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    <title>2006 Reports</title>
    <link>http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/list.php?6</link>
    <description><![CDATA[Discussion forum for Cryptology ePrint Archive reports posted in 2006.
Please put the report number in the subject.

]]></description>
    <language>EN</language>
    <pubDate>Wed, 20 Oct 2010 01:25:56 -0600</pubDate>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 20 Oct 2010 01:25:56 -0600</lastBuildDate>
    <category>2006 Reports</category>
    <generator>Phorum 5.1.22</generator>
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    <item>
      <title>MAC Reforgeability discussion</title>
      <link>http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,304,304#msg-304</link>
      <author>mahaju</author>
      <description><![CDATA[Hello
I am a new graduate student enrolled in Chosun University, Gwangju, South Korea and I need to understand the concepts in the paper MAC Reforgeability by John Black and Martin Cochran

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/095

http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/095

I an new to cryptology and to this forum. If anyone has any ideas about this paper, please share them with me.

I will greatly appreciate your help.

Thank you.]]></description>
      <category>2006 Reports</category>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,304,304#msg-304</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Oct 2010 01:25:56 -0600</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Adversary with large min-entropy</title>
      <link>http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,19,197#msg-197</link>
      <author>Jonybhai</author>
      <description><![CDATA[for a given subset choose high-entropy components. small. large  against an adversary with qubits. sampling preserves smooth min-entropy rate (They are also large [and] expensive to maintain But they are sufficiently pervasive that  If adversary forwards P, then user is signing using his “real” secret key  This approach works even when residual min-entropy is small 

Thanks]]></description>
      <category>2006 Reports</category>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,19,197#msg-197</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2009 10:59:26 -0700</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>2006/468</title>
      <link>http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,82,82#msg-82</link>
      <author>Skeptic</author>
      <description><![CDATA[The subject and the methods introduce in the article are of high interest. I'm still currently working on it and I have a question about the perturbation polynomial. 

1) Perturbation polynomial :

The construction implies the use of a multivariate polynomial. However in the AES system (part S), the equations for one round are multivariate but with univariate monomials. So if some multivariate monomials are used in the construction of Qf (as stated in the previous article[5]), the equation implied by Qf are founded by inspection,ie the permutation pi_1 of M_1 is ineffective. Or do I miss something?]]></description>
      <category>2006 Reports</category>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,82,82#msg-82</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2009 07:57:46 -0600</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Adversary with large min-entropy</title>
      <link>http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,19,19#msg-19</link>
      <author>evdoks</author>
      <description><![CDATA[Could someone clarify what does it mean when the adversary described in definition 3.1 generates challenge messages with large min-entropy? Can we say that in such a way we try to model a &quot;stupid&quot; adversary?

Best regards,
Sergei Evdokimov]]></description>
      <category>2006 Reports</category>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?6,19,19#msg-19</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Sep 2007 11:27:13 -0600</pubDate>
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