Paper 2026/1094

Asymmetric Message Franking in the Plain Model: Generic and Efficient Constructions

Milan Gonzalez-Thauvin, ETH Zurich
Keitaro Hashimoto, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Abstract

Asymmetric Message Franking (AMF), proposed by Tyagi et al. at Crypto’19, is a sort of signature scheme that aims to provide privacy-preserving content moderation in secure messaging applications. In this work, we present the first generic construction of AMF using a public-key encryption scheme, a signature scheme, and a ZAP proof system for NP languages. This construction yields the first AMF scheme provably secure in the plain model from standard assumptions, and has tight security. To improve the efficiency of AMF in the plain model, we build a concrete scheme from asymmetric pairing groups based on our idea for the generic construction. It achieves a signature size of 47 group elements, which is significantly smaller than an instantiation of the generic construction. Also, we provide a variant of the generic construction that yields a post-quantum secure AMF scheme in the plain model from a polynomially hard LWE assumption, demonstrating its feasibility.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2026
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-35428-0_13
Keywords
Asymmetric Message FrankingSecure MessagingGeneric ConstructionPlain Model
Contact author(s)
milan gonzalez-thauvin @ inf ethz ch
keitaro hashimoto @ aist go jp
History
2026-08-12: revised
2026-05-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1094
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1094,
      author = {Milan Gonzalez-Thauvin and Keitaro Hashimoto},
      title = {Asymmetric Message Franking in the Plain Model: Generic and Efficient Constructions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1094},
      year = {2026},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-032-35428-0_13},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1094}
}
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