\kappa)}, Z_0^{(\kappa)}, Z_1^{(\kappa)})$ without knowing the r_i 's of the honest parties (and thus without knowing the resulting challenge e), his success probability is negligible.

To simulate a proof, the r_i contributed by corrupted parties are extracted from the ANI-VSS's. Then any challenge e can be hit simply by opening the ANI-VSS for an honest P_j to $r_j = e \oplus \bigoplus_{i \neq j} r_i$.¹³

6 Almost-Asynchronous Broadcast

In Section 5, we have employed synchronous broadcast for distributing the inputs. This single round of synchronous broadcast can be simulated using synchronous rounds of point-to-point communication. We now explore what is the number of synchronous rounds of point-to-point communication needed to simulate one round of broadcast using known techniques.

6.1 The $t < n/3$ Case

When $t < n/3$, then just one synchronous point-to-point round is needed. In this synchronous round, the sender P_S sends x (the value he wants to broadcast) to all parties. Then the parties run an asynchronous consensus protocol (cf. [Bra84, Ben83, CR93, ADH08]) on x , where each P_i inputs the value it received from P_S . The output of this consensus is taken as the broadcasted value. The parties wait until all the broadcasts of inputs, and other values, completed before they start running the rest of the asynchronous phase, to ensure that all corrupted parties has to decide on their broadcasted value before any of the other computations are performed.

6.2 The $t < n/2$ Case

When $t < n/2$, Byzantine agreement is not possible using a fully asynchronous protocol, and therefore another approach must be taken. An easy solution is to use a fully synchronous broadcast protocol for $t < n/2$. Classical broadcast protocols [PSL80, LSP82, DS82, FL82, MT86, GM93] require $t + 1$ rounds of synchronous point-to-point communication, and this is known to be optimal if the parties are required to terminate in the same round. When stopping in different rounds is allowed, the number of communication rounds can be reduced to $\min(t + 1, f + 2)$, where f is the actual number of corrupted parties in the execution and t is the maximal number of corruptions tolerated, and this is optimal [DRS90, BGP92]. Note that the fact that parties can (and will) terminate in different rounds usually requires relatively expensive resynchronization efforts [LLR02] and [Nie03, Chapter 7], but that this is not an issue in our setting: we go asynchronous after the broadcast anyway, making the resynchronization unnecessary.

Even more interestingly, it was recently shown in [FN08] that one round of synchronous broadcast can be simulated by some initial number τ of synchronous rounds of point-to-point communication followed by asynchronous point-to-point communication. The number τ beats the $t + 1$ bound on the worst-case number of rounds needed when insisting on using a broadcast protocol where all rounds are synchronous. It is essentially $\tau = t/2$ when $t = n/2$ and goes linear to $\tau = 1$ when $t = n/3$.

¹³ For the ANI-VSS described above, the extraction would simply amount to decryption under the secret key used by P_i . The honest parties have enough shares to facilitate this.

Another approach is to use a probabilistic broadcast protocol, which allows *expected* constant round complexity for $t < n/2$ [Rab83,Tou84,FM88]. The practical implications are however questionable, as the expected round complexities of all known randomized protocols are fairly large constants.

7 Conclusions

We presented the first multi-party protocol for a non-synchronous network which tolerates $t < n/2$ faulty parties. The protocol achieves all properties of synchronous MPC in an almost-asynchronous network. With one single round of synchronous broadcast, both input-guarantee and security for $t < n/2$ can be achieved. This contrasts fully-asynchronous MPC protocols which ignore the inputs of up to t honest parties and cannot guarantee security better than $t < n/3$.

Theorem 1. *When $t < n/2$, then any PPT function can be computed without input deprivation using one synchronous broadcast round.*

By simulating the synchronous broadcast round by point-to-point communication, we obtain the following result:

Corollary 1. *When $t < n/2$, then any PPT function can be computed without input deprivation using $\min(t+1, \tau, r_n)$ synchronous point-to-point rounds, where $\tau \leq t/4 + 2$ denotes the number of synchronous rounds for almost-asynchronous broadcast (cf. Section 6), and r_n denotes the expected round complexity of a synchronous constant-round broadcast protocol among n parties.*

By simulating the synchronous broadcast round by asynchronous consensus (which requires $t < n/3$), we obtain the following result:

Corollary 2. *When $t < n/3$, then any PPT function can be computed without input deprivation using one synchronous point-to-point round.*

7.1 Some Open Problems

On the theoretical side it would be interesting to find out what are the minimal setup assumptions needed for our result. The UC model does not necessarily require setup assumption when $t < n/2$. Can one reproduce our result without setup assumptions? Maybe in the model from [Can00]? Can our result be reproduced under more general computational assumptions?

As described in Appendix A, the communication complexity of our protocol can be made as low as $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$ bits per gate using a few simple optimizations. This is, however, far from the complexity of the currently best synchronous protocols. It would be interesting to get an efficiency of “almost-asynchronous MPC”, which can compete with the currently best fully synchronous protocols.

