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Paper 2007/415

Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.'s ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Meng-Hui Lim and Sanggon Lee and Hoonjae Lee

Abstract

A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. In 2007, Oh et al. proposed an efficient ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol on elliptic curve pairings, which is believed to be able to generate two session keys securely after a protocol execution. However, we discover that their protocol is in fact susceptible to the basic impersonation attack as well as the key compromise impersonation attack. In this paper, we present the imperfections of Oh et al.'s scheme and subsequently we suggest a slight modification to the scheme which would resolve the problems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
CryptanalysisImpersonation AttackKey Agreement Protocol
Contact author(s)
meng17121983 @ yahoo com
History
2007-11-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/415
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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