

Practical Short Signature Batch Verification

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Abstract

In many applications, it is desirable to work with signatures that are both short, and yet where *many* messages from *different* signers be verified very quickly. RSA signatures satisfy the latter condition, but are generally thousands of bits in length. Recent developments in pairing-based cryptography produced a number of “short” signatures which provide equivalent security in a fraction of the space. Unfortunately, verifying these signatures is computationally intensive due to the expensive pairing operation. In an attempt to simultaneously achieve “short and fast” signatures, Camenisch, Hohenberger and Pedersen (Eurocrypt 2007) showed how to *batch verify* two pairing-based schemes so that the total number of pairings was independent of the number of signatures to verify.

In this work, we present both theoretical and practical contributions. On the theoretical side, we introduce new batch verifiers for a wide variety of regular, identity-based, group, ring and aggregate signature schemes. These are the first constructions for batching group signatures, which answers an open problem of Camenisch et al. On the practical side, we implement each of these algorithms and compare each batching algorithm to doing individual verifications. Our goal is to test whether batching is practical; that is, whether the benefits of removing pairings significantly outweigh the cost of the additional operations required for batching, such as group membership testing, randomness generation, and additional modular exponentiations and multiplications. We experimentally verify that the theoretical results of Camenisch et al. and this work, indeed, provide an efficient, effective approach to verifying multiple signatures from (possibly) different signers.

1 Introduction

As we move into the era of pervasive computing, where computers are everywhere as an integrated part of our surroundings, there are going to be a host of devices exchanging messages with each other, e.g., sensor networks, vehicle-2-vehicle communications [14, 36]. For these systems to work properly, messages must carry some form of authentication, but the system requirements on the authentication are particularly demanding. Any cryptographic solution must simultaneously be:

1. *Short*: Bandwidth is an issue. Raya and Hubaux argue that due to the limited spectrum available for vehicular communication, something shorter than RSA signatures is needed [34].

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2. *Quick to verify large numbers of messages from different sources:* Raya and Hubaux also suggest that vehicles will transmit safety messages every 300ms to all other vehicles within a minimum range of 110 meters [34], which in turn may retransmit these messages. Thus, it is much more critical that authentications be quick to verify rather than to generate.
3. *Privacy-friendly:* Users should be held accountable, but not become publicly identifiable.

Due to the high overhead of using digital signatures, researchers have developed a number of alternative protocols designed to amortize signatures over many packets [21, 26], or to replace them with symmetric MACs [33]. Each approach has significant drawbacks; for example, the MAC-based protocols use time-delayed delivery so that the necessary verification keys are delivered *after* the authenticated messages arrive. This approach can be highly efficient within a restricted setting where synchronized clocks are available, but it does not provide non-repudiability of messages (to hold malicious users accountable) or privacy. Signature amortization requires verifiers to obtain many packets before verifying, and is vulnerable to denial of service. Other approaches, including the short, undeniable signatures of Monnerat and Vaudenay [28, 29] are inappropriate for the pervasive settings we consider, since verification requires interaction with the signer.

In 2001, Boneh, Lynn and Shacham developed a pairing-based signature that provides security equivalent to 1024-bit RSA at a cost of only 170 bits [8] (slightly larger than HMAC-SHA1). This was followed by many signature variants, some of them privacy-friendly, which were also relatively short, e.g., [6, 10, 19, 11]. Unfortunately, the focus was on reducing the signature size, but less attention was paid to the verification cost which require expensive pairing operations.

Recently, Camenisch, Hohenberger and Pedersen [13] took a step toward speeding up the verification of short signatures, by showing how to *batch verify* two short pairing-based signatures so that the total number of dominant (pairing) operations was independent of the number of signatures to verify. However, their solution left open several questions which this work addresses.

First, their work was purely theoretical. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide a detailed *empirical analysis* of batch verification of short signatures. This is interesting, because our theoretical results and those of Camenisch et al. [13] reduce the total number of pairings by *adding* in other operations, such as random number generation and small modular exponentiations, so it was unclear how well these algorithms would perform in practice. Fortunately, in section 5, we verify that these algorithms do work well.

Second, the existing literature contained many good ideas on batch verification, but these ideas were scattered across multiple papers, and it wasn't always clear how to safely employ these techniques from scheme to scheme. In section 3, we present some basic tools that can be used to securely batch verify a set of pairing-based equations.

Third, using this framework, we present a detailed study of when and how to batch verify existing group, regular, identity-based, ring, and aggregate signature schemes (see Figure 2 for a summary). This is non-trivial because we sometimes have to change the signatures themselves in order to get them to batch efficiently. To our knowledge, these are the *first* known results for batch verification of group and ring signatures, answering an open problem of Camenisch et al. [13]. This is particularly exciting, because it is the first step towards making short, *privacy-friendly* authentication fast enough for deployment in real systems.

Finally, Camenisch et al. [13] did not address the practical issue of what to do if the batch verification fails. How does one detect *which* signatures in the batch are invalid? Does this detection process eliminate all of the efficiency gains of batch verification? Fortunately, our empirical studies reveal good news: invalid signatures can be detected via a recursive divide-and-conquer approach, and if $< 15\%$ of the signatures are invalid, then batch verification is still more efficient than individual verification. At the time we conducted these experiments, the divide-and-conquer approach

| | Approx. Signature Size (MNT160 curve) | Verification Time | |
|---|--|-------------------|----------|
| | | Standard | Batched* |
| <i>Signatures</i> | | | |
| BLS [9] (single signer) | 160 bits | 47.6 ms | 2.28 ms |
| CHP [13] (many signers) | 160 bits | 73.6 ms | 26.16 ms |
| <i>Identity-Based Signatures</i> | | | |
| ChCh [15] | 320 bits | 49.1 ms | 3.93 ms |
| Waters [38] | 480 bits | 91.2 ms | 9.44 ms |
| Hess [22] | 1120 bits | 49.1 ms | 6.70 ms |
| <i>Anonymous Signatures</i> | | | |
| BBS [6] Group signature (modified per §4.1) | 2400 bits | 139.0 ms | 24.80 ms |
| CYH [19] Ring signature, 2-member ring | 480 bits | 52.0 ms | 6.03 ms |
| CYH [19] Ring signature, 20-member ring | 3360 bits | 86.5 ms | 43.93 ms |

*Verification time *per signature* when batching 200 signatures.

Figure 1: Cryptographic overhead and verification time for some of the pairing-based signatures described in this work. For this summary table, all schemes were implemented in a 160-bit MNT elliptic curve. See section 4 for a description of all signature schemes considered and section 5 for full experimental results.

was the best method known to us. Recently, Law and Matt [24] proposed three new techniques for finding invalid signatures in a batch. One of their techniques allows to save approximately half the time needed by the simple divide-and-conquer approach, for large batch sizes. Thus, while our numbers seem good, they can be further improved.

Overall, we conclude that many interesting short signatures can be batch verified, and that batch verification is an extremely valuable tool for system implementors. As an example of our results in section 5, for the short group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [6], we see that when batching 200 group signatures (in a 160-bit MNT curve) individual verification takes 139ms whereas batch verification reduces the cost to 25ms per signature (see Figure 1).

2 Algebraic Setting: Pairings

Let PSetup be an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1^τ , outputs the parameters for a bilinear pairing as $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbf{e})$, where $\mathbb{G}_1 = \langle g_1 \rangle$, $\mathbb{G}_2 = \langle g_2 \rangle$ and \mathbb{G}_T are of prime order $q \in \Theta(2^\tau)$. The efficient mapping $\mathbf{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is both: (*bilinear*) for all $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $h \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $a, b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, $\mathbf{e}(g^a, h^b) = \mathbf{e}(g, h)^{ab}$; and (*non-degenerate*) if g generates \mathbb{G}_1 and h generates \mathbb{G}_2 , then $\mathbf{e}(g, h) \neq 1$. This is called the *asymmetric* setting. A specialized case is the *symmetric* setting, where $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$. We will always write group elements in the multiplicative notation, although the groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 are actually implemented as additive groups.

Since we are looking at various schemes based on these groups, we are interested in groups that have the smallest representation of the group elements, we want to know if schemes in the symmetric setting can be moved over to the asymmetric setting and finally want to be able to verify whether a given element is a member of a specific group.

2.1 Size of Group Elements

Pairings are constructed such that \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 are groups of points on some elliptic curve E , and \mathbb{G}_T is a subgroup of a multiplicative group over a related finite field. All groups have order q .

The group of points on E defined over \mathbb{F}_p is written as $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. Usually it is the case that \mathbb{G}_1 is a subgroup of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$, \mathbb{G}_2 is a subgroup of $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$ where k is the embedding degree, and \mathbb{G}_T is a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}^*$. In the symmetric case $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$ is usually a subgroup of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

In the following, we use numbers for security comparable to 1024 bit RSA. The MOV attack by Menezes, Vanstone and Okamoto states that solving the discrete logarithm problem on a curve reduces to solving it over the corresponding finite field [27]. Hence the size of p^k must be comparable to that of an RSA modulus to provide the same level of security, so elements of \mathbb{F}_{p^k} must be of size 1024. But the size of the finite field is not the only thing that matters for security. The group order q must also be large enough to resist the Pollard- ρ attack on discrete logarithms, which means that $q \geq 160$. Now assume that $|p| = |q| = 160$, then we would need an embedding degree $k = 6$ to get the size of the corresponding field close to the required 1024 bits. However, we could also let $|q| = 160$, $|p| = 512$, and choose $k = 2$ to achieve the same. Both these options have their advantages and disadvantages as discussed by Koblitz and Menezes [23].

