Paper 2018/066
Tweaking Generic OTR to Avoid Forgery Attacks
Hassan Qahur Al Mahri, Leonie Simpson, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson, and Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong
Abstract
This paper considers the security of the Offset Two-Round (OTR) authenticated encryption mode \cite{cryptoeprint:2013:628} with respect to forgery attacks. The current version of OTR gives a security proof for specific choices of the block size
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. International Conference on Applications and Techniques in Information Security, ATIS 2016
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-981-10-2741-3_4
- Keywords
- Authenticated encryptionOTRconfidentialityintegrityforgery attacktweakable block ciphersymmetric encryptionAEAD
- Contact author(s)
- hassan mahri @ hdr qut edu au
- History
- 2018-01-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/066
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/066, author = {Hassan Qahur Al Mahri and Leonie Simpson and Harry Bartlett and Ed Dawson and Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong}, title = {Tweaking Generic {OTR} to Avoid Forgery Attacks}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/066}, year = {2018}, doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-2741-3_4}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/066} }