Paper 2017/926
How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party
Daniel Genkin, Yual Ishai, and Mor Weiss
Abstract
Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage?
Our goal is to design a hardware device
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2017
- Keywords
- Leakage-ResilienceSecure Multiparty ComputationAlgebraic Manipulation DetectionAMD Circuits
- Contact author(s)
- mormorweiss @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-12-04: last of 3 revisions
- 2017-09-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/926
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/926, author = {Daniel Genkin and Yual Ishai and Mor Weiss}, title = {How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/926}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/926} }