Paper 2018/017
Verifiability of Helios Mixnet
Ben Smyth
Abstract
We study game-based definitions of individual and universal verifiability by Smyth, Frink & Clarkson. We prove that building voting systems from El Gamal coupled with proofs of correct key generation suffices for individual verifiability. We also prove that it suffices for an aspect of universal verifiability. Thereby eliminating the expense of individual-verifiability proofs and simplifying universal-verifiability proofs for a class of encryption-based voting systems. We use the definitions of individual and universal verifiability to analyse the mixnet variant of Helios. Our analysis reveals that universal verifiability is not satisfied by implementations using the weak Fiat-Shamir transformation. Moreover, we prove that individual and universal verifiability are satisfied when statements are included in hashes (i.e., when using the Fiat-Shamir transformation, rather than the weak Fiat-Shamir transformation).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Voting'18: 3rd Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting
- Keywords
- election schemesverifiability
- Contact author(s)
- research @ bensmyth com
- History
- 2018-08-31: last of 4 revisions
- 2018-01-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/017
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/017,
author = {Ben Smyth},
title = {Verifiability of Helios Mixnet},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/017},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/017}
}