We have talked about how many bits are required to represent elements in the finite fields, but what about the groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 ? Since they are subgroups of a curve over the field, they are represented by their coordinates (x, y) which are elements of the field, and hence one would expect their size to be twice the size of an element in the field. However one only needs to represent x and the LSB of y in order to recompute y later. Also, in some cases (when \mathbb{G}_2 is the trace zero subgroup) elements of \mathbb{G}_2 can be represented as elements of the field $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$ instead, which would only require half the space [23].

In the asymmetric setting, the best we can hope for are group elements in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T of size 160, 512 and 1024 bits respectively. In the symmetric setting it seems the best curve is a supersingular curve with $k = 2$, which means that elements of $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T will be of size 512 and 1024 bits respectively. Finally, an important thing to keep in mind is that no matter the order of the groups, performance is dominated by the operations in the underlying finite field.

2.2 From Symmetric to Asymmetric

If one wants to go from the symmetric to the asymmetric setting to take advantage of the small group elements in \mathbb{G}_1 , there are a few pitfalls one should be aware of. In some asymmetric groups it is not possible to hash into \mathbb{G}_2 , but in these groups there exist a isomorphism from \mathbb{G}_2 to \mathbb{G}_1 . In other groups there is no such isomorphism, but it is possible to hash into \mathbb{G}_2 . So if a scheme requires both for the security proof, that scheme cannot be realized in the asymmetric setting. See Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [20] for more.

2.3 Testing Membership

Our proofs will require that elements of purported signatures are members of \mathbb{G}_1 , but how efficiently can this fact be verified? Determining whether some data represents a point on a curve is easy. The question is whether it is in the correct subgroup. Assume that the subgroup has order q . The easy way to verify if $y \in \mathbb{G}_1$ is simply to test $y^q = 1$. Since q might be quite large this test is inefficient, but as we will see later the time required to test membership of group elements are insignificant compared to the time required to do the pairings in the applications we have in mind. Yet, in some cases, there are more efficient ways to test group membership [18].

3 Basic Tools for Pairing-Based Batch Verification

We now provide some basic observations to determine when pairing equations can be batch verified.

Let us begin with a formal definition of *pairing based* batch verifier. Recall that `PSetup` is an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1^τ , outputs the parameters $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbf{e})$, where $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ are of prime order $q \in \Theta(2^\tau)$. Pairing-based verification equations are represented by a *generic pairing based claim* X corresponding to a boolean relation of the following form: $\prod_{i=1}^k \mathbf{e}(f_i, h_i)^{c_i} \stackrel{?}{=} A$, for $k \in \text{poly}(\tau)$ and $f_i \in \mathbb{G}_1, h_i \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $c_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, for each $i = 1, \dots, k$. A pairing-based verifier `Verify` for a generic pairing-based claim is a probabilistic $\text{poly}(\tau)$ -time algorithm which on input the representation $\langle A, f_1, \dots, f_k, h_1, \dots, h_k, c_1, \dots, c_k \rangle$ of a claim X , outputs *accept* if X holds and *reject* otherwise. We define a batch verifier for pairing-based claims.

Definition 3.1 (Pairing-based Batch Verifier)

Let `PSetup`(1^τ) $\rightarrow (q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbf{e})$. For each $j \in [1, \eta]$, where $\eta \in \text{poly}(\tau)$, let $X^{(j)}$ be a generic pairing-based claim and let `Verify` be a pairing based verifier. We define a pairing-based batch verifier for `Verify` as a probabilistic $\text{poly}(\tau)$ -time algorithm which outputs:

- accept if $X^{(j)}$ holds for all $j \in [1, \eta]$;
- reject if $X^{(j)}$ does not hold for any $j \in [1, \eta]$ except with negligible probability.

3.1 Small Exponents Test Applied to Pairings

Bellare, Garay and Rabin proposed methods for verifying multiple equations of the form $y_i = g^{x_i}$ for $i = 1$ to n , where g is a generator for a group of prime order [4]. One might be tempted to just multiply these equations together and check if $\prod_{i=1}^n y_i = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}$. However, it would be easy to produce two pairs (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) such that the product of them verifies correctly, but each individual verification does not, e.g. by submitting the pairs $(x_1 - \alpha, y_1)$ and $(x_2 + \alpha, y_2)$ for any α . Instead, Bellare et al. proposed the following method, which we will later apply to pairings.

Small Exponents Test: Choose exponents δ_i of (a small number of) ℓ_b bits and compute $\prod_{i=1}^n y_i^{\delta_i} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i \delta_i}$. Then the probability of accepting a bad pair is $2^{-\ell_b}$. The size of ℓ_b is a tradeoff between efficiency and security. (In Section 5, we set $\ell_b = 80$ bits.)

Theorem 3.2 Let `PSetup`(1^τ) $\rightarrow (q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbf{e})$ where q is prime. For each $j \in [1, \eta]$, where $\eta \in \text{poly}(\tau)$, let $X^{(j)}$ corresponds to a generic claim as in Definition 3.2. For simplicity, assume that $X^{(j)}$ is of the form $A \stackrel{?}{=} Y^{(j)}$ where A is fixed for all j and all the input values to the claim $X^{(j)}$ are in the correct groups. For any random vector $\Delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ of ℓ_b bit elements from \mathbb{Z}_q , an algorithm `Batch` which tests the following equation $\prod_{j=1}^\eta A^{\delta_j} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^\eta Y^{(j)\delta_j}$ is a pairing-based batch verifier that accepts an invalid batch with probability at most $2^{-\ell_b}$.

Proof. The proof closely follows the proof of the small exponents test by Bellare et al. [4], but for completeness we include a full proof of this theorem in Appendix A.¹ □

Thus, Theorem 3.2 provides a *single* verification equation, which we then want to optimize.

¹A natural question to ask is if this batch verifier also works for composite order groups. Unfortunately the answer is not straightforward. The reason for requiring a prime order group, is that for the proof of the small exponents test to go through, we need an element β_1 to have an inverse in \mathbb{Z}_q , which is the case if $\text{gcd}(\beta_1, q) = 1$. If q is prime this is always the case, but what if q is composite? If $q = p_1 p_2$, where p_1, p_2 are primes, then this is the case except when β_1 is a multiple of p_1, p_2 or q . If β_1 is chosen at random it is very unlikely that an inverse does not exist, and the small exponents test will work in almost all cases. However, this really depends on the signature scheme, so if one wants to apply this method to a scheme set in a composite order group, one should examine the proof in Appendix A and make sure that it still applies to the chosen scheme.

3.2 Basic Batching Techniques

Armed with Theorem 3.2, let's back up for a moment to get a complete picture of how to develop an efficient batch verifier. This summarizes the ideas we used to obtain the results in Figure 2, which we believe will be useful elsewhere. Immediately after the summary, we'll explain the details.

Summary: Suppose you have η bilinear equations, to batch verify them, do the following:

1. Apply Technique 1 to the individual verification equation, if applicable.
2. Apply Theorem 3.2 to the equations. This *combines* all equations into a single equation after checking membership in the expected algebraic groups and using the small exponents test.
3. Optimize the resulting single equation using Techniques 2, 3 and 4.
4. If batch verification fails, use the divide-and-conquer approach to identify the bad signatures.

Technique 1 *Change the verification equation.* Recall that a Σ -protocol is a three step protocol (commit, challenge, response) allowing a prover to prove various statements to a verifier. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic a Σ -protocol can be turned into a signature scheme, by forming the challenge as the hash of the commitment and the message to be signed. The signature is then either (commit, response) or (challenge, response). The latter is often preferred, since the challenge is usually smaller than the commitment, which results in a smaller signature. However, we observed that this often causes batch verification to become very inefficient, whereas using (commit, response) results in a much more suitable verification equation.

We use this technique to help batch the Hess IBS [22] and the group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [6] and Boyen and Shacham [10]. Indeed, we believe that prior attempts to batch verify group signatures overlooked this idea and thus came up without efficient solutions.

Combination Step: Given η pairing-based claims, apply Theorem 3.2 to obtain a single equation. The combination step actually consist of two substeps:

1. *Check Membership:* Check that all elements are in the correct subgroup. Only elements that could be generated by an adversary needs to be checked (e.g., elements of a signature one wants to verify). Public parameters need not be checked, or could be checked only once.
2. *Small Exponents Test:* Combine all equations into one and apply the small exponents test.

Next, optimize this *single* equation using any of the following techniques in any order.

Technique 2 *Move the exponent into the pairing.* When a pairing of the form $\mathbf{e}(g_i, h_i)^{\delta_i}$ appears, move the exponent δ_i into $\mathbf{e}()$. Since elements of \mathbb{G} are usually smaller than elements of \mathbb{G}_T , this gives a small speedup when computing the exponentiation.

$$\text{Replace } \mathbf{e}(g_i, h_i)^{\delta_i} \text{ with } \mathbf{e}(g_i^{\delta_i}, h_i)$$

Remember that it is also possible to move an exponent out of the pairing, or move it between the two elements of the pairing. In some cases, this allows for further optimizations.

