Paper 2024/473
Extremely Simple (Almost) Fail-Stop ECDSA Signatures
, BitFashionedAbstract
Fail-stop signatures are digital signatures that allow a signer to prove that a specific forged signature is indeed a forgery. After such a proof is published, the system can be stopped. We introduce a new simple ECDSA fail-stop signature scheme. Our proposal is based on the minimal assumption that an adversary with a quantum computer is not able to break the (second) preimage resistance of a cryptographically-secure hash function. Our scheme is as efficient as traditional ECDSA, does not limit the number of signatures that a signer can produce, and relies on minimal security assumptions. Using our construction, the signer has minimal computational overhead in the signature producing phase and produces a signature indistinguishable from a 'regular' ECDSA signature.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- ECDSAfail-stop signaturesquantum fallbacks
- Contact author(s)
- mario @ bitfashioned com
- History
- 2024-03-25: revised
- 2024-03-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/473
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/473,
author = {Mario Yaksetig},
title = {Extremely Simple (Almost) Fail-Stop ECDSA Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/473},
year = {2024},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/473}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/473}
}
