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2000/394 Garay and Ostrovsky technical report on "almost everywhere secure computation"
Posted by: cryptography (IP Logged)
Date: 26 October 2007 15:17

Hi, I just happened to look at your report on almost everywhere secure computation on ePrint. Interesting, work...

(1) I looked at your remarks about simulation based definition and KKMO definition and I think you are not understanding that a simulator is just an "abstract mental construct" which does not have to be possessed by the adversary or for the adversary to be even aware that such a simulator at all exists.

It is just a way (or can be a way) of proving/bounding the amount of knowledge/information that an adversary learns about the inputs/outputs of other parties but other then that it is "hypothetical mental construct". Your problem seems to be arising from the fact that you are seeing "simulator" as a tangible entity - who is provided inputs from somewhere and who is providing outputs to someone. This is not the case!! There is no simulator out there that is working and producing results - just like there is no ideal case. Its just a way of modelling and proving certain properties of MPC protocols.

Remember when you show that there exists a simulator (which is given inputs/outputs etc. etc.) by which the entire logs of the adversary could be created, then the claim is that adversary has this much knowledge /information about the I/O of some parties - which essentially conveys that adversary has learnt not one more bit of information about the inputs and outputs of the parties then this! Thats it.

Its only a way of proving things - that you have to understand [Don't always start looking out for a real simulator which is given inputs about different variables and parties on the network!]

My students also initially faced some difficulties in understanding this at first - but now they are understanding that a simulator is just an "abstract mental construct".

(2) I find it a little funny that you like to claim that you understand the definitions of your co-author. The previous version that you sent to ICALP - without the permission of your third co-author - and without infact the approval of the third co-author - to send a paper with his name on it [And he has logs of these emails] you mention that you do not understand those definitions [namely you mention that they are too complex], then he sent some draft to Canetti who seem told you inputs are not handled satisfactorially - it seems that too was fixed by the fellow in the new version and in a still new version Canetti seems to have given you an example - but as I tell you - the problem is in your misunderstanding the whole "simulation" thing for which you actually go out looking for real inputs from real life!

3) all your faulty claims about the contributions in technical report on "secure computation on incomplete networks" have been addressed in the recent version of the report posted on ePrint Archive.

4) Lastly, you also seem to mention you presented the work of the third author at several rump sessions at TCC'07 etc. You do not even understand his work - how did you present his work to these conferences? Your actions seem to be in the same "subterfuginous" manner as before where you do not take any approval about submitting something to a conference without the permission or approval of your co-author..?

Your actions have no integrity or professional of any kind?

5) Lastly, writting a dozen papers on a topic or even hundred does not help or even understand a topic necessarily. How else would Ran Canetti, you both be making such remarks about the definitions of the other paper?

cheers,
Cryptographer

Re: 2000/394 Garay and Ostrovsky technical report on "almost everywhere secure computation"
Posted by: cryptography (IP Logged)
Date: 26 October 2007 15:19

Also, check the recent versions of the technical report on "Secure computation on incomplete networks"

Which has elaborate explainations and enhanced acknowledgements on your reports.


cheers,
cryptographer.



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