Paper 2017/967
Anonymous IBE, Leakage Resilience and Circular Security from New Assumptions
Zvika Brakerski, Alex Lombardi, Gil Segev, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Abstract
In anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE), ciphertexts not only hide their corresponding messages, but also their target identity. We construct an anonymous IBE scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in general groups (and thus, as a special case, based on the hardness of factoring Blum integers).
Our approach extends and refines the recent tree-based approach of Cho et al. (CRYPTO '17) and Döttling and Garg (CRYPTO '17). Whereas the tools underlying their approach do not seem to provide any form of anonymity, we introduce two new building blocks which we utilize for achieving anonymity: blind garbled circuits (which we construct based on any one-way function), and blind batch encryption (which we construct based on CDH).
We then further demonstrate the applicability of our newly-developed tools by showing that batch encryption implies a public-key encryption scheme that is both resilient to leakage of a
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- identity-based encryptionanonymityleakage resiliencecircular security
- Contact author(s)
- alexjl @ mit edu
- History
- 2017-10-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/967
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/967, author = {Zvika Brakerski and Alex Lombardi and Gil Segev and Vinod Vaikuntanathan}, title = {Anonymous {IBE}, Leakage Resilience and Circular Security from New Assumptions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/967}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/967} }