Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/169

Simplified pairing computation and security implications

Steven D. Galbraith and Colm O hEigeartaigh and Caroline Sheedy

Abstract: Recent progress on pairing implementation has made certain pairings extremely simple and fast to compute. Hence, it is natural to examine if there are consequences for the security of pairing-based cryptography.

This paper gives a method to compute eta pairings in a way which avoids the requirement for a final exponentiation. The method does not lead to any improvement in the speed of pairing implementation. However, it seems appropriate to re-evaluate the security of pairing based cryptography in light of these new ideas. A multivariate attack on the pairing inversion problem is proposed and analysed. Our findings support the belief that pairing inversion is a hard computational problem.

Category / Keywords: foundations / pairings

Date: received 15 May 2006

Contact author: coheig at gmail com

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Version: 20060516:193252 (All versions of this report)

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