Paper 2024/1216

Delegatable Anonymous Credentials From Mercurial Signatures With Stronger Privacy

Scott Griffy, Brown University
Anna Lysyanskaya, Brown University
Omid Mir, Austrian Institute of Technology
Octavio Perez Kempner, NTT Social Informatics Laboratories
Daniel Slamanig, Universität der Bundeswehr München
Abstract

Delegatable anonymous credentials (DACs) enable a root issuer to delegate credential-issuing power, allowing a delegatee to take a delegator role. To preserve privacy, credential recipients and verifiers should not learn anything about intermediate issuers in the delegation chain. One particularly efficient approach to constructing DACs is due to Crites and Lysyanskaya (CT-RSA '19). In contrast to previous approaches, it is based on mercurial signatures (a type of equivalence-class signature), offering a conceptually simple design that does not require extensive use of zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, current constructions of ``CL-type'' DACs only offer a weak form of privacy-preserving delegation: if an adversarial issuer (even an honest-but-curious one) is part of a user's delegation chain, they can detect when the user shows its credential. This is because the underlying mercurial signature schemes allows a signer to identify his public key in a delegation chain. We propose CL-type DACs that overcome the above limitation based on a new mercurial signature scheme that provides adversarial public key class hiding which ensures that adversarial signers who participate in a user's delegation chain cannot exploit that fact to trace users. We achieve this introducing structured public parameters for each delegation level. Since the related setup produces critical trapdoors, we discuss techniques from updatable structured reference strings in zero-knowledge proof systems (Groth et al. CRYPTO '18) to guarantee the required privacy needs. In addition, we propose a simple way to realize revocation for CL-type DACs via the concept of revocation tokens. While we showcase this approach to revocation using our DAC scheme, it is generic and can be applied to any CL-type DAC system. Revocation is a vital feature that is largely unexplored and notoriously hard to achieve for DACs, thus providing revocation can help to make DAC schemes more attractive in practical applications.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2024
Keywords
Anonymous credentialsdelegatable anonymous credentialsmercurial signaturesrevocationsignature schemes
Contact author(s)
scott_griffy @ brown edu
anna_lysyanskaya @ brown edu
omid mir @ ait ac at
octavio perezkempner @ ntt com
daniel slamanig @ unibw de
History
2024-10-14: revised
2024-07-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1216
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1216,
      author = {Scott Griffy and Anna Lysyanskaya and Omid Mir and Octavio Perez Kempner and Daniel Slamanig},
      title = {Delegatable Anonymous Credentials From Mercurial Signatures With Stronger Privacy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1216},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1216}
}
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