Technique 3 *When two pairings with a common first or second element appear, they can be combined.* This can reduce η pairings to one. It will work like this:

$$\text{Replace } \prod_{i=1}^{\eta} \mathbf{e}(g_i^{\delta_i}, h) \text{ with } \mathbf{e}\left(\prod_{i=1}^{\eta} g_i^{\delta_i}, h\right)$$

When batching η instances using Theorem 3.2 this will reduce η pairings to one. This is also worth keeping in mind when designing schemes, or picking schemes that one wants to batch verify. Pick a scheme so that when $\mathbf{e}(g, h)$ appears in the verification equation, g or h is fixed.

In rare cases, it might be useful to apply this technique “in reverse”, e.g., splitting a single pairing into two or more pairings to allow for the application of other techniques. For example, we do this when batching Boyen’s ring signatures [11], so that we can apply Technique 4 below.

Technique 4 *Waters hash*. In his IBE, Waters described how hash identities to values in \mathbb{G}_1 [38], using a technique that was subsequently employed in several signature schemes. Assume the identity is a bit string $V = v_1v_2\dots v_m$, then given public parameters u_1, \dots, u_m , $u' \in \mathbb{G}_1$, the hash is $u' \prod_{i=1}^m u_i^{v_i}$. Following works by Naccache [30] and Chatterjee and Sarkar [16, 17] documented the generalization where instead of evaluating the identity bit by bit, divide the k bit identity bit string into z blocks, and then hash. (In Section 5, we SHA1 hash our messages to a 160-bit string, and use $z = 5$ as proposed in [30].) Recently, Camenisch et al. [13] pointed out the following method:

$$\text{Replace } \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \mathbf{e}(g_j, \prod_{i=1}^m u_i^{v_{ij}}) \text{ with } \prod_{i=1}^m \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} g_j^{v_{ij}}, u_i)$$

In this work, we apply this technique to schemes with structures related to the Waters hash; namely, the ring signatures of Boyen [11] and the aggregate signatures of Lu et al. [25].

3.3 Handling Invalid Signatures

If there is even a single invalid signature in the batch, then the batch verifier will reject the entire batch with high probability. In many real-world situations, a signature collection may contain invalid signatures caused by accidental data corruption, or possibly malicious activity by an adversary seeking to degrade service. The ratio of invalid signatures to valid could be quite small, and yet a standard batch verifier will reject the entire collection. In some cases, this may not be a serious concern. E.g., sensor networks with a high level of redundancy may choose to simply drop messages that cannot be efficiently verified. Alternatively, systems may be able to cache and/or individually verify important messages when batch verification fails. Yet, in some applications, it might be critical to tolerate some percentage of invalid signatures without losing the performance advantage of batch verification.

In Section 5.2, we employ a recursive *divide-and-conquer* approach, similar to that of Pastuszak, Pieprzyk, Michalek and Seberry [32], as: First, shuffle the incoming batch of signatures, and if batch verification fails, simply divide the collection into two halves, and recurse on the halves. When this process terminates, the batch verifier outputs the index of each invalid signature. Through careful implementation and caching of intermediate results, much of the work of the batch verification (i.e., computing the product of many signature elements) can be performed once over the full signature collection, and need not be repeated when verifying each sub-collection. Thus, the cost of each recursion is dominated by the number of pairings used in the batch verification algorithm. In Section 5.2, we show that even if up to 15% of the signatures are invalid, this technique still performs faster than individual verification.

Recently, Law and Matt [24] proposed three new techniques for finding invalid signatures in a batch. One of their techniques, which is the most efficient for large batch sizes, allows to save approximately half the time needed by the simple divide-and-conquer approach. Thus, it is possible to do even better than the performance numbers we present.

| Scheme | Model | Individual-Verify | Batch-Verify | Reference | Techniques |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|---|-----------|------------|
| <i>Group Signatures</i> | | | | | |
| BBS [6] | RO | 5η | 2 | §4.1 | 1,2,3 |
| BS [10] | RO | 5η | 2 | §4.1 | 1,2,3 |
| <i>ID-based Ring Signatures</i> | | | | | |
| CYH [19] | RO | 2η | 2 | §4.2 | 2,3 |
| Ring Signatures | | | | | |
| Boyen [11] (same ring) | plain | $\ell \cdot (\eta + 1)$ | $\min\{\eta \cdot \ell + 1, 3 \cdot \ell + 1\}$ | §4.2 | 2,3,4 |
| <i>Signatures</i> | | | | | |
| BLS [9] | RO | 2η | $s + 1$ | [9] | 2,3 |
| CHP [13] (time restrictions) | RO | 3η | 3 | [13] | 2,3 |
| <i>ID-based Signatures</i> | | | | | |
| Hess [22] | RO | 2η | 2 | §4.3 | 1,2,3 |
| ChCh [15] | RO | 2η | 2 | [24] | 2,3 |
| Waters [38, 30, 12, 17] | plain | 3η | $\min\{(2\eta + 3), (z + 3)\}$ | [13] | 2,3,4 |
| <i>Aggregate Signatures</i> | | | | | |
| BGLS [7] (same users) | RO | $\eta(\ell + 1)$ | $\ell + 1$ | §4.4 | 2,3 |
| Sh [37] (same users) | RO | $\eta(\ell + 2)$ | $\ell + 2$ | §4.4 | 2,3 |
| LOSSW [25] (same sequence) | plain | $\eta(\ell + 1)$ | $\min\{(\eta + 2), (\ell \cdot k + 3)\}$ | §4.4 | 2,3,4 |

Figure 2: **Signatures with Efficient Batch Verifiers.** Let η be the number of signatures to verify, s be the number of distinct signers involved and ℓ be either the size of a ring or the size of an aggregate. Boyen batch verifier requires each signature to be issued according to the same ring. Aggregate verifiers work for signatures related to the same set of users. In CHP, only signatures from the same time period can be batched and z is a (small) parameter (e.g., 8). In LOSSW, k is the message bit-length. RO stands for random oracle.

4 Batch Verifiers for Short Signatures

We now show how to batch verify a selection of existing regular, identity-based, group, ring, and aggregate signature schemes. To our knowledge, these are the first such verifiers for group, ring and aggregate signatures. After a search through the existing literature, we are presenting only the schemes with the best results (although we often note common schemes that do not appear to batch well.) Figure 2 shows a summary of our results.

4.1 Short Group Signatures

The short group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham (BBS) [6] and Boneh and Shacham (BS) [10] do not appear to batch well *without* making some alterations in both the signatures and their verification equations. We show how to do this to achieve a batch verifier which requires only 2 pairings at the cost of a small increase in the signature size.

Recall that a group signature scheme allows any member to sign on behalf of the group in such a way that anyone can verify a signature using the group public key while nobody, but the group manager, can identify the actual signer. A group signature scheme consists in four algorithm: KeyGen, Sign, Verify and Open, that, respectively generate public and private keys for users and the group manager, sign a message on behalf of a group, verify the signature on a message according to the group and trace a signature to a signer. For our purposes, we focus on the verification algorithm.

The Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) Group Signatures. Let $\text{PSetup}(1^\tau) \rightarrow (q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbf{e})$, where $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ is a hash function and there exists an efficiently-computable isomorphism $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$. Let ℓ be the number of users in a group.

The BBS scheme requires a computable isomorphism $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ since their definition of the SDH assumption is based on it, but such an isomorphism does not exist for the MNT curves we use in Section 5. Boneh and Boyen recently gave a definition which doesn't require said isomorphism [5].

KeyGen. The group manager sets the keys as:

1. Select a random $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and set $g_1 \leftarrow \psi(g_2)$.
2. Select $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{1_{\mathbb{G}_1}\}$, $r_1, r_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and set u, v such that $u^{r_1} = v^{r_2} = h$.
3. Select $\gamma \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and set $w = g_2^\gamma$.
4. For $i = 1$ to n , select $x_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and set $f_i = g_1^{\frac{1}{\gamma+x_i}}$.

The public key is $\mathbf{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$, the group manager's secret key is $\mathbf{gmsk} = (r_1, r_2)$ and the secret key of the i 'th user is $\mathbf{gsk}[i] = (f_i, x_i)$.

Sign. Given a group public key $\mathbf{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$, a user private key (f, x) and a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$, compute the signature σ as follows:

1. Select $\alpha, \beta, r_\alpha, r_\beta, r_x, r_{\gamma_1}, r_{\gamma_2} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$.
2. Compute $T_1 = u^\alpha$; $T_2 = v^\beta$; $T_3 = f \cdot h^{\alpha+\beta}$.
3. Compute $\gamma_1 = x \cdot \alpha$ and $\gamma_2 = x \cdot \beta$.
4. Compute $R_1 = u^{r_\alpha}$; $R_2 = v^{r_\beta}$;
 $R_3 = \mathbf{e}(T_3, g_2)^{r_x} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, w)^{-r_\alpha - r_\beta} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^{-r_{\gamma_1} - r_{\gamma_2}}$; $R_4 = T_1^{r_x} \cdot u^{-r_{\gamma_1}}$; $R_5 = T_2^{r_x} \cdot v^{-r_{\gamma_2}}$.
5. Compute $c = H(M, T_1, T_2, T_3, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5)$.
6. Compute $s_\alpha = r_\alpha + c \cdot \alpha$; $s_\beta = r_\beta + c \cdot \beta$; $s_x = r_x + c \cdot x$; $s_{\gamma_1} = r_{\gamma_1} + c \cdot \gamma_1$; $s_{\gamma_2} = r_{\gamma_2} + c \cdot \gamma_2$.
7. Signature is $\sigma = (T_1, T_2, T_3, c, s_\alpha, s_\beta, s_x, s_{\gamma_1}, s_{\gamma_2})$.

