Paper 2001/035
Forward security in private key cryptography
Mihir Bellare and Bennet Yee
Abstract
The damage caused by key-exposure can be mitigated by employing forward-security. This has been common practice in the design of pseudorandom number generators. The motivation of this paper is to return to this basic practice and provide a rigorous analysis of it, including definitions, constructions and proofs in the style of reduction-based modern cryptography. We then broaden the investigation to look at forward-security in the more general context of symmetric-key cryptography, namely for primitives like symmetric encryption or message authentication codes. We apply this to the problem of maintaining secure access logs in the presence of breakins.
Note: Earlier titled ``Design and application of pseudorandom number generators with forward security.'' The first version of this paper dates to 1998.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- pseudorandom number generatorsforward securityaudit logs
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2002-11-18: last of 5 revisions
- 2001-05-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/035
- License
-
CC BY