On the security of a Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing

Arinjita Paul; S. Sharmila Deva Selvi; C.  Pandu Rangan

Paper 2017/867

On the security of a Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing

Arinjita Paul, S. Sharmila Deva Selvi, and C. Pandu Rangan

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss to provide delegation of decryption rights. A semi-trusted proxy agent re-encrypts ciphertexts under the public key of Alice into ciphertexts under the public key of Bob, without learning anything about the underlying message. In IWSEC 2017, Kuchta et al. presented a pairing-free certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme, and claimed that their scheme is the first to provide the certificateless property without resorting to pairing. They proved their construction is CCA-secure in the random oracle model, under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this work, we show that the recently proposed construction of Kuchta et al. is vulnerable to several attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Proxy Re-Encryption Pairing-free Public Key Conditional Unidirectional.
Contact author(s): arinjita paul @ gmail com
History: 2019-11-22: revised; 2017-09-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/867
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/867,
      author = {Arinjita Paul and S. Sharmila Deva Selvi and C.  Pandu Rangan},
      title = {On the security of a Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/867},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/867}
}