Paper 2020/1084
Fully Collision-Resistant Chameleon-Hashes from Simpler and Post-Quantum Assumptions
David Derler, Stephan Krenn, Kai Samelin, and Daniel Slamanig
Abstract
Chameleon-hashes are collision-resistant hash-functions parametrized by a public key. If the corresponding secret key is known, arbitrary collisions for the hash can be found. Recently, Derler et al. (PKC '20) introduced the notion of fully collision-resistant chameleon-hashes. Full collision-resistance requires the intractability of finding collisions, even with full-adaptive access to a collision-finding oracle. Their construction combines simulation-sound extractable (SSE) NIZKs with perfectly correct IND-CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes. We show that, instead of perfectly correct PKE, non-interactive commitment schemes are sufficient. For the first time, this gives rise to efficient instantiations from plausible post-quantum assumptions and thus candidates of chameleon-hashes with strong collision-resistance guarantees and long-term security guarantees. On the more theoretical side, our results relax the requirement to not being dependent on public-key encryption.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. SCN 2020
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_21
- Keywords
- Chameleon-hash
- Contact author(s)
-
david @ dfinity org
stephan krenn @ ait ac at
kaispapers @ gmail com
daniel slamanig @ ait ac at - History
- 2020-09-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1084
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1084, author = {David Derler and Stephan Krenn and Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig}, title = {Fully Collision-Resistant Chameleon-Hashes from Simpler and Post-Quantum Assumptions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1084}, year = {2020}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_21}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1084} }