Verify. Given a group public key $\mathbf{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$, a message M and a group signature $\sigma = (T_1, T_2, T_3, c, s_\alpha, s_\beta, s_x, s_{\gamma_1}, s_{\gamma_2})$, compute the values

$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &= u^{s_\alpha} \cdot T_1^{-c}; & R_2 &= v^{s_\beta} \cdot T_2^{-c}; \\ R_3 &= \mathbf{e}(T_3, g_2)^{s_x} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, w)^{-s_\alpha - s_\beta} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^{-s_{\delta_1} - s_{\delta_2}} \cdot \\ &\quad (\mathbf{e}(T_3, w) \cdot \mathbf{e}(g_1, g_2)^{-1})^c; \\ R_4 &= T_1^{s_x} \cdot u^{-s_{\delta_1}}; & R_5 &= T_2^{s_x} \cdot v^{-s_{\delta_2}}. \end{aligned}$$

Accept iff $c \stackrel{?}{=} H(M, T_1, T_2, T_3, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5)$.

An Efficient Batch Verifier for BBS Group Signatures.

Computing R_3 is the most expensive part of the verification above, but at first glance it is not clear that this can be batched, because each R_3 is hashed in the verification equation. However, as described by Technique 1, the signature and the verification algorithm can be modified at the expense of increasing the signature size by one element. Let $\sigma = (T_1, T_2, T_3, R_3, c, s_\alpha, s_\beta, s_x, s_{\gamma_1}, s_{\gamma_2})$ be the new signature, together with:

New Individual Verify. Given a group public key $\mathbf{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$, a message M and a group signature $\sigma = (T_1, T_2, T_3, R_3, c, s_\alpha, s_\beta, s_x, s_{\gamma_1}, s_{\gamma_2})$, compute the values $R_1 \leftarrow u^{s_\alpha} \cdot T_1^{-c}$;

$R_2 \leftarrow v^{s_\beta} \cdot T_2^{-c}$; $R_4 \leftarrow T_1^{s_x} \cdot u^{-s_{\gamma_1}}$; $R_5 \leftarrow T_2^{s_x} \cdot v^{-s_{\gamma_2}}$, then check the following equation

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{e}(T_3, g_2)^{s_x} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, w)^{-s_\alpha - s_\beta} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^{-s_{\gamma_1} - s_{\gamma_2}} \cdot \\ & (\mathbf{e}(T_3, w) \cdot \mathbf{e}(g_1, g_2)^{-1})^c \stackrel{?}{=} R_3. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Finally check if $c \stackrel{?}{=} H(M, T_1, T_2, T_3, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5)$. Accept if all checks succeed, else reject.

Now we define a batch verifier, where the main objective is to use a *constant* number of pairings.

BBS Batch Verify. Let $\text{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$ be the group public key, and let $\sigma_j = (T_{j,1}, T_{j,2}, T_{j,3}, R_{j,3}, c_j, s_{j,\alpha}, s_{j,\beta}, s_{j,x}, s_{j,\gamma_1}, s_{j,\gamma_2})$ be the j 'th signature on the message M_j , for each $j = 1, \dots, \eta$. For each $j = 1, \dots, \eta$, compute the following values:

$$\begin{aligned} R_{j,1} & \leftarrow u^{s_{j,\alpha}} \cdot T_{j,1}^{-c_j} & R_{j,2} & \leftarrow v^{s_{j,\beta}} \cdot T_{j,2}^{-c_j} \\ R_{j,4} & \leftarrow T_{j,1}^{s_{j,x}} \cdot u^{-s_{j,\gamma_1}} & R_{j,5} & \leftarrow T_{j,2}^{s_{j,x}} \cdot v^{-s_{j,\gamma_2}} \end{aligned}$$

Now for each $j = 1, \dots, \eta$, check the following:

$$c_j \stackrel{?}{=} H(M_j, T_{j,1}, T_{j,2}, T_{j,3}, R_{j,1}, R_{j,2}, R_{j,3}, R_{j,4}, R_{j,5})$$

Then check the following *single* pairing based equation

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{e}\left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} (T_{j,3}^{s_{j,x}} \cdot h^{-s_{j,\gamma_1} - s_{j,\gamma_2}} \cdot g_1^{-c_j})^{\delta_j}, g_2\right) \cdot \\ & \mathbf{e}\left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} (h^{-s_{j,\alpha} - s_{j,\beta}} \cdot T_3^c)^{\delta_j}, w\right) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} R_{j,3}^{\delta_j}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ is a random vector of ℓ_b bit elements from \mathbb{Z}_q . Accept if and only if all checks succeed.

Theorem 4.1 *For security level ℓ_b , the above algorithm is a batch verifier for the BBS group signature scheme, where the probability of accepting an invalid signature is $2^{-\ell_b}$.*

Proof sketch. Let $\text{gpk} = (g_1, g_2, h, u, v, w)$ be the group public key, and let $\sigma_j = (T_{j,1}, T_{j,2}, T_{j,3}, R_{j,3}, c, s_{j,\alpha}, s_{j,\beta}, s_{j,x}, s_{j,\gamma_1}, s_{j,\gamma_2})$ be the j 'th signature on the message M_j , for each $j = 1, \dots, \eta$. Since the BBS Batch Verify algorithm performs the same tests as the New Individual Verify algorithm for each signature separately, we just need to prove that equation 2 is a batch verifier for equation 1. From Theorem 3.2, for any random vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ of ℓ_b bit elements from \mathbb{Z}_q , the following equation

$$\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} (\mathbf{e}(T_{j,3}, g_2)^{s_{j,x}} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, w)^{-s_{j,\alpha} - s_{j,\beta}} \cdot \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^{-s_{j,\gamma_1} - s_{j,\gamma_2}} \cdot (\mathbf{e}(T_{j,3}, w) \cdot \mathbf{e}(g_1, g_2)^{-1})^{c_j})^{\delta_j} \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} R_{j,3}^{\delta_j} \quad (3)$$

is a batch verifier for the pairing based equation 1. It is easy to see that equation 3 is equivalent to equation 2. Indeed, equation 2 is an optimized version of equation 3 obtained by applying techniques 2 and 3. \square

The Boneh-Shacham (BS) Group Signatures As we point out in Figure 2, the (even shorter) group signatures of Boneh and Shacham [10] can also be batch verified using techniques similar to those above. The BS scheme includes a feature known as *verifier local revocation* (VLR), which allows verifiers to discard signatures from revoked signers. Unfortunately, the checks required to test for revoked signers cannot easily be batched. Thus, our batch verifier omits them. Since VLR is not a “traditional” property of a group signature (e.g., [2, 6]), the resulting batch verifier is still quite useful for applications where only a *standard* group signature is needed. Note that verifiers may still perform revocation checks using the non-batched verify algorithm and the group manager can still recover the signer’s identity in case of misbehavior. An interesting open problem would be to create a group signature scheme that simultaneously supports both VLR *and* an efficient batch verification.

Performance and Signature Length. The BBS batch verifier is suitable to verify many signatures issued by many group members on different messages. The original BBS signature consists of three elements of \mathbb{G}_1 and six elements of \mathbb{Z}_q while its modified version, needed to construct the BBS batch verifier, requires three elements of \mathbb{G}_1 , one element of \mathbb{G}_T , and six elements of \mathbb{Z}_q . When implemented in the 170-bit MNT curve proposed by Boneh et al., this results in a signature representation of approximately 2553 bits with security approximately equivalent to 1024-bit RSA. This is still shorter than the comparable (non-pairing) scheme of Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye, and Tsudik [2] which achieves a similar security level at a cost of at least 3872 bits. For applications where bandwidth is at a premium, it is desirable to use the extremely short group signature of Boneh and Shacham [10] which is suitable to construct a batch verifier that requires only two pairing operations. With appropriate modifications to permit batching, a BS signature results in four elements of \mathbb{G}_1 , one element of \mathbb{G}_T , and four elements of \mathbb{Z}_q which can be represented in 2,384 bits.

4.2 Ring and Identity-based Ring Signature Schemes

A ring signature scheme allows a signer to sign a message on behalf of a set of users which include the signer herself in such a way that a verifier is convinced that the signer is one of the ring members, but he cannot tell which member is the actual signer. A ring signature is a triple of algorithms *KeyGen*, *Sign* and *Verify*, that, respectively generate public and private keys for a user, sign a message on behalf of the ring and verify the signature on a message according to the ring.

