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Paper 2001/035

Forward security in private key cryptography

Mihir Bellare and Bennet Yee

Abstract

The damage caused by key-exposure can be mitigated by employing forward-security. This has been common practice in the design of pseudorandom number generators. The motivation of this paper is to return to this basic practice and provide a rigorous analysis of it, including definitions, constructions and proofs in the style of reduction-based modern cryptography. We then broaden the investigation to look at forward-security in the more general context of symmetric-key cryptography, namely for primitives like symmetric encryption or message authentication codes. We apply this to the problem of maintaining secure access logs in the presence of breakins.

Note: Earlier titled ``Design and application of pseudorandom number generators with forward security.'' The first version of this paper dates to 1998.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
pseudorandom number generatorsforward securityaudit logs
Contact author(s)
mihir @ cs ucsd edu
History
2002-11-18: last of 5 revisions
2001-05-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/035
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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