Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-checking

S.  Dov Gordon; Samuel Ranellucci; Xiao Wang

Paper 2018/216

Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-checking

S. Dov Gordon, Samuel Ranellucci, and Xiao Wang

Abstract

We construct new four-party protocols for secure computation that are secure against a single malicious corruption. Our protocols can perform computations over a binary ring, and require sending just 1.5 ring elements per party, per gate. In the special case of Boolean circuits, this amounts to sending 1.5 bits per party, per gate. One of our protocols is robust, yet requires almost no additional communication. Our key technique can be viewed as a variant of the “dual execution” approach, but, because we rely on four parties instead of two, we can avoid any leakage, achieving the standard notion of security.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: malicious security robustness
Contact author(s): gordon @ gmu edu
History: 2018-02-26: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/216
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/216,
      author = {S.  Dov Gordon and Samuel Ranellucci and Xiao Wang},
      title = {Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-checking},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/216},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/216}
}