Paper 2017/831
Security Proof of JAMBU under Nonce Respecting and Nonce Misuse Cases
Geng Wang, Haiyang Zhang, and Fengmei Liu
Abstract
JAMBU is an AEAD mode of operation which entered the third round of CAESAR competition. However, it does not have a security proof like other modes of operation do, and there was a cryptanalysis result that has overthrown the security claim under nonce misuse case by the designers. In this paper, we complement the shortage of the scheme by giving security proofs of JAMBU both under nonce respecting case and nonce misuse case. We prove that JAMBU under nonce respecting case has a slightly lower security than the birthday bound of $n$ bits, and JAMBU under nonce misuse case has a tight security bound of $n/2$ bits.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- JAMBUCAESAR CompetitionProvable SecurityNonce-Misuse Resistance
- Contact author(s)
- cnpkw @ 126 com
- History
- 2018-03-22: revised
- 2017-08-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/831
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/831,
author = {Geng Wang and Haiyang Zhang and Fengmei Liu},
title = {Security Proof of {JAMBU} under Nonce Respecting and Nonce Misuse Cases},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/831},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/831}
}