In an identity-based ring signature, a user can choose an arbitrary string, for example her email address, as her public key. The corresponding private key is then created by binding such a string which represents the user’s identity with the master key of a trusted party called private key generator (PKG). Such a scheme consists of four algorithms: *Setup*, *KeyGen*, *Sign* and *Verify*. During *Setup*, the PKG sets the system parameters P_{pub} and chooses a master secret key msk . During *KeyGen*, the PKG gives the user a secret key based on her identity string. Then the signing and verification algorithms operate as before, except that only P_{pub} and the ring members identities are needed in place of their public keys.

Figures 3 and 4 summarize the two schemes we consider and how to batch them, respectively.² The CYH scheme is fairly straightforward to batch, while the Boyen scheme required more creativity, especially in the application of techniques 3 and 4.

²In the course of the study, we noticed that the identity-based ring signature scheme proposed in [3] is a very nice candidate for batch verification. Unfortunately, we found that, for ring size greater than two, the security proof has a flaw. After hearing of this proof flaw, Brent Waters translated it into an attack on the scheme (personal communication). It is still open to see if such a scheme is indeed secure for rings of size two.

| Scheme | Setup | Signature | Verify |
|--------|--|---|---|
| | Key Generation | | |
| CYH | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ $msk \leftarrow \alpha$ $P_{pub} \leftarrow g^\alpha$ | Let $L = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_\ell\}$ Let ID_s be the signer $\forall i \in [1, \ell]$ s.t. $i \neq s$ $u_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$ $h_i \leftarrow H_2(M L u_i)$ $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $u_s \leftarrow pk_s^r \cdot \left(\prod_{i \neq s} u_i \cdot pk_i^{h_i} \right)^{-1}$ $h_s \leftarrow H_2(M L u_s)$ $S = sk_s^{h_s+r}$ $\sigma \leftarrow (u_1, \dots, u_\ell, S)$ | Let $\sigma = (u_1, \dots, u_\ell, S)$ $\forall i \in [1, \ell]$ $h_i \leftarrow H_2(M L u_i)$ $\mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} u_i \cdot pk_i^{h_i}, P_{pub} \right) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(S, g_2)$ |
| | Boyen | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ $\hat{A}_0, \hat{B}_0, \hat{C}_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_2$ | Let $L = \{pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_\ell\}$ where $pk_i = (A_i, B_i, C_i, \hat{A}_i, \hat{B}_i, \hat{C}_i)$ W.l.o.g., let pk_ℓ be the signer $s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{\ell-1}, t_0, t_1, \dots, t_\ell \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $\forall i \in [0, \ell-1], S_i \leftarrow g_1^{s_i}$ $d \leftarrow \frac{1}{a_\ell + b_\ell \cdot M + c_\ell \cdot t_\ell}$ $S_\ell \leftarrow \left(g \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{\ell-1} (A_i \cdot B_i^M \cdot C_i^{t_i})^{-s_i} \right)^d$ $\sigma = (S_0, \dots, S_\ell, t_0, \dots, t_\ell)$ |

Figure 3: **Ring signature schemes that we consider.** We denote by P_{pub} , sk and pk the system parameters, user private key and user public key, respectively. Moreover, we denote with pk_i and sk_i the public and private keys of the i -th user in the ring. A ring signature on a message M is denoted by σ and ℓ represents the ring size.

| Scheme | Batch Verification Precomputation | Techniques |
|--------|--|------------|
| | Batch Verification Equation | |
| CYH | Let $\sigma_j = (u_{j,1}, \dots, u_{j,\ell}, S_j)$ and $L_j = \{ID_{j,1}, \dots, ID_{j,\ell_j}\}; \forall i, j h_{j,i} \leftarrow H_2(M_j L_j u_{j,i})$ | 2,3 |
| | $\mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell_j} (u_{j,i} \cdot pk_{j,i}^{h_{j,i}})^{\delta_j}, P_{pub} \right) = \mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_j, g_2 \right)$ | |
| Boyen | Let $\sigma_j = (S_{j,0}, \dots, S_{j,\ell}, t_{j,0}, \dots, t_{j,\ell}), pk_i \leftarrow (A_i, B_i, C_i, \hat{A}_i, \hat{B}_i, \hat{C}_i)$ and $D = \mathbf{e}(g_1, g_2)$ | 2,3,4 |
| | If $\eta < 3$, $\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \prod_{i=0}^{\ell} \mathbf{e}(S_{j,i}^{\delta_j}, \hat{A}_i \cdot \hat{B}_i^{m_{j,i}} \cdot \hat{C}_i^{t_{j,i}}) = \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} D^{\delta_j}$ Otherwise, $\prod_{i=0}^{\ell} \left(\mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,i}^{\delta_j}, \hat{A}_i \right) \cdot \mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,i}^{\delta_j m_{j,i}}, \hat{B}_i \right) \cdot \mathbf{e} \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,i}^{\delta_j t_{j,i}}, \hat{C}_i \right) \right) = \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} D^{\delta_j}$ | |

Figure 4: **Batch verifier for the ring signature and ID-based ring signature schemes we consider.** Let η be the number of signatures to verify and M_j be the message corresponding to the j 'th signature σ_j . With $pk_{j,i}$ and ℓ_j we denote the public key of the i 'th ring member and the size of the ring associated to the j 'th signature, respectively. The vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ in \mathbb{Z}_q is required by the small exponents test.

4.3 Signature and Identity-based Signature Schemes

In this section, for completeness, we first review some previously known short signature schemes and their corresponding batch verifiers. In 2001, Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [9] proposed the first

| Scheme | Setup | Signature | Verification Precomputation |
|--------|---|--|---|
| | Key Generation | | Verification Equation |
| BLS | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ <hr/> $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $sk \leftarrow \alpha; pk \leftarrow g_2^\alpha$ | $\sigma \leftarrow H(M)^{sk}$ | $e(H(M), pk) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\sigma, g_2)$ |
| CHP | Let Φ be the set of time periods. $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H_1 : \Phi \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1, H_2 : \Phi \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \Phi \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ <hr/> $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $sk \leftarrow \alpha; pk \leftarrow g_2^\alpha$ | $a \leftarrow H_1(\phi)$ $h \leftarrow H_2(\phi)$ $b \leftarrow H_3(M \phi)$ $\sigma \leftarrow a^{sk} \cdot h^{sk \cdot b}$ | $a \leftarrow H_1(\phi); h \leftarrow H_2(\phi); b \leftarrow H_3(M \phi)$ <hr/> $e(\sigma, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} e(a, pk) \cdot e(h, pk)^b$ |

Figure 5: **Signature Schemes that we consider.** We denote by pk and sk the public key and the private key of a user, respectively. We denote by σ a signature on a message M . In CHP, ϕ is a time period in the set of time periods Φ .

short pairing-based signature scheme which is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model. We'll refer to this scheme as BLS.

| Scheme | Batch Verification Precomputation | Techniques |
|--------|--|------------|
| | Batch Verification Equation | |
| BLS | $\prod_{i=1}^s e(\prod_{\ell=i_1}^{i_{n_i}} H(M_\ell)^{\delta_\ell}, pk_i) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\prod_{j=1}^\eta \sigma_j^{\delta_j}, g_2)$ | 2,3 |
| CHP | $a \leftarrow H_1(\phi); h \leftarrow H_2(\phi); \forall j \in [1, \eta], b_j \leftarrow H_3(M_j \phi)$ <hr/> $e(\prod_{j=1}^\eta \sigma_j^{\delta_j}, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} e(a, \prod_{j=1}^\eta pk_j^{\delta_j}) \cdot e(h, \prod_{j=1}^\eta pk_j^{b_j \cdot \delta_j})$ | 2,3 |

Figure 6: **Batch verifiers for the signature schemes we consider.** Let η be the number of signatures to verify. With pk_j we denote the public key of the user who issued the j 'th signature. The vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ in \mathbb{Z}_q is required by the small exponents test. In BLS, s is the number of different signer and n_i is the number of signatures issued by the i 'th signer (for details see the text). In CHP, ϕ is a time period in the set of time periods Φ .

As also noticed by the authors, BLS is suitable to verify a bunch of purported signatures either issued from the *same* signer on different messages or by different public keys on the *same* message in a faster way than simply verifying each signature separately. Indeed, consider η BLS signatures $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_\eta$ issued by means of the BLS signature algorithm (see Figure 5) under the same public key pk on different messages M_1, \dots, M_η . According to the BLS verification equation (see Figure 5), 2η pairing evaluations are needed to verify each equation separately, while applying techniques 2 and 3, only two pairing evaluations suffice: $e(\prod_{j=1}^\eta H(M_j)^{\delta_j}, pk) = e(\prod_{j=1}^\eta \sigma_j^{\delta_j}, g_2)$, for some vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ in \mathbb{Z}_q . In Figure 6, we consider batching *different* messages from s *different* signers. Here BLS batch verification equation requires $s + 1$ pairing evaluations.

