Paper 2017/866

Enhanced Modelling of Authenticated Key Exchange Security

Papa B. Seye and Augustin P. Sarr

Abstract

The security models for Authenticated Key Exchange do not consider leakages on pre–computed ephemeral data before their use in sessions. We investigate the consequences of such leakages and point out damaging consequences. As an illustration, we show the HMQV–C protocol vulnerable to a Bilateral Unknown Key Share (BUKS) and an Unilateral Unknown Key Share (UUKS) Attack, when precomputed ephemeral public keys are leaked. We point out some shades in the seCK model in multi–certification authorities setting. We propose an enhancement of the seCK model, which uses a liberal instantiation of the certification systems model from the ASICS framework, and allows reveal queries on precomputed ephemeral (public and private) keys. We propose a new protocol, termed eFHMQV, which in addition to provide the same efficiency as MQV, is particularly suited for implementations wherein a trusted device is used together with untrusted host machine. In such settings, the non–idle time computational effort of the device safely reduces to one digest computation, one integer multiplication, and one integer addition. The eFHMQV protocol meets our security definition, under the Random Oracle Model and the Gap Diffie–Hellman assumption.