Our protocols in this paper recently inspired an efficient implementation of secure MPC in an “almost-asynchronous” model, see [DGKN08]. The security guarantees are lower than what we get in this paper, but we hope that [DGKN08] is an indication that the approach we introduce here can lead to highly secure and highly efficient MPC for realistic networks.

It is also an interesting open problem whether our result can be obtained using a protocol which defaults to the normal asynchronous security guarantees if the initial synchrony assumption fails — i.e., the protocol still guarantees security against $t' < n/3$ corrupted parties but might deprive t' parties of giving inputs.

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A Efficiency Considerations

In this section we analyze the communication complexity of the protocol. In the analysis we measure the total number of bits sent by the honest parties. We let c_I (c_M , c_O) be the number of input (multiplication, output) gates in the circuit.

During the analysis we give a few optimizations. We excluded these from the main text to keep the focus on that which is essentially new, namely that one can obtain corruption threshold $t < n/2$ and guarantee inputs from all parties using a single synchronous round.

We assume that the size of signature shares, proofs and signatures are $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$ bits, where κ is the security parameter. The tools we use from [Pai99,Sho00,HNP05] meet these requirements.

A.1 Circuit Evaluation

The linear gates require no communication. When ignoring the generation of the triples, each multiplication gate requires two decryptions and each output gate requires one decryption. Each decryption communicates $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa)$ bits, as all parties send decryption shares to all parties and give proofs to all parties. So, each gate handled by P_k communicates $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa)$ bits. Each gate is handled by each of the n kings, for a total of $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$ bits per gate. Ignoring the generation of triples, the evaluation of the circuit thus communicates $\mathcal{O}((c_M + c_O)n^3\kappa)$ bits.

A.2 Triple Generation

The communication of triple generation (per king P_k and per triple gid) can be seen to be $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$ bits – each randomization communicates $\mathcal{O}(n\kappa)$ bits, and a total of $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ randomizations are needed to create a triple. Exploiting that a king can generate many triples in parallel, the communication per generated triple can, however, be brought down to an amortized $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa)$: The king contacts all n parties with different, incomplete gid , and waits for $n-t$ parties to return valid randomizations. Thereby n randomizations give rise to $n-t \geq t+1$ triples gid coming one randomization closer to completion. Since each gid needs $t+1$ randomizations to be complete, on average one gid is completed in each round of n randomizations. Since each of the n kings need one triple per multiplications gate, the total communication complexity of generating triples is $\mathcal{O}(c_M n^3\kappa)$ bits.

A.3 Input

In the input stage each input encryption is broadcast along with a ANI-ZKPoK of the plaintext. The broadcast of a κ -bit value can be implemented with communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$ [DS82], so the communication complexity of the broadcasts can be $\mathcal{O}(c_I n^3\kappa)$ bits.

ANI-ZKPoK:

In our setting, we only prove knowledge of relations for which we have Σ -protocols where all messages have length $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$. The communication complexity of the ANI-ZKPoK protocol is therefore that of ANI-VSS'ing $\mathcal{O}(\kappa + n)$ values of length $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$, which is the same as broadcasting $\mathcal{O}(\kappa + n)$ values of length $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$.

When ℓ proofs are performed in parallel, one value $r = \oplus_{i=1}^n r_i$ can be expanded into ℓ challenges $(e^{(1)}, \dots, e^{(\ell)})$ using a pseudo-random generator. In that case ℓ proofs use $\mathcal{O}(\ell\kappa + n)$ ANI-VSS's. We will always have $\ell > n$, meaning that the amortized number of ANI-VSS's used per proof is $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$. Each ANI-VSS broadcasts κ bits and

communicates an additional $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa)$ bits. Each proof therefore broadcasts $\mathcal{O}(\kappa^2)$ bits and communicates an additional $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa^2)$ bits.

We can reduce the factor κ^2 to κ as follows. We only use the ANI-ZKPoK to prove plaintext knowledge for the homomorphic encryption function, which comes to our help. Assume that we prove κ instances in parallel, and note that by running the basic one-bit challenged proof for each instance not κ times but only some constant c times, the amortized communication per proof instance can be brought down to broadcasting $\mathcal{O}(\kappa c) = \mathcal{O}(\kappa)$ bits and sending an additional $\mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa c) = \mathcal{O}(n^2\kappa)$ bits. Since $\mathcal{O}(\kappa)$ bits can be broadcast with communication $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$, the amortized communication per input can be $\mathcal{O}(n^3\kappa)$.