Camenisch, Hohenberger and Pedersen [13] proposed a signature scheme secure of the same size as BLS also secure in the random oracle model. We'll refer to this as CHP. This scheme allows

| Scheme | Setup | Sign | Verification Precomputation |
|--------|--|--|---|
| | Key Generation | | Verification Equation |
| ChCh | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $msk \leftarrow \alpha; P_{pub} \leftarrow g_2^\alpha$ $sk \leftarrow H_1(ID)^\alpha; pk \leftarrow H_1(ID)$ | $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $S_1 \leftarrow pk^s$ $a \leftarrow H_2(M S_1)$ $S_2 \leftarrow sk^{s+a}$ $\sigma \leftarrow (S_1, S_2)$ | $\text{Let } \sigma = (S_1, S_2), a \leftarrow H_2(M S_1)$ $\frac{\mathbf{e}(S_2, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(S_1 \cdot pk^a, P_{pub})}{}$ |
| Hess | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $msk \leftarrow \alpha; P_{pub} \leftarrow g_2^\alpha$ $sk \leftarrow H_1(ID)^\alpha; pk \leftarrow H_1(ID)$ | $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$ $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $S_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^s$ $a \leftarrow H_2(M S_1)$ $S_2 \leftarrow sk^a \cdot h^s$ $\sigma \leftarrow (S_1, S_2)$ | $\text{Let } \sigma = (S_1, S_2), a \leftarrow H_2(M S_1)$ $\frac{\mathbf{e}(S_2, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(pk, P_{pub})^a \cdot S_1}{}$ |
| Waters | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^\tau)$ $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q; h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$ $A \leftarrow \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^\alpha$ $y'_1, y'_2, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $u'_1 \leftarrow g_1^{y'_1}; u'_2 \leftarrow g_1^{y'_2}$ $\forall \ell \in [1, z], u_\ell \leftarrow g_1^{y_\ell}$ $\hat{u}'_1 \leftarrow g_2^{y'_1}; \hat{u}'_2 \leftarrow g_2^{y'_2}$ $\forall \ell \in [1, z], \hat{u}_\ell \leftarrow g_2^{y_\ell}$ $msk \leftarrow h^\alpha$ $P_{pub} \leftarrow (A, u'_1, u'_2, u_1, \dots, u_z, \hat{u}'_1, \hat{u}'_2, \hat{u}_1, \dots, \hat{u}_z)$ $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $k_1 \leftarrow h^\alpha \cdot (u'_1 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^z u_i^{\kappa_i})^r$ $k_2 \leftarrow g_1^{-r}$ $sk \leftarrow (k_1, k_2)$ | $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $S_1 \leftarrow k_1 \cdot (u'_2 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^z u_i^{m_i})^s$ $S_2 \leftarrow k_2$ $S_3 \leftarrow g_1^{-s}$ $\sigma \leftarrow (S_1, S_2, S_3)$ | $\text{Let } \sigma = (S_1, S_2, S_3) \text{ and } A = \mathbf{e}(h, g_2)^\alpha$ $\frac{\mathbf{e}(S_1, g_2) \cdot \mathbf{e}(S_2, \hat{u}'_1 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^z \hat{u}_i^{\kappa_i}) \cdot \mathbf{e}(S_3, \hat{u}'_2 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^z \hat{u}_i^{m_i}) \stackrel{?}{=} A}{}$ |

Figure 7: **Identity-based signature schemes that we consider.** We denote by msk , P_{pub} , sk and pk the master key, the system parameters, user private key and user public key, respectively. We denote by σ a signature on a message M . In Waters, z is the number of ℓ -bit chunks. Moreover, the identity ID and the message M are parsed as $\kappa_1, \dots, \kappa_z$ and m_1, \dots, m_z , respectively.

efficient batch verification of signatures made by *different* signers provided that all signatures have been issued during the *same* period of time. Since the values g_2 , a and h are the same for all signatures, from techniques 2 and 3, the CHP batch verification equation shown in Figure 6 requires only three pairings.

In the following we focus on batch verification for identity-based signature schemes. An identity based signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Key Generation, Sign and Verify. The public key generator PKG initializes the system during the Setup phase by choosing the system parameters P_{pub} which are made public. Moreover, the PKG chooses a master key msk and keeps it secret. The master key is used in the key generation phase along with the identity of a user to compute the user's private key. A user can sign a message by using the Sign algorithm. Finally, a verifier can check a signature on a message by using the Verify algorithm on input the signature, the public parameters and the identity of the signer. In Figure 7 we summarize the identity-based signature schemes we consider.

| Scheme | Batch Verification Precomputation | Techniques |
|------------|--|------------|
| | Batch Verification Equation | |
| ChCh | Let $\sigma_j = (S_{j,1}, S_{j,2})$. $\forall j \in [1, \eta]$, $a_j \leftarrow H_2(M_j S_{j,1})$ | 2,3 |
| | $e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,2}^{\delta_j}, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} (S_{j,1} \cdot pk_j^{a_j})^{\delta_j}, P_{pub})$ | |
| Hess | Let $\sigma_j = (S_{j,1}, S_{j,2})$. $\forall j \in [1, \eta]$, $a_j \leftarrow H_2(M_j S_{j,1})$ | 2,3 |
| | $e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,2}^{\delta_j}, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} pk_j^{a_j \cdot \delta_j}, P_{pub}) \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,1}^{\delta_j}$ | |
| Waters | Let $\sigma_j = (S_{j,1}, S_{j,2}, S_{j,3})$ and $P_{pub} = (A, u'_1, u'_2, u_1, \dots, u_z, \hat{u}'_1, \hat{u}'_2, \hat{u}_1, \dots, \hat{u}_z)$ | 2,3, 4 |
| | If $z > 2\eta - 2$, | |
| | $e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,1}, g_2) \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \left(e(S_{j,1}^{\delta_j}, \hat{u}'_1 \prod_{i=1}^z \hat{u}_j^{k_{j,i}}) \cdot e(S_{j,3}^{\delta_j}, \hat{u}'_2 \prod_{i=1}^z \hat{u}_j^{m_{j,i}}) \right) \stackrel{?}{=} A^{\sum_{j=1}^{\eta} \delta_j}$ | |
| Otherwise, | $e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,1}^{\delta_j}, g_2) \cdot e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,2}^{\delta_j}, \hat{u}'_1) \cdot e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,3}^{\delta_j}, \hat{u}'_2) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^z e(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} (S_{j,2}^{k_{j,i}} \cdot S_{j,3}^{m_{j,i}})^{\delta_j}, \hat{u}_i) \stackrel{?}{=} A^{\sum_{j=1}^{\eta} \delta_j}$ | |

Figure 8: **Batch verifiers for the identity-based signature schemes we consider.** Let η be the number of signatures to verify. With pk_j we denote the public key of the user who issued the j 'th signature σ_j on message M_j . The vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$ in \mathbb{Z}_q is required by the small exponents test. In CHP-2, z is the number of ℓ -bit chunks. Moreover, the identity ID_j and the message M_j corresponding to the j -th signature are parsed as $\kappa_{j,1}, \dots, \kappa_{j,z}$ and $m_{j,1}, \dots, m_{j,z}$, respectively.

As shown in Figure 8, techniques 2 and 3 allow to construct a batch verifier which requires only two pairing evaluations for the schemes ChCh and Hess. Both ChCh and Hess schemes are proved secure in the random oracle model. The ChCh batch verifier of Figure 8 was also shown in [24]. In [13] Camenisch et al. showed a batch verifier for an identity-based signature scheme secure in the standard model. This scheme, which we refer to as Waters, was originally proposed by Waters [38], although we'll be using the optimizations to this scheme suggested in [30, 17].

4.4 Aggregate Signatures

Aggregate signatures were introduced by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [8]. An aggregate signature is a shorter representation of n signatures provided by different users on different messages. In particular, consider n signatures $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n$ on messages M_1, \dots, M_n issued by n users with public keys pk_1, \dots, pk_n . An aggregate signature scheme provides an aggregation algorithm, which can be run by anyone and outputs a compressed short signature σ on input all σ_i , for $i = 1, \dots, n$. Moreover, there is a verification algorithm that on inputs the signature σ the public keys pk_1, \dots, pk_n and the messages M_1, \dots, M_n decides if σ is a valid aggregate signature. Figure 4.4 reviews the aggregate signatures we consider. Sh scheme [37] requires the existence of a third party named *aggregator* who is responsible of aggregating signatures. LOSSW scheme [25], proved to be secure in the standard model, is a sequential aggregate signature scheme. The aggregate signature must be constructed sequentially, with each signer adding its signature in turn. Figure 10 shows the corresponding batch verifier obtained by using our basic tools. Following the line of Theorem 4.1 it is easy to see that the pairing based equations in Figure 10 are batch verifiers for the corresponding schemes when all aggregate signatures are issued by the same set of users.

