Paper 2019/444

Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Gildas Avoine, Sébastien Canard, and Loïc Ferreira

Abstract

Key exchange protocols in the asymmetric-key setting are known to provide stronger security properties than protocols in symmetric-key cryptography. In particular, they can provide perfect forward secrecy, as illustrated by key exchange protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. However public-key algorithms are too heavy for low-resource devices, which can then not benefit from forward secrecy. In this paper, we describe a scheme that solves this issue. Using a nifty resynchronisation technique, we propose an authenticated key exchange protocol in the symmetric-key setting that guarantees perfect forward secrecy. We prove that the protocol is sound, and provide a formal security proof.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Authenticated key agreementSymmetric-key cryptographyPerfect forward secrecyKey-evolving
Contact author(s)
loic ferreira @ orange com
History
2019-06-26: revised
2019-05-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/444
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/444,
      author = {Gildas Avoine and Sébastien Canard and Loïc Ferreira},
      title = {Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/444},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/444}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/444}
}
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