The price to pay is that each proof has knowledge error 2^{-c} . By setting the constant c appropriately and using a Chernoff bound, it can, however, be guaranteed that the probability that $\kappa/2$ false instances pass the proof is negligible. For some party P to prove knowledge of $k = \kappa/2 - 1$ plaintexts (x_1, \dots, x_k) encrypted by (X_1, \dots, X_k) , the linear homomorphic properties are used to expand (X_1, \dots, X_k) into (Y_1, \dots, Y_κ) such that all parties can verify that (Y_1, \dots, Y_κ) decrypts to (y_1, \dots, y_κ) which are an encoding of (x_1, \dots, x_k) allowing efficient reconstruction given at most $k/2$ losses – one can e.g. use a Reed-Solomon code. Then P proves plaintext knowledge of the y_i and will fail if it does not know at least $k/2$ of them. This, however, implies that it can compute (x_1, \dots, x_k) efficiently.

A.4 Overall Communication Analysis

Summing the above complexities gives a communication complexity of $\mathcal{O}((c_I + c_M + c_O)n^3\kappa)$ bits.

B Sketch of UC Simulation

In this section we sketch how the security properties argued in the main text imply a UC simulation using known techniques from [CDN01, DN03]. The UC simulator runs the protocol honestly, with the following changes:

- Since it does not know the input of the honest parties, it uses $x' = 0$ as plaintext in the encryption X to all input wires for which an honest party is to provide the input.
- After the corrupted parties broadcasted their encryptions X for their input wires along with correct PoPKs, the simulator decrypts X to get the plaintext $x = D_{dk}(X)$ and gives x to the ideal functionality as the input of the corrupted party. This is possible as it is the simulator which simulates the setup phase, which allows it to learn dk .
- After providing the inputs on behalf of the corrupted parties, the simulator gets the result y from the ideal functionality, where y is a function of the inputs of the honest parties and the inputs x chosen by the simulator for the corrupted parties. Since the simulator used $x' = 0$ for the honest parties in the simulation, the output ciphertext Y corresponding to y in the simulation is most likely not going to be an encryption of y .¹⁴ Since we only want static security, this can be dealt with as in [CDN01]: The simulator simply cheats with the decryption shares of the honest parties to make Y wrongly decrypt to y . It then simulates the ZK proofs that these decryption shares are correct. Below we call this a simulated decryption of Y to y .

¹⁴ For convenience of language, let us just assume that the computation has one public output $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and therefore just one output wire in the circuit and just one output ciphertext Y in the protocol.

What remains is simply to argue that this UC simulation is indistinguishable from the real protocol (to the environment). This can be done along the lines of [CDN01]: First we show that replacing the wrong inputs $x' = 0$ by the correct inputs¹⁵ x in the encryptions X used by the honest parties produces a distribution which is indistinguishable. This follows from the IND-CPA security of the cryptosystem.

One subtlety with the above step is that when we appeal to the IND-CPA security of the cryptosystem, clearly the simulator cannot use dk to decrypt the plaintexts X provided by the corrupted parties. This is handled as in [DN03]: Use the rewinding proofs of plaintext knowledge to extract x instead of getting it by decryption. Since we are no longer describing a UC simulator, but simply analyzing it, we can use rewinding on the proofs of knowledge: We just rewind the entire UC execution including environment and adversary — see [DN03] for details. Problems are not over, however, as dk is also used in Multiply when the parties decrypt F and G . This is handled by picking uniformly random $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and then doing a simulated decryption of F to f and a simulated decryption of G to g . I.e., except if we are looking at the case where $(f, g) = (f', g') = (\delta_a, \delta_b)$ for a pair (F', G') for which we already simulated a decryption to (f', g') and for which the adversary knows δ_a and δ_b . In this case we extract δ_a and δ_b from the adversary, set $f = f' + \delta_a$ and $g = g' + \delta_b$ and simulate decryption of F and G to f respectively g .

We then make the change that we do simulated decryptions of F and G to $D_{dk}(F)$ respectively $D_{dk}(G)$, instead of doing simulated decryptions of F and G to the random elements f and g defined above. To distinguish the two distributions produced by this change, the adversary has to be able to distinguish $D_{dk}(F)$ and $D_{dk}(G)$ from the random elements f and g defined above. In Section 4.2 we argued that it can do this with at most negligible advantage.

We then make the change that we do real decryptions of F and G instead of simulated decryptions to $D_{dk}(F)$ respectively $D_{dk}(G)$. This defines indistinguishable distribution by the security of the decryption simulator.

We then make the change that we do a real decryption of Y instead of a simulated decryption of Y to the y obtained from the ideal functionality. That this produces an indistinguishable distribution is seen as follows: We are by now using the correct inputs x on behalf of the honest parties, and we are inputting the plaintext x of the X provided by corrupted parties to the ideal functionality. Therefore the ideal functionality and the protocol are computing on the same input values x . Therefore Y contains the y returned by the ideal functionality, except with negligible probability, and thus the simulated decryption to y and the honest decryption of Y are indistinguishable.

After this last change, we have actually arrived at the real-life protocol and thus at the end of the sketch of the UC simulator and its security.

¹⁵ those contained in the ideal functionality