| Scheme | Setup Key Generation | Aggregate Signature | Verification |
|--------|---|--|--|
| BGLS | Same as BLS Same as BLS | Let σ_i be a BLS signature on message M_i under private key pk_i $\sigma \leftarrow \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \sigma_i$ | $\mathbf{e}(\sigma, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \mathbf{e}(H(M_i), pk_i)$ |
| Sh | Same as BLS For users and aggregator, same as BLS | Let σ_i be a BLS signature on message M_i under private key pk_i If all BLS signatures are valid, the aggregator use its secret key sk_{ag} to compute $\sigma \leftarrow H(M_1 \dots M_{\ell})^{sk_{ag}} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \sigma_i$ | $\mathbf{e}(\sigma, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(H(M_1, \dots, M_{\ell}), pk_{ag}) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \mathbf{e}(H(M_i), pk_i)$ |
| LOSSW | $(q, g_1, g_2, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \text{PSetup}(1^{\tau})$ $\alpha, y' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $(y_1, \dots, y_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^k$ $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_k)$ $u' \leftarrow g_1^{y'}$ $\hat{u}' \leftarrow g_2^{y'}$ $\forall i = 1, \dots, k,$ $u_i \leftarrow g_1^{y_i}$ $\hat{u}_i \leftarrow g_2^{y_i}$ $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_k,$ $\hat{u}_1, \dots, \hat{u}_k)$ $A \leftarrow \mathbf{e}(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha}$ $sk \leftarrow (\alpha, y', \mathbf{y})$ $pk \leftarrow (A, u', \hat{u}', \mathbf{u})$ | Let $\sigma' = \left(\prod_i^{\ell-1} g_1^{\alpha_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell-1} (u'_i \prod_{t=1}^k u_{i,t}^{m_{i,t}})^{r'} \right),$ $g_1^{r'}$ be an aggregate so far on a set of messages $\{M_1, \dots, M_{\ell-1}\}$ under public keys $\{pk_1, \dots, pk_{\ell-1}\}$. Let M_{ℓ} be the message to sign under public key pk_{ℓ} and corresponding secret key sk_{ℓ} . We denote $pk_i = (A_i, u'_i, \hat{u}'_i, u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,k}, u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,k})$, $sk_i = (\alpha_i, y'_i, y_{i,1}, \dots, y_{i,k})$ and $M_i = m_{i,1}, \dots, m_{i,k}$. $w_1 \leftarrow S'_1 \cdot g_1^{\alpha} \cdot (S'_2)^{(y'_i + \sum_{t=1}^k y_{i,t} \cdot m_{i,t})}$ $w_2 \leftarrow S'_2$ $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $S_1 \leftarrow w_1 (u'_i \prod_{t=1}^k u_{i,t}^{m_{i,t}})^r \prod_{i=1}^t (u'_i \prod_{t=1}^k u_{i,t}^{m_{i,t}})^r$ $S_2 \leftarrow w_2 \cdot g_1^r$ $\sigma = (S_1, S_2)$ | $\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_i \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(S_1, g_2) / \mathbf{e}(S_2, \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (\hat{u}'_i \prod_{t=1}^k u_{i,t}^{m_{i,t}}))$ |

Figure 9: For setup, key generation and signature of BGLS and Sh see Figure 5. We denote by σ an aggregate signature on a set of ℓ messages M_1, \dots, M_{ℓ} . In LOSSW a message M_i is processed as a k -bit string denoted by $m_{i,1}, \dots, m_{i,k}$.

5 Implementation and Performance Analysis

The previous work on batching short signatures [13] considers only asymptotic performance. Unfortunately, this “paper analysis” conceals many details that are revealed only through empirical evaluation. Additionally, the existing work does not address how to handle invalid signatures.

We seek to answer these questions by conducting the first empirical investigation into the feasibility of short signature batching. To conduct our experiments, we built concrete implementations of seven signature schemes described in this work, including two public key signature schemes (BLS, CHP), three Identity-Based Signature schemes (ChCh, Hess, Waters), a ring signature (CYH), and a short group signature scheme (BBS). *For each scheme, we measured the performance of the individual verification algorithm against that of the corresponding batch verifier.* We then turned our attention to the problem of efficiently sorting out invalid signatures.

Experimental Setup. To evaluate our batch verifiers, we implemented each signature scheme in C++ using the MIRACL library for elliptic curve operations [35]. Our timed experiments were

| Scheme | Batch Verification Equation | Techniques |
|--------|--|------------|
| BGLS | $\mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \sigma_j^{\delta_j}, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} H(M_{j,i})^{\delta_j}, pk_i)$ | 2,3 |
| Sh | $\mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \sigma_j^{\delta_j}, g_2) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} H(M_{j,1}, \dots, M_{j,\ell})^{\delta_j}, pk_{ag}) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} H(M_{j,i}), pk_i)$ | 2,3 |
| LOSSW | <p>Let $\sigma_j = (S_{j,1}, S_{j,2})$ and $pk_i = (A_i, u'_i, \hat{u}'_i, u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,k}, u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,k})$</p> <p>If $\eta < \ell \cdot k + 1$, $\mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,1}^{\delta_j}, g_2) \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \mathbf{e}(S_{j,2}^{-\delta_j}, \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (\hat{u}'_i \prod_{t=1}^k u_{i,t}^{m_{j,i,t}})) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_i^{\delta_j}$</p> <p>Otherwise,</p> $\mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,1}^{\delta_j}, g_2) \cdot \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,2}^{-\delta_j}, \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \hat{u}'_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \prod_{t=1}^k \mathbf{e}(\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} S_{j,2}^{-\delta_j m_{j,i,t}}, u_{i,t}) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_i^{\delta_j}$ | 2,3,4 |

Figure 10: Let η be the number of signatures to verify. The vector $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{\eta})$ in \mathbb{Z}_q is required by the small exponents test. In LOSSW a message $M_{j,i}$ provided by pk_i in the j 'th aggregate is processed as a k -bit string denoted by $m_{j,i,1}, \dots, m_{j,i,k}$.

conducted on a 3.0Ghz Pentium D 930 with 4GB of RAM running Linux Kernel 2.6. All hashing was implemented using SHA1,⁴ and small exponents were of size 80 bits. For each scheme, our basic experiment followed the same outline: (1) generate a collection of η distinct signatures on 100-byte random message strings. (2) Conduct a timed verification of this collection using the batch verifier. (3) Repeat steps (1, 2) four times, averaging to obtain a mean timing. To obtain a view of batching efficiency on collections of increasing size, we conducted the preceding test for values of η ranging from 1 to approximately 400 signatures in intervals of 20. Finally, to provide a baseline, we separately measured the performance of the corresponding *non-batched* verification, by verifying 1000 signatures and dividing to obtain the average verification time per signature. A high-level summary of our results is presented in Figure 12.

| Curve | k | $\mathcal{R}(\mathbb{G}_1)$ | $\mathcal{R}(\mathbb{G}_T)$ | \mathcal{S}_{RSA} | Pairing Time |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| MNT160 | 6 | 160 bits | 960 bits | 960 bits | 23.3 ms |
| MNT192 | 6 | 192 bits | 1152 bits | 1152 bits | 33.2 ms |
| SS512 | 2 | 512 bits | 1024 bits | 957 bits | 16.7 ms |

Figure 11: Description of the elliptic curve parameters used in our experiments. $\mathcal{R}(\cdot)$ describes the approximate number of bits to optimally represent a group element. \mathcal{S}_{RSA} is an estimate of “RSA-equivalent” security derived via the approach of Page et al. [31].

Curve Parameters. The selection of elliptic curve parameters impacts both signature size and verification time. The two most important choices are the size of the underlying finite field \mathbb{F}_p , and the curve’s embedding degree k . Due to the MOV attack, security is bounded by the size of the associated finite field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} . Simultaneously, the representation of elements \mathbb{G}_1 requires approximately $|p|$ bits. Thus, most of the literature on short signatures recommends choosing a relatively small

⁴We selected SHA1 because the digest size closely matches the order of \mathbb{G}_1 . One could use other hash functions with a similar digest size, *e.g.*, RIPEMD-160, or truncate the output of a hash function such as SHA-256 or Whirlpool. Because the hashing time is negligible in our experiments, this should not greatly impact our results.

| Scheme | Signature Size (bits) | | | Individual Verification | | | Batched Verification* | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | MNT160 | MNT192 | SS512 | MNT160 | MNT192 | SS512 | MNT160 | MNT192 | SS512 |
| <i>Signatures</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| BLS (single signer) | 160 | 192 | 512 | 47.6 ms | 77.8 ms | 52.3 ms | 2.28 ms | 2.93 ms | 32.42 ms |
| CHP | 160 | 192 | 512 | 73.6 ms | 119.0 ms | 93.0 ms | 26.16 ms | 34.66 ms | 34.50 ms |
| BLS cert + CHP sig | 1280 | 1536 | 1536 | 121.2 ms [†] | 196.8 ms [†] | 145.3 ms [†] | 28.44 ms [†] | 37.59 ms [†] | 66.92 ms [†] |
| <i>Identity-Based Signatures</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| ChCh | 320 | 384 | 1024 | 49.1 ms | 79.7 ms | 73.3 ms | 3.93 ms | 5.24 ms | 59.45 ms |
| Waters | 480 | 576 | 1536 | 91.2 ms | 138.64 ms | 61.1 ms | 9.44 ms | 11.49 ms | 59.32 ms |
| Hess | 1120 | 1344 | 1536 | 49.1 ms | 79.0 ms | 73.1 ms | 6.70 ms | 8.72 ms | 55.94 ms |
| <i>Anonymous Signatures</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| BBS (modified per §4.1) | 2400 | 2880 | 3008 | 139.0 ms | 218.3 ms | 193.0 ms | 24.80 ms | 34.18 ms | 198.03 ms |
| CYH, 2-member ring | 480 | 576 | 1536 | 52.0 ms | 77.0 ms | 113.0 ms | 6.03 ms | 8.30 ms | 105.69 ms |
| CYH, 20-member ring | 3360 | 4032 | 10752 | 86.5 ms | 126.8 ms | 829.3 ms | 43.93 ms | 61.47 ms | 932.66 ms |

*Average time per verification when batching 200 signatures.

