Paper 2019/410

Policy-Based Sanitizable Signatures

Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig

Abstract

Sanitizable signatures are a variant of signatures which allow a single, and signer-defined, sanitizer to modify signed messages in a controlled way without invalidating the respective signature. They turned out to be a versatile primitive, proven by different variants and extensions, e.g., allowing multiple sanitizers or adding new sanitizers one-by-one. However, existing constructions are very restricted regarding their flexibility in specifying potential sanitizers. We propose a different and more powerful approach: Instead of using sanitizers' public keys directly, we assign attributes to them. Sanitizing is then based on policies, i.e., access structures defined over attributes. A sanitizer can sanitize, if, and only if, it holds a secret key to attributes satisfying the policy associated to a signature, while offering full-scale accountability.

Note: This updated version fixes some minor typos, fixes a problem with the relation R to provably achieve signer-accountability and strengthens the proof-soundness property.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. CT-RSA 2020
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-40186-3_23
Keywords
Sanitizable SignaturesChameleon-HashesDigital Signatures
Contact author(s)
kaispapers @ gmail com
daniel slamanig @ ait ac at
History
2020-08-10: last of 3 revisions
2019-04-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/410
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/410,
      author = {Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig},
      title = {Policy-Based Sanitizable Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/410},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-40186-3_23},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/410}
}
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