[†]Values were derived by manually combining data from BLS and CHP tests.

Figure 12: Summary of experimental results. Timing results indicate verification time *per signature*. With the exception of BLS, our experiments considered signatures generated by distinct signers.

p , and a curve with a high value of k . (For example, an MNT curve with $|p| = 192$ bits and $k = 6$ is thought to offer approximately the same level of security as 1152-bit RSA [31].) The literature on short signatures focuses mainly on signature size rather than verification time, so it is easy to miss the fact that using such high-degree curves *substantially* increases the cost of a pairing operation, and thus verification time. To incorporate these effects into our results, we implemented our schemes using two high-degree ($k = 6$) MNT curves with $|p|$ equal to 160 bits and 192 bits. For completeness, we also considered a $|p|=512$ bit supersingular curve with embedding degree $k = 2$, and a subgroup \mathbb{G}_1 of size 2^{160} . Figure 11 details the curve choices along with relevant details such as pairing time and “RSA-equivalent” security determined using the approach of Page et al. [31].

5.1 Performance Results

Public-Key signatures. Figure 13 presents the results of our timing experiments for the public-key BLS and CHP verifiers. Because the BLS signature does not batch efficiently for messages created by *distinct* signers, we studied the combination suggested in [13], where BLS is used for certificates which are created by a single master authority, and CHP is used to sign the actual messages under users’ individual signing keys. Unfortunately, the CHP batch verifier appears to be quite costly in the recommended MNT curve setting. This outcome stems from the requirement that user public keys be in the \mathbb{G}_2 subgroup. This necessitates expensive point operations in the curve defined over the extension field, which undoes *some* of the advantage gained by batching. However, batching still reduces the per-signature verification cost to as little as 1/3 to 1/4 that of individual verification.

Identity-Based signatures. Figure 14 gives our measurements for three IBS schemes: ChCh, Waters and Hess. (For comparison, we also present CHP signatures with BLS-signed public-key certificates.) In all experiments, we consider signatures generated by different signers. In contrast with regular signatures, the IBSes batch quite efficiently, at least when implemented in MNT curves. The Waters scheme offers strong performance for a scheme not dependent on random oracles.⁵ In our implementation of Waters, we first apply a SHA1 to the message, and use the Waters hash parameter $z = 5$ which divides the resulting 160-bit digest into blocks of 32 bits (as in [30]).

⁵However, it should be noted that Waters has a somewhat loose security reduction, and may therefore require




Figure 13: Public-Key Signature Schemes. Per-signature times were computed by dividing total batch verification time by the number of signatures verified. Note that in the BLS case, all signatures are formulated by the same signer (as for certificate generation), while for CHP each signature was produced by a different signer. Individual verification times are included for comparison.

Anonymous signatures. Figure 15 gives our results for two privacy-preserving signatures: the CYH ring signature and the modified BBS group signature. As is common with ring signatures, in CYH both the signature size and verification time grow linearly with the number of members in the ring. For our experiments we arbitrarily selected two cases: (1) where all signatures are formed under a 2-member ring (useful for applications such as lightweight email signing [1]), and (2) where all signatures are formed using a 20-member ring.⁶ In contrast, both the signature size and verification time of the BBS group signature are independent of the size of the group. This makes group signatures like BBS significantly more practical for applications such as vehicle communication networks, where the number of signers might be quite large.

5.2 Batch Verification and Invalid Signatures

In Section 3.3, we discuss techniques for dealing with invalid signatures. When batch verification fails, this *divide-and-conquer* approach recursively applies the batch verifier to individual halves of the batch, until all invalid signatures have been located. To save time when recursing, we compute products of the form $\prod_{i=1}^{\eta} x_i^{\delta_i}$ so that partial products will be in place for each subset on which we might recurse. We accomplish this by placing each $x_i^{\delta_i}$ at the leaf of a binary tree and caching intermediate products at each level. This requires no additional computation, and total storage of approximately 2η group elements for each product to be computed.

To evaluate the feasibility of this technique, we used it to implement a “resilient” batch verifier for the BLS signature scheme. This verifier accepts as input a collection of signatures where some

larger parameters in order to achieve security comparable to alternative schemes.

⁶Although the CYH batch verifier can easily batch signatures formed over differently-sized rings, our experiments use a constant ring size. Our results are representative of any signature collection where the *mean* ring size is 20.





Figure 14: Identity-Based Signature Schemes. Times represent total batch verification time divided by the number of signatures verified. “CHP+BLS cert” represents the batched public-key alternative using certificates, and is included for comparison.



*Uses a different timescale.

Figure 15: Anonymous Signature Schemes. Times represent total batch verification time divided by the number of signatures verified. For the CYH ring signature, we consider two distinct signature collections, one consisting of 2-member rings, and another with 20-member rings. The BBS signature verification is independent of the group size.

may be invalid, and outputs the index of each invalid signature found. To evaluate batching performance, we first generated a collection of 1024 valid signatures, and then randomly corrupted an r -fraction by replacing them with random group elements. We repeated this experiment for values of r ranging from 0 to 15% of the collection, collecting multiple timings at each point, and averaging to obtain a mean verification time. The results are presented in Figure 16.

Batched verification of BLS signatures is preferable to the naïve individual verification algorithm even as the number of invalid signatures exceeds 10% of the total batch size. The random distribution of invalid signatures within the collection is nearly the worst-case for resilient verification. In practice, invalid signatures might be grouped together within the batch (e.g., if corruption is due to a burst of EM interference). In this case, the verifier might achieve better results by omitting the random shuffle step or using another re-ordering technique.

6 Conclusion

Our experiments provide strong evidence that batching short signatures is practical, even in a setting where an adversary can inject invalid signatures. Our results apply to standard and Identity-Based signatures, as well as to the more exotic short ring and group signatures which are increasingly being considered for privacy-critical applications. At a deeper level, our results indicate that ef-




Figure 16: BLS batch verification in the presence of invalid signatures (160-bit MNT curve). A “resilient” BLS batch verifier was applied to a collection of 1024 purported BLS signatures, where some percentage were randomly corrupted. Per-signature times were computed by dividing the total verification time (including identification of invalid signatures) by the total number of signatures (1024), and averaging over multiple experimental runs.

efficient batching depends heavily on the underlying design of a signature scheme, particularly on the placement of elements within the elliptic curve subgroups. For example, the CHP signature and the ChCh IBS have comparable size and security, yet the latter scheme can batch more than 250 signatures per second (each from a different signer), while our CHP implementation clocks in at fewer than 40. We believe that scheme designers should take these considerations into account when proposing new pairing-based signature schemes.

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A Proof of the Small Exponents Test

Proof. It is easy to see that if $A = Y^{(j)}$ holds for all $j \in [1, \eta]$, then $\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} A^{\delta_j} = \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} Y^{(j)\delta_j}$ holds for any random vector $\Delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_\eta)$. We must now show the other direction, that if **Batch** outputs *accept*, then $A = Y^{(j)}$ holds for all $j \in [1, \eta]$ except with probability at most $2^{-\ell_b}$. Since A and $Y^{(j)}$ are in \mathbb{G}_T , we can write $A = \mathbf{e}(g, g)^a$ and $Y^{(j)} = \mathbf{e}(g, g)^{y^{(j)}}$ for some $a, y^{(j)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. The batch verification equation can then be written as $\prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \mathbf{e}(g, g)^a = \prod_{j=1}^{\eta} \mathbf{e}(g, g)^{y^{(j)}} \Rightarrow \mathbf{e}(g, g)^{\sum_{j=1}^{\eta} a} = \mathbf{e}(g, g)^{\sum_{j=1}^{\eta} y^{(j)}}$. Now define $\beta_j = a - y^{(j)}$. Since **Batch** accepts it must be true that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{\eta} \beta_j \delta_j \equiv 0 \pmod{q} \quad (4)$$

Now assume that at least one of the individual equations do not hold. We assume without loss of generality that this is true for equation $j = 1$. This means that $\beta_1 \neq 0$. Since q is a prime then β_1 has an inverse γ_1 such that $\beta_1 \gamma_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$. This and Equation 4 gives us

$$\delta_1 \equiv -\gamma_1 \sum_{j=2}^{\eta} \delta_j \beta_j \pmod{q} \quad (5)$$

Let event E occurs if $A \neq Y^{(1)}$, but **Batch** accepts. Note that we do not make any assumptions about the remaining values. Let $\Delta' = \delta_2, \dots, \delta_\eta$ denote the last $\eta - 1$ values of Δ and let $|\Delta'|$ be the number of possible values for this vector. Equation 5 says that given a fixed vector Δ' there is exactly one value of δ_1 that will make event E happen, or in other words that the probability of E given a randomly chosen δ_1 is $\Pr[E|\Delta'] = 2^{-\ell_b}$. So if we pick δ_1 at random and sum over all possible choices of Δ' we get $\Pr[E] \leq \sum_{i=1}^{|\Delta'|} (\Pr[E|\Delta'] \cdot \Pr[\Delta'])$. Plugging in the values, we get: $\Pr[E] \leq \sum_{i=1}^{2^{\ell_b(\eta-1)}} (2^{-\ell_b} \cdot 2^{-\ell_b(\eta-1)}) = 2^{-\ell_